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1 
Introduction 
This introductory chapter starts with a description of psychodiagnostics and the errors 
that are often made in psychodiagnostic decision making. Next, we consider the 
"diagnostic cycle", a normative model of the psychodiagnostic process that consists 
of several steps. The aims of this study, discussed subsequently, concern the 
successive substeps "classification of problem behavior" and "hypothesis-generation". 
In this context we then discuss some aspects with regard to classification and 
psychodiagnostic hypotheses. The chapter finishes with an outline of the thesis. 
Psychodiagnostics is concerned with the explanation of problem behavior with a view 
to treatment recommendation. In the field of developmental psychopathology a 
diagnostician usually tries to find an answer to the following questions: 
- What's the matter with this child? 
- What conditions have caused, triggered, and maintain the problems? 
- What can best be done to reduce or remedy the problems of this child, and/or to 
prevent future problems? 
- Does the treatment have the intended effect? 
Nowadays, psychodiagnostics is considered by many as a process of judgement 
and decision making (e.g., Westmeyer, 1972; Woody, 1980). In addition, it is 
recognized that psychodiagnostic judgement and decision making is rather complex 
(e.g., Achenbach, 1985; Arkes, 1981; De Bruyn, 1992). The decision process 
concerns, for instance, multiple steps, and each decision has consequences for future 
steps; the decisions require the integration of a lot of information; the information 
is nonetheless often incomplete; information and statements are probabilistic and 
often difficult to quantify; and the set of alternative options, such as explanatory 
hypotheses and treatments, is usually not completely known. Especially with complex 
and ill-defined decision problems, cognitive and social limitations can be of 
overriding importance (Vlek, 1990). 
The term psychodiagnostics is closely related to clinical assessment (Woody, 
1980) and diagnostic work-up (Achenbach, 1985). In this thesis we use the terms 
interchangeably. Apart from diagnostician, we use the broader concepts of clinician 
and mental health practitioner. The related concepts of judgement and decision 
making are also used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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1.1 Liabilities of clinical decision making 
Research has frequently shown that the quality of psychodiagnostic activities leaves 
much to be desired (e.g., Carroll, 1987; Nezu & Nezu, 1993). The reasoning of the 
diagnostic decision maker is considered to be a major source of error. Although 
diagnosticians usually have good faith in the quality of their performances, it has 
been demonstrated that clinical judgements are often distorted, that is, different from 
what could be expected on rational grounds (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; 
Westenberg & Koele, 1993). Starting with Meehl's (1954) classic monograph on 
clinical versus statistical prediction, it has been shown convincingly that a simple 
statistical formula provides more accurate and consistent predictions than the clinician 
does (see Westenberg & Koele, 1993, for an overview). Subsequent research also 
showed limitations of clinical judgement outside of prediction tasks. Examples of 
frequent errors and biases,1 often related, are presented below. 
Belief perseverance. Clinicians have a tendency to adhere to a preconceived attitude 
or belief in the face of evidence that ought, rationally, to weaken or even reverse the 
belief (Elstein & Bordage, 1988; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 
1986). In addition, Elstein, Shulman & Sprafka (1978) found that the most common 
error in medical cue interpretation is to assign positive (confirmatory) weights to 
non-contributory findings rather than creating new hypotheses or remembering the 
new information separately, an error they called overinterpretation. 
Primacy effect. The first information clinicians receive has more influence on their 
final judgement than information presented later. This is not solely caused by 
attention decrement but can be interpreted as occurring because early-formed 
impressions predominate over the implications of later information (Arkes, 1981; 
Elstein & Bordage, 1988; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Westenberg & Koele, 1993). 
Confirmation bias. In hypothesis testing, clinicians have a fundamental tendency to 
seek information consistent with their current hypothesis and to avoid the collection 
of potentially falsifying evidence (Arkes, 1981; Elstein, 1988; Nurcombe & 
Gallagher, 1986; Westenberg & Koele, 1993). This bias can lead to erroneous 
acceptance of hypotheses (Achenbach, 1985). 
Overconfidence in positive test results. A common error in probability revision is 
clinicians' tendency to overestimate the chance that a hypothesis (e.g., a certain 
disorder) is correct, given a positive test result. Such overestimation displays neglect 
of Bayes' theorem. Specifically, base rates are often neglected, and the predictive 
1 A bias is understood to mean "a source of error which is systematic rather than random, 
and consists of either failure to take account of a normativcly relevant feature or else a 
tendency to respond to a normatively irrelevant feature" (Evans, 1983, p. 462). 
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value of a positive test is frequently confused with test sensitivity (Einhorn, 1988; 
Elstein, 1988; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 1986; Westenberg & Koele, 1993).2 
Excessive data collection. Clinicians collect more data than are needed, apparently 
because (a) clinicians are often unaware of redundancies, and (b) more data increase 
the confidence clinicians have in their judgement (Elstein, 1988; Elstein & Bordage, 
1988). 
Search for the exotic. Elstein (1988) concluded that (medical) clinicians often search 
for exotic diseases and conditions at the expense of more probable ones. One 
mechanism underlying this phenomenon is that small probabilities tend to be 
overestimated. 
Premature closure. The primacy and belief perseverance biases among other things, 
can contribute to premature closure of the set of hypotheses, with the result that the 
correct hypothesis is not considered (Elstein, 1988; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 1986; 
Westenberg & Koele, 1993). 
Illusory correlation. Clinicians may have preconceived assumptions as a result of 
which they infer correlations between attributes that are not in fact correlated 
(Achenbach, 1985; Arkes, 1981; Chapman & Chapman, 1967; Westenberg & Koele, 
1993). 
Overconfìdence in own capability. Clinicians consistently overestimate the quality of 
their judgements (e.g., classifications, base rate estimates, treatment success) (Arkes, 
1981; Elstein, 1988; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 1986; Westenberg & Koele, 1993). 
Oskamp (1965) showed that providing a clinician with more information increases 
the clinician's confidence in personality judgement without necessarily increasing the 
accuracy of the judgement (which quickly reaches a ceiling). As was stated before, 
premature commitment to a hypothesis and disregard of disconfirmatory information 
is a source of overconfìdence in a hypothesis. With regard to treatment, improvement 
of a client's condition is usually attributed to the treatment given, neglecting possible 
placebo effects (Arkes, 1981; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 1986) and regression effects. 
A client's poor therapy success, on the other hand, is often attributed to external 
factors, such as a personality characteristic of the client or bad luck (Elstein, 1988; 
Jordan, Harvey & Weary, 1988). Related to overconfìdence is the hindsight bias. 
Outcomes (e.g., of therapy, of prediction about suicide) often seem in retrospect to 
have been almost inevitable (Arkes, 1981; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nurcombe & 
Gallagher, 1986; Westenberg & Koele, 1993). 
2 The base rate is the a priori chance that the hypothesis is correct, P(H*); The predictive 
value of a positive test is P(H* | D+) and can be computed by means of Bayes' theorem: 
P(H+1 D+) = P(D+1H+) · P(H+) / P(D+); Test sensitivity refers to the test's accuracy in 
identifying people who have the disorder, or P(D+1H*) = P(D+ & Ы) / Р(ІГ). 
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Framing effect. The phenomenon of framing effect is a recurrent issue in this thesis. 
Framing refers to the structuring of the choice problem in a certain manner. In many 
studies (see, for example, Slovic, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1988; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981) it has been shown that decisions are influenced by the way in 
which the choice situation is structured. A different structuring of the same choice 
situation can lead to a change in the preference order of the options, which is 
inconsistent with the notion of rational choice. For example, it has been shown in 
general that if options are presented as losses, risks are taken, but if options are 
depicted as gains, people play it safe (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). In 
medicine, the attractiveness of alternative therapeutic treatments can be influenced 
by the way in which they are worded (Elstein, 1988; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 1986). 
McNeil, Pauker, Sox and Tversky (1982), for instance, asked 424 physicians, 491 
graduate students, and 238 patients with different medical conditions, to imagine that 
they had lung cancer and to choose between two therapies: surgery and radiation 
therapy. The data presented to the subjects showed that surgery offers better 
long-term prospects at the cost of a greater immediate risk. However, for half the 
subjects the data referred to survival whereas the data for the other half referred to 
mortality. Because life and death are complementary outcomes, the two frames are 
equivalent presentations of the problem. Nevertheless, due to such difference in 
framing the percentage of subjects who selected surgery dropped from 75 in the 
survival condition to 58 in the mortality condition. This result was attributed to the 
fact that the risk of perioperative death looms larger when it is presented in terms of 
mortality than when it is presented in terms of survival. Surprisingly, the effect was 
not generally smaller for the physicians (who had considerable experience in 
evaluating medical data) or for the graduate students (who had received statistical 
training) than for the patients (who had neither). 
Most of the errors above appeared in laboratory studies and some of them have 
been studied mainly in the medical rather than the psychodiagnostic domain 
(excessive data collection, search for the exotic, framing effect). Some researchers 
therefore question the external validity or generalizability of these errors (e.g., Holt, 
1988). Most investigators, however, have the opinion that the errors are characteristic 
of human judgement in general and that the complex psychodiagnostic process is 
especially liable to such errors (e.g., Achenbach, 1985; Arkes, 1981; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980). 
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1.2 Factors affecting judgemental bias 
1.2.1 Cognitive processes and structures 
In the last decennia, errors in clinical judgement and decision making have been 
mainly attributed to cognitive factors rather than motivational ones (e.g., Elstein & 
Bordage, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Even in the cases of confirmation bias 
(Evans, 1989) and asymmetry in the attribution of successes and failures (Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980), cognitive explanations seem more acceptable than, for example, 
ego-defensive ones. A central tenet to this cognitive or information processing 
approach is the concept of bounded or limited rationality (Newell & Simon, 1972; 
Simon, 1957). This concept assumes that human capacity for rational thought is 
limited, especially by the small capacity of working memory. As a consequence, 
people - clinicians included - have to reduce complex problems to manageable 
proportions. It is assumed that the ways to simplify problems are often useful, but 
that they can also lead to cognitive errors like the ones stated above. 
One way is the application of the availability heuristic, that has become well 
known by the work of Tversky and Kahneman (e.g., 1974). These investigators 
focussed largely on the domain of frequency and probability judgement, but it is 
recognized that availability may play a part in reasoning tasks of other kinds as well 
(e.g., Evans, 1989). The availability heuristic is employed when people let themselves 
be guided by the ease with which information (e.g., instances, occurrences, 
associations, scenarios) can be brought to mind. The availability of information is 
influenced by such factors as salience, vividness, recency, and mood (Nisbett & Ross, 
1980; Salovey & Turk, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Van Schie, 1993). The 
phenomena of premature closure, search for the exotic, overestimation of base rates 
of rare disorders or conditions, illusory correlation, hindsight bias, and framing effect 
may be (partly) due to the availability heuristic (Achenbach, 1985; Evans, 1989; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nurcombe & Gallagher, 1986; Spears, 1993; Turk, Salovey 
& Prentice, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Van Schie, 1993; Westenberg & 
Koele, 1993). 
Other cognitive mechanisms that are assumed to manifest itself in biases of 
clinical judgement include the anchoring heuristic (i.e., insufficient adjustment of 
initial values - Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); the representativeness heuristic (i.e., 
the likelihood that an object X is a member of a category Y is judged according to 
the degree to which one perceives the salient features of X as being representative 
of (i.e., similar to, typical of) the characteristic features of class Y - Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974); the notion of perceived relevance (i.e., information is ignored 
because people fail to perceive its relevance - Evans, 1989); vividness of information 
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(i.e., subjects overweight vivid information and underweight dull, pallid, and abstract 
information - Nisbett & Ross, 1980); and the application of pre-existing knowledge 
structures such as beliefs and person-prototypes (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). (For 
examples of specific biases resulting from these mechanisms, see the references listed 
with the availability heuristic). 
1.2.2 Other restricting conditions to the quality of psychodiagnostics 
The fact that errors in clinical judgement are nowadays especially attributed to 
cognitive factors, does not mean that non-cognitive factors do not play a part at all. 
A major emotional factor is the individual's psychological regret for taking, or failing 
to take an action (Hogarth, 1980). The fact that a possibility is selected because it has 
the smaller maximum loss is called the minimax regret principle (Elstein, 1988). The 
tendency to search for the exotic can be a respond to the regret the clinician would 
feel about missing a certain condition (Elstein, 1988). In addition, motivational 
factors such as wishful thinking (Elstein, 1988) and the need for social acceptance 
(Van Schie, 1993) are supposed to be sources of error. 
An important additional impediment to the quality of psychodiagnostics is the 
absence of a solid and accessible knowledge base. The empirical knowledge that the 
psychodiagnostician has at his disposal is far from complete. For example, little is 
known about the degree of occurrence of conditions of psychopathologie disorders, 
which has consequences for hypothesis-generation and testing. Another important 
lack concerns knowledge about the indications for specific treatments. Further, the 
knowledge that the clinician has at his disposal is usually scattered over several 
sources, which are not so easy to consult. As a result, the diagnostician often has to 
rely on patchy knowledge. 
Finally, in the diagnostic process, the collection and interpretation of data is a 
central task. However, methods and instruments are often unavailable or insufficient 
with regard to evaluative criteria (e.g., reliability, validity, clinical utility). For 
example, very few questionnaires are designed to identify causal variables (Haynes, 
Spain & Oliveira, 1993). 
1.3 Improving the quality of psychodiagnostics: the diagnostic cycle 
With the preceding review in mind, three obvious ways to improve the quality of 
psychodiagnostics can be outlined: developing and evaluating diagnostic instruments, 
developing systematic empirical knowledge, and minimizing judgemental biases (cf. 
De Bruyn, 1984; Pameijer, 1992; Rispens, 1988). With respect to the latter, 
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various - and sometimes controversial - debiasing strategies have been proposed, 
depending on the type of bias, the supposed underlying mechanism, and the presumed 
nature of the information processing stage3 (e.g., Arkes, 1981; Amoult & Anderson, 
1988; Evans, 1989; Holt, 1988; Kleinmuntz, 1990). A broad and generally accepted 
strategy, however, is imposing structure on the decision task (e.g., Evans, 1989; 
Fischhoff, 1982; Hogarth, 1980; Vlek, 1990; Westenberg & Koele, 1993). Most 
decision structuring has been done with tasks such as offering an explicit choice 
between concrete action alternatives (e.g., Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). 
Although choosing between alternatives also occurs in psychodiagnostics (e.g., the 
selection of a treatment), the diagnostic process in itself is complex and dynamic. 
Several models have been proposed that may govern the complex process of 
psychodiagnostic decision making (e.g., De Bruyn, 1992; Carey, Flasher, Maisto & 
Turkat, 1984; Jäger, 1986; Nezu & Nezu, 1993; Rispens, Carlier & Schoorl, 1984). 
Differences between these models include the completeness with which the diagnostic 
process is represented, the stages that are distinguished, and the detailedness of the 
stages and the relevant decision rules. One of the models that tries to give a complete 
account of how the diagnostician has to proceed is the diagnostic cycle (De Bruyn, 
1992). The study for this thesis was carried out within the framework of this model. 
The development of the diagnostic cycle has been inspired by the general 
methodological concept of the empirical cycle (De Groot, 1969) and Westmeyer's 
(1972) logical approach of the diagnostic decision process (De Bruyn, 1992). The 
structure of the diagnostic cycle is depicted in Figure 1.1. The diagnostic cycle starts 
with a complaint analysis. In this step the diagnostician examines the problems as 
experienced by the client and in the client's own terms. In the next step, problem 
analysis, the diagnostician translates the complaint of the client into a concrete 
problem description. The ultimate goal of this step is to sort the problems or 
symptoms into clusters of dysfunctional behavior, that is, to identify the particular 
behavioral or personality disorders) involved. Next, in the step of diagnosing, the 
diagnostician tries to explain the disorder by generating and testing hypotheses about 
conditions that caused it and/or are maintaining it. In the final step, indication for 
treatment, the diagnostician determines which treatment is most appropriate in view 
of the diagnosis and the characteristics of the client. At each moment in the 
diagnostic process, whenever the current step needs more support, the diagnostician 
can return to a previous step. This is symbolized by the backward arrows in Figure 
1.1. 
3 For example, the selection of information vs. the generation of inference or judgement 
from the information selected (Evans, 1984, 1989). 
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Figure 1.1 The structure of the diagnostic cycle (adapted from De Bruyn, 1992) 
Referai 
Problem Analysis < J 
> 
Advice 
In practice, the diagnostic cycle does not always have to be passed completely. Each 
of the four components can be performed as a distinct professional activity. In 
addition, the clinician can sometimes skip one or more steps, for example, go directly 
from complaint analysis to indication of treatment (e.g., in the case of stuttering). 
However, the complexity of the case at hand and the lack of relevant knowledge 
frequently require completing all steps. In this situation, the output of each of the 
first three steps forms the input for the next step, so that a fixed order is prescribed. 
This is represented by the forward arrows in Figure 1.1. 
The diagnostic cycle is the super-ordinate goalstructure which should govern the 
overall process of diagnostic decision making. At each step and substep of the cycle, 
more specific rules and decision aids can be implemented. Some examples of these 
can be found in the forthcoming manual by De Bruyn, Pameijer, Ruijssenaars and 
Van Aarle. 
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1.4 Aims of this study 
The major goal of explicating the diagnostic cycle is to support the quality of 
decision making by outlining the structure of the diagnostic process. However, the 
utility and validity of this framework needs empirical scrutiny. The present study is 
part of a research program aiming at empirical evaluation of the diagnostic cycle 
(e.g., De Bruyn, 1990). It focuses on two steps of the diagnostic cycle: problem 
analysis and diagnosing. More specifically, it tries to investigate whether classifica-
tion of problem behavior has an effect on the next substep ofhypothesis-generation. 
Because of the exploratory nature of the study, both the quality and (as yet) neutral 
or descriptive characteristics of hypotheses will be considered. 
The problem, however, is that investigation of this question is not straightforward. 
As was discussed in the previous section, the diagnostic cycle is a super-ordinate 
goalstructure that guides the overall process of diagnostic decision making. The 
model does not specify which instruments should be used in each step of the process. 
An obvious next question then is whether it matters which classification system is 
used in the step of problem analysis. That is, are the various available classifications 
interchangeable or do they have different effects on the generation of psychodiagnos-
tic hypotheses? Although it is desirable that alternative descriptions of the same 
pathologic behavior have the same effect on hypothesis-generation and other aspects 
of the diagnostic cycle, a differential effect of divergent classification systems is not 
unlikely given the phenomenon of framing effect (discussed in section 1.1). 
The choice of the classification systems to be considered in this study is one of 
the subjects of the next section (1.5). In section 1.6 psychodiagnostic hypotheses will 
be further examined. 
1.5 Classification of problem behavior 
1.5.1 Terminology 
The terminology in the field of classification is rather confusing. We therefore 
present uses and descriptions of relevant terms as well as our own position. 
In the literature about psychopathology (e.g., Blashfield, 1984, p. viii), the term 
classification is used for the process of systematically ordering phenomena into 
groups or types ("the classification of a case") as well as for an ordered set of groups 
or types ("a psychopathologie classification"). 
The first use of the term covers both the activity of forming classes and the 
activity of assigning an unallocated entity to an already existing set of classes. 
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Following the terminology of biologists, some researchers restrict the term 
classification only to the first activity and use the term identification to refer to the 
second activity (Blashfield, 1984). In this thesis, however, the term classification can 
imply identification, so both terms are used interchangeably. The standard medical 
name for identification is diagnosis and psychiatrists often prefer this term to 
identification or classification (Achenbach, 1985; Blashfield, 1984). For example, in 
the DSM-III-R classification system, a "diagnosis" is made if the case meets the 
criteria of a certain disorder. The confusing thing is that in psychodiagnostics the 
term diagnosis is reserved for a conclusion concerning the cause or nature of a 
problem (e.g., De Bruyn, 1992; Westmeyer, 1972). We only use the term diagnosis 
in this latter sense. To prevent misunderstandings, one sometimes speaks of 
classification as "diagnosis in its narrow sense" or "formal diagnosis", and denotes 
the second meaning of diagnosis with "diagnosis in its broad sense", or "biopsycho-
social diagnosis", or "diagnostic formulation" (Achenbach, 1985; Verhulst, 1992b). 
The second use of the term classification is closely related to the meaning of 
classification system, that is, a system of ordered classes. The term nosology refers 
to a medical or psychiatric classification (Achenbach, 1985; Millón, 1987). Instead 
of classification or classification system, often the term taxonomy is used (e.g., 
Blashfield, 1984; Quay, 1986a). However, Achenbach (1985) reserves the term 
taxonomy for a special case of classification, in which the ordering has been based 
on intrinsic characteristics of the phenomena classified (p. 152). Millón (1987) 
applies the term to scientific classification systems. The word taxonomy is further 
used for the study of classification (Blashfield, 1984; Janke, 1982; Millón, 1987). In 
the present study we use the terms classification (in its second use), classification 
system, and taxonomy interchangeably. The adjectives taxonomie and taxonic are 
used to refer to matters which pertain to taxonomies and taxa respectively (Millón, 
1987). 
The classes or taxa of psychopathologie classification systems are usually 
syndromes that consist of symptoms (Millón, 1987). A symptom is a manifestation 
of a pathological condition. It refers to the presence of a particular overt behavior, 
affect, cognition, perception, or other characteristic. Although a distinction can be 
made between objective signs (biophysical markers and behavioral acts) and 
subjectively reported symptoms (moods, feelings, perceptions, memories, attitudes, 
etc.), in common use a symptom may involve objective as well as subjective 
manifestations (APA, 1987; Kazdin, 1983). 
A syndrome is a constellation of symptoms that occur together and covary over 
time (Achenbach, 1985; Kazdin, 1983; Millón, 1987). Instead of syndrome, the term 
disorder is frequently used. However, some consider the term syndrome to be less 
specific than disorder (e.g., Achenbach, 1990; APA, 1987). In the DSM, for example, 
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the notion of disorder refers to a higher level of understanding of the clinical 
problem than does the concept of syndrome (Kazdin, 1983). That is, use of the term 
disorder assumes that the syndrome cannot be accounted for merely by being part of 
a more pervasive disorder. Reason for this belief of independence may be lain in 
information about the cause, family history, possible biological correlates, and 
response to treatment. In this thesis, therefore, syndrome is used as a general term 
that covers more specific concepts such as disorder. 
Finally, a disease is a disorder for which there exists additional information about 
the specific etiology and pathophysiological process (APA, 1987; Kazdin, 1983). The 
organic mental disorders of DSM-III-R are diseases in that sense. 
1.5.2 Advantages of classification 
Although some points of criticism have been raised against classification and the use 
of classification systems, it is now recognized that classification has important 
advantages (Blashfield, 1984). First, in dealing with psychopathology, diagnosticians 
have to integrate and interpretate a lot of data from different sources. By abstracting 
and structuring the welter of information, classification contributes to efficient 
processing and the avoidance of cognitive overload (Achenbach, 1985). Blashfield 
mentions five other purposes of classification and classification systems. The first 
purpose is providing the nomenclature necessary for communication among the 
people working in the field. Next, because the name of a disorder is the key to its 
literature, a classification furnishes a basis for information retrieval, including 
information about the factors that play a part in the particular disorder (De Bruyn et 
al., in press). Third, a classification system provides descriptive information about 
disorders, so that a clinician knows what (else) to expect with a certain client. 
Another purpose of a classification is providing a basis for prognosis. The final 
purpose is that a classification system provides the basic concepts for theory 
formulation (concept formation). 
In spite of the obvious advantages, a lot of clinicians question the usefulness of 
classification for diagnostic practice (Rispens, 1986). This does not mean that such 
practitioners do not classify at all. Clinicians have private classifications (Krol, 1992; 
Rutter & Gould, 1985) and, according to Rispens (1986), they cannot resist the 
tendency to classify a case in terms of these implicit taxonomies. Unfortunately, 
clinicians are not always aware of their private classifications, nor of their guiding 
effect on the further course of the diagnostic process. 
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1.5.3 Approaches to classification 
With respect to classification of (child) psychopathology different approaches can be 
distinguished (Achenbach, 1985). The Kraepelinian and the quantitative approaches 
are the leading ones. The Kraepelinian approach has its origin in nineteenth-century 
medicine, of which Emil Kraepelin was the most influential taxonomist. In the 
Kraepelinian approach, descriptive categories are constructed on the basis of 
knowledge and experience of clinical experts (Achenbach, 1985; Blashfield, 1984). 
Famous classifications within this paradigm are the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) and the 
ICD-10 (WHO, 1990). In the multivariate approach on the other hand, multivariate 
methods are used to detect classes of symptoms that empirically covary (Achenbach, 
1985; Blashfield, 1984). A well-known example of the many multivariate classifica-
tion systems (see, for example, Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978; Barkley, 1988; 
Dreger, 1982; and Quay, 1986a) is the CBCL (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a). 
Other approaches are less widespread. The categorizations within the psycho-
dynamic approach are based on psychodynamic theory. For example, in the 
Freud-Abraham classification (presented by Wolman, 1978) the origins of psycho-
neuroses are linked to psychoananalytic developmental phases. While the Kraepe-
linian and multivariate approaches seek accurate descriptions of psychopathology, 
psychodynamic categorization focusses on theoretical inference about psychological 
functioning (Achenbach, 1985). 
It is not sure whether one can really speak of a behavioral approach to 
classification of psychopathology. Achenbach (1985), Epstein, Detwiler, and Reitz 
(1985), Kazdin (1983), Mash and Terdal (1988), and Morey, Skinner, and Blashfield 
(1986) state that behavioral assessment lacks a taxonomie counterpart, and in a recent 
article about classification and behavior therapy Bosch (1994) only discusses 
Kraepelinian and multivariate systems. Indeed, the behavioral classification systems 
we found in the literature are (partially) aimed at the determination of eliciting and 
maintaining conditions (e.g., Goldfried & Sprafkin, 1976; Kanfer & Saslow, 1965, 
1969; Tryon, 1976a, 1976b), or can be merely considered as an initiative to the 
development of a classification system (Adams, Doster & Calhoun, 1977). In 
addition, the relatively new concept of "response cluster" which refers to the 
correlation or covariation of two or more behaviors (Kazdin, 1982, 1985; Mash & 
Terdal, 1988; VoeItz& Evans, 1982), shows similarity with the traditional syndrome. 
However, the difference between these concepts is that syndromes are problematic 
and in that sense form a special case of response clusters (Kazdin, 1985). Moreover, 
syndromes have an interindividual or nomothetic character, whereas response clusters 
seem to differ per person, even if these persons have the same general problem 
(Kazdin, 1982, 1985; Voeltz & Evans, 1982). What seems most similar to 
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classification of disordered behavior at this moment, are broad categorizations such 
as the distinction between "behavioral excesses" and "behavioral deficits" (e.g., 
Gelfand & Hartmann, 1984; Herbert, 1987; Ross, 1980), or between "behavioral 
excesses", "shy, withdrawn, and fearful behavior", "behavioral deficits", and 
"inappropriate stimulus control" (Marholin & Bijou, 1978). 
1.5.4 Choice of classifications for this study 
Because of the advantages associated with classification systems, we decided to 
restrict ourselves to this type of classification (and thus to omit private classifications 
and broad public categorizations). We further figured that the systems should be 
applicable by diagnosticians of different theoretical orientations, thus leaving out 
systems of the psychodynamic approach. In addition, the systems to be chosen should 
be widely used and - preferably - belonging to different taxonomie approaches. 
These considerations left us with two of the most influential classification systems 
in the field of developmental psychopathology: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of mental disorders (DSM-III-R: APA, 1987) and the Child Behavior Checklist 
(CBCL: Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a). 
The DSM-III-R grew out of the Kraepelinian tradition (Achenbach, 1985; 
Blashfield, 1984). The classes or disorders found in the DSM-III-R have been 
abstracted from clinical observation and experience and have a categorical (yes/no) 
form (Quay, 1986a). To reach a classification, the clinician matches the condition of 
the client with the description of the disorder. For most of the disorders, specific 
"diagnostic criteria" to be met for application of the classification have been outlined. 
The manual consists of different sections. For the classification of childhood 
disorders, the section entitled "Disorders usually first evident in infancy, childhood, 
or adolescence" is most important. However, disorders listed in other sections, which 
are usually assigned to adults, can be assigned to children if the criteria are met. 
Multiple classification is possible in a limited sense, because disorders can differ in 
priority (Millón, 1987). Recently, the fourth edition of the DSM has been published 
(DSM-IV; APA, 1994). 
In the CBCL there are 118 behavioral/emotional problem items, which the parents 
(or guardians) of children between the ages of 4 and 16 are asked to respond to. 
Parents score a problem item as 0 for not true of their child, 1 for somewhat or 
sometimes true, or 2 for very or often true. The completed checklist is then scored 
using the Revised Child Behavior Profile, which contains items of the checklist 
arranged in eight or nine dimensional syndrome scales. These scales were originally 
derived from a principal components analysis of the CBCLs completed by the parents 
of a large number of referred children. Separate analyses for each sex at the ages of 
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4-5, 6-11, and 12-16 years were undertaken. A demarcation between the clinical and 
the normal range of scores was then obtained by also including a sample of parents 
of nonreferred children. The syndromes of the profile, representing a taxonomy of 
behavior problems, can be used subsequently as a basis for classification of the child 
into a certain "profile type". In November 1991, after we started our research, 
Achenbach (1991b) provided a successor of the Revised Child Behavior Profile of 
1983. This new profile displays a subset of items of the CBCL arranged in eight 
"cross-informant syndromes" which are common to all age/sex groups. These 
syndromes have counterparts in the related Youth Self-Report and the Teacher's 
Report Form (Achenbach, 1991a). Norms for the new profile have been obtained for 
each sex at ages 4-11 and 12-18. The new profiles have not been standardized in 
most other countries than the USA, including the Netherlands. 
In the present study the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems will be used to investigate 
whether classification in and of itself has an effect on the generation of psychodiag-
nostic hypotheses and whether alternative classifications have different effects on 
hypothesis-generation (see section 1.4). For clinical practice a differential effect of 
the DSM-III-R and the CBCL would be rather disadvantageous because diagnosti-
cians usually employ either a clinically based (e.g., the DSM-III-R) or a statistically 
derived (e.g., the CBCL) classification system and rarely combine both approaches 
(Edelbrock & Costello, 1988a). 
1.6 Psychodiagnostic hypotheses 
A psychodiagnostic hypothesis is a (yet to be tested) supposition about a particular 
factor or a combination of factors that may totally or partly explain a problem. "To 
explain" needs here to be broadly interpreted as a collective term for bringing up 
causes, reasons, triggers, conditions, maintaining variables, and other types of 
relevant factors. In short, a hypothesis can be defined as a potential (sub)explanation, 
or, in terms of the psychodiagnostic cycle, a potential (sub)diagnosis. 
Confirmed hypotheses about the factors that lead to a behavior disorder are often 
the most important determinants of the focus and methods of intervention. In many 
cases, interventions attempt to modify the explanatory factors in confirmed 
hypotheses directly (e.g., De Bruyn, 1992; Haynes et al., 1993; Pameijer, 1992). 
Despite their importance, psychodiagnostic hypotheses are not often the object of 
research. For that reason, we will also discuss the related concepts of explanation, 
causality, and medical diagnostic hypotheses. These concepts may contribute to a 
better understanding of psychodiagnostic hypotheses and their generation. 
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1.6.1 Explanations 
An explanation gives an account of why phenomena take place or behave in the way 
they do. That which has to be explained is called the explanandum. This can be the 
fact that an event took place or the fact that some state of affairs occurs. That which 
explains is called the explanans. The explanans may concern different matters, which 
can be used to characterize explanations. For example, Elster (1983) and Follesdal, 
Wallee, and Elster (1986) distinguish between three main types of scientific 
explanations: causal, intentional, and functional. In a causal explanation, the 
explanans concerns the cause of the phenomenon to be explained (i.e., the effect). 
For example, the hypothesis "The depression is the result of sexual abuse" is of the 
causal type. Intentional or teleological explanations account for actions or intentional 
behavior. The explanans of intentional explanations involves goals or desires as well 
as beliefs concerning the realization of those desires. A common term for beliefs and 
desires is "reason". An example of an intentional hypothesis is "The childish 
behavior of Annelies is an attempt to get out of difficult tasks". In a functional 
explanation, a phenomenon is explained by its beneficial effect. Functional 
explanations play a major role in biology where they are founded on the theory of 
evolution by natural selection. In psychopathology, Skinnerian reinforcement, for 
instance, may provide a mechanism for functional explanations. For example, "The 
enuresis yields parental attention" is a functional hypothesis. The fact that in 
functional explanations phenomena are explained by their actual consequences seems 
to violate the generalized principle of temporal asymmetry, which means that the 
explanans cannot succeed the explanandum (Elster, 1983; Haynes, 1992). The 
conclusion is that in functional explanations the explanandum must be an entity 
which persists over time, not a one-shot event (Elster, 1983, 1989; e.g., "The enuresis 
is maintained by parental attention"). 
There has been much debate about what a scientific explanation should look like 
and what conditions should be met in order that the explanans correctly explains the 
explanandum (e.g., Achinstein, 1981; Ruben, 1990; Van Fraassen, 1980). We will 
briefly discuss three approaches: the deductive-nomological model of Hempel and 
Oppenheim (Hempel, 1965; Stegmüller, 1983), the model of statistical relevance 
(Salmon, 1970; Stegmüller, 1973; Westmeyer, 1974, 1975), and Elster's emphasis 
on the specification of mechanisms (Elster, 1983, 1989). 
Although they are not perfect, the first two models are well known. Moreover, 
they have been used by Westmeyer as a basis for the explication of the concept of 
diagnosis in psychodiagnostics. According to Westmeyer (1972, 1990), in the 
deterministic case a diagnosis should be accomplished through a deductive-nomologi-
cal explanation (also called D-N, or Η-O, or covering law model). According to the 
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D-N model an event is explained when it is construed as the conclusion of a 
deductive argument of which the premises consist of general deterministic laws and 
specific antecedent conditions. Schematically: 
L,, L2, ..., Lr The presentation of a positive stimulus 
increases the proabability that a parti­
cular behavior will occur again. 
С,, C2, ..., Ct When John has a tantrum his mother 
soothes him. Mother's soothing is a 
positive stimulus to John. 
logical deduction 
E John has frequently tantrums. 
The general laws L
r
 and specific antecedent conditions Ck together constitute the 
explanans. The event E is the explanandum. By testing whether the antecedent 
conditions are true, the diagnostician determines whether the potential explanation 
holds in the case of E and thus is a diagnosis. 
In psychology, real deterministic laws are rare. Westmeyer (1974, 1975) applied 
the statistical-causal analysis of Stegmüller (1973), originally developed by Salmon 
(1970), to the psychodiagnostic process.4 The models of these three authors differ 
with regard to provisos but all start from the notion of statistical relevance.5 Suppose 
that χ is a student who visits a psychological guidance office because of learning 
problems, and the prior weight of learning problems (B) among students who visit 
a psychological guidance office (A) is .70. Or, formally, {x € A.B, p(B | A) = .70}. 
In order to reach a diagnosis for this explanandum, the diagnostician searches for all 
factors C, that are statistically relevant for learning problems with children who visit 
a psychological guidance office. A factor С is said to be statistically relevant to В 
within A if and only if p(B | A.C) Φ p(B | A); thus, in this case, * .70. One speaks 
of positive and negative statistical relevance if the first p-value is larger respectively 
smaller than .70. Examples of relevant factors are intelligence, brain disorder, and 
concentration disorder. The factors can have different values, which are of various 
relevance (e.g., low vs. high intelligence are respectively positively and negatively 
4 Westmeyer (1974,1975), with reference to Stegmüller (1973), notes that the probabilistic 
version of the D-N model, the inductive-statistical explanation, leads to problems. 
5 Relevance preserves from nonsense (D-N) explanations like "John Jones avoided becoming 
pregnant during the past year, for he has taken his wife's birth control pills regularly, and 
every man who regularly takes birth control pills avoids pregnancy" (Salmon, 1970, p. 
178). 
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statistically relevant). All factors and their possible values are then combined, 
resulting in η potential diagnoses C¡. The class of these η probability statements is 
called K. Finally, the diagnostician investigates which C¡ holds true for x. The result 
is a diagnosis Cx, part of the explanans {x e A.CX, K}.6 
The implementation of Westmeyer's normative approach to diagnosis is 
handicapped by the fact that it requires a solid knowledge base, a prerequisite that 
at this moment is hardly ever fulfilled in psychology. The approach of Elster is less 
elaborated but has the advantage that it is usable with less adequate knowledge bases. 
According to Elster (1983, 1989), an explanation should contain an explanatory 
mechanism that connects explanans and explanandum. "To explain is to provide a 
mechanism" (Elster, 1983, p. 24). Mechanisms refer to the means through which an 
explanatory factor exerts its influence, and range from detailed rules to vague 
processes, depending on the quality of the knowledge at a certain point of time. 
The various goals and requirements of explanation models can be used to 
formulate criteria which psychodiagnostic hypotheses should meet. This is done in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
1.6.2 Causality 
As is the case with explanation, the formal definition of causality is characterized by 
lack of agreement (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Verschuren 1991). We will never-
theless discuss some notions of causality that are fruitful in the light of psychodiag-
nostic hypotheses. According to Haynes (1992), clinicians and researchers must 
differentiate explanatory factors according to their effect on the various parameters 
of behavior disorders (such as their origin, immediate onset and maintenance), and 
realize that causal variables that are applicable to one parameter of a behavior 
disorder are not necessarily applicable to others. With respect to causal models of 
psychopathology, he discusses the following types of causes (Haynes, 1992). An 
original cause (sometimes called first cause) precedes all other causes of a behavior 
disorder, that is, it is the first event in a chain leading to the disorder. Original causes 
are often single events, are relatively independent of other factors in the chain, and 
often precede the targeted behavior problem by a significant period of time. 
Theoretically, causal analysis of behavior disorders can continue in endless 
regression. However, a point is reached where a clinically useful original cause is 
identified, and further regression does not contribute to intervention purposes. 
6 Because the posterior weight p(B | A.C„) is not necessarily larger than the prior weight, 
Stegmüller (1973) and Westmeyer (1974, 1975) prefer the terms analysis, analysandum, 
and analysans rather than explanation, explanandum, and explanans. 
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Maintaining causes (also called sustaining factors) are those variables that explain 
the current parameters of a behavior disorder and are often different form original 
causes. In the literature about psychodiagnostic hypotheses, the original and 
maintaining causes of behavior disorders are often stressed (e.g., Pameijer, 1992; 
Verhulst, 1992b). However, a focus on maintaining causes is often of the greater 
benefit (Haynes, 1992). Triggering causes (also called "precipitating" or "immediate" 
causes) are a subset of maintaining causes and are associated with the immediate 
onset of a behavior problem. Although a trigger occurs in close temporal proximity 
to the behavior problem, it needs not immediately precede it. In most cases, a trigger 
initiates a chain of events terminating in the occurrence of the problem. Apart from 
the occurrence of a behavior problem, a causal variable can differentially affect its 
magnitude and duration. For example, it is hypothesized that "learned helplessness" 
may have a weak triggering effect on depression, but a relatively strong effect on the 
magnitude or duration of depressive episodes (Haynes, 1992). Further, causal 
variables that affect the topography (the form, structure, or content) of a behavior 
disorder may be distinguished. A last example of a type of causal variables are those 
that affect the degree of stimulus generalization. 
The effects of causal variables may thus vary across the parameters of a behavior 
disorder. In addition, in psychopathology (Haynes, 1992), few causal variables appear 
to be necessary (i.e., the disorder never occurs without the variable) and causes may 
or may not be sufficient (i.e., the disorder occurs whenever the variable occurs). 
Consequently, behavior disorders can seldom be attributed to a single cause 
(Gadenne, 1988; Haynes, 1992; Pameijer, 1992). According to Haynes (1992), causal 
models of behavior disorders are evolving away from simple, univariate models to 
become more complex, dynamic (i.e., recognizing changes across time or as a 
function of some other parameter), nonlinear, and synthetic (i.e., depicting various 
causal weights and paths, the directionality of causal relationships, and interactions 
among causal variables). It must be kept in mind, however, that most attention should 
be paid to those factors that are clinically useful, that is, most powerful and 
modifiable (Haynes, 1992; Haynes et al., 1993). 
Because of their complexity, causal relationships and causal models are often 
difficult to describe and conceptualize. One medium for clarifying causal relation-
ships is through causal path diagrams (also referred to as causal networks, schematic 
diagrams, and Venn diagrams). For example, causal path diagrams are used to 
illustrate multiple causal variables, the strength and direction of causal variables, 
noncausal functional relationships, unidirectional and bidirectional relationships, the 
order of causal events, the form of causal relationships, and intervening and 
mediating variables (Bromley, 1986; Haynes, 1992; Verschuren, 1991). 
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1.6.3 Hypothesis-generation 
Unfortunately, little is known about the generation of hypotheses in the psychodiag-
nostic domain. The generation of medical hypotheses, however, has received some 
more attention. A comprehensive study has been presented by Elstein, Shulman, and 
Sprafka (1978),7 who investigated the thought processes of physicians as they 
performed on medical-diagnostic problem solving. Elstein et al. (1978) observed that 
diagnostic problems are solved through a process of hypothesis-generation and 
testing, and that a purely inductive method of gathering data until a solution 
spontaneously emerges was never employed. In their opinion, hypotheses serve as 
organizing rubrics in working memory. They help to overcome limitations of 
memory capacity and serve to transform an open medical problem (What is the 
patient's illness?) into a set of closed problems that are much easier to solve (Is the 
illness X? or Y? or Z?). They found that physicians begin generating hypotheses at 
the earliest moments of their encounters with patients. The choice of these early 
hypotheses is not arbitrary or random: the hypotheses are generated typically by 
associations from clusters of a few cues, and inconsistent cues tend to be ignored. 
The subsequent diagnostic workup is planned to permit testing, elaboration, or 
refinement of the early hypotheses. With this, the most interpretative error consists 
of regarding noncontributory information as a confirmation of an existing hypothesis, 
an error they called overinterpretation. Elstein et al. (1978) further noted that the size 
of the set of hypotheses being explored at any point in time is usually around four 
or five and appears to have an upper bound of about six or seven. This small number 
was attributed to limitations of both the capacity of the human information-proces-
sing system and time. In addition, the results suggested that diagnostic competence 
is case-related rather than a general problem-solving characteristic. Knowledge and 
experience appear to be the basic components of competence. 
With respect to the medical domain Johnson (1982) argues that in addition to 
hypotheses generated because of direct links to patient data ("data-driven heuristics"), 
there are also hypotheses generated because they are linked to other hypotheses 
("hypothesis-driven heuristics"). 
Although medical and psychodiagnostic hypotheses are both referred to as 
clinical, they must not simply be lumped together. In somatic medicine, a lot of 
diagnostic categories have been defined on the basis of etiology, or anatomical or 
physiological aberrations (Verhulst, 1992b). In these cases, identification of a disease 
7 Ten years later reviewed by them in the light of subsequent work and the results of others 
(Elstein, Shulman & Sprafka, 1990). 
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means identification of the cause of a problem (cf. Eddy & Clanton, 1982; Johnson, 
1982; Kassirer, 1982), and potential classifications correspond to diagnostic 
hypotheses. As was said before, most psychopathologie disorders, on the contrary, 
are syndromes of manifest symptoms, the causes of which have to be discovered. In 
the case of one medical disease, the different hypotheses are competing in nature 
(e.g., Elstein & Bordage, 1988), but - as was discussed before - in the case of one 
psychopathologie disorder, the hypotheses can be supplementing as well as competing 
(Gadenne, 1988; Haynes, 1992; Pameijer, 1992). 
How do diagnosticians come to hypotheses? Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) have 
proposed that judgements of probable cause are made up of four components. The 
first is a causal field or context in which judgements of probable cause are made. 
Causal candidates are differences-in-a-background, involving events that are unusual, 
abnormal, or unlikely. If a variable is not conceived as a difference-in-a-field, it will 
not be deemed causally relevant. The second component refers to probabilistic 
indicators of causal relations, called "cues-to-causality". These include covariation, 
temporal order, contiguity in time and space, and similarity (e.g., physical similarity, 
and congruity of duration and magnitude) of cause and effect. The third component 
consists of the judgemental strategies used for combining the causal field with the 
cues-to-causality. These include, for example, the construction of a causal chain that 
bridges the spatial and temporal gap, and rules for trade-offs between cues (e.g., 
temporal antecedence supercedes spatial contiguity). Of the elements mentioned 
above, the conception of X being a difference-in-the-background, the temporal order 
of X and Y, and the perception of a causal link from X to Y, are all necessary to 
inferring cause. The last component of the model of Einhom and Hogarth (1986) 
involves the discounting of an explanation by specific alternatives. According to 
Einhom (1988), the model also relates to hypothesis-construction in clinical 
psychology. However, we think that with respect to this domain two short comments 
should be given. First, it should be noted that knowledge about etiology may (and 
should) play a part with all four components. For example, as Einhom and Hogarth 
suggest, diagnostic curiosity might be triggered by noting that something in the 
client's anamnesis is abnormal or unusual (spontaneous causal reasoning), but the 
diagnostician might also actively hypothesize or look for a certain difference-in-a-
background on the basis of knowledge. Further, the discounting of causal strength by 
alternative explanations (component four) may be somewhat less relevant in cases 
where psychodiagnostic hypotheses supplement each other. 
Indicators of causality do not secure against errors in causal analysis. For 
example, Nisbett and Ross (1980) argue that the cue of similarity or "the resem-
blance criterion", a primitive version of the representativeness heuristic, is a major 
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source of error in the causal reasoning of both lay persons and scientists. Another 
example is the "fundamental attribution error", that is, the tendency to attribute overt 
behaviors to personal dispositions, thereby underestimating the causal role of 
environmental influences and overestimating the degree of cross-situational 
consistency in behavior (Haynes, 1992; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). This error may be 
traced to the availability and representativeness heuristics (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), 
discussed in section 1.2. These and other errors in causal analysis (Kahneman et al., 
1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) would be less harmful if alternative candidates and/or 
supplementary causal candidates are considered. However, as we discussed before, 
the generation of psychodiagnostic hypotheses is weighed down with conservatism 
(belief perseverance and the primacy effect) and premature closure of the set of 
hypotheses. Various strategies have been suggested to enhance the consideration of 
alternative or supplementary hypotheses (e.g., Amoult & Anderson, 1988), but once 
again agreement is lacking.8 In this thesis we explore among other things whether 
classification (really) is of any help here. 
1.7 Outline of this thesis 
In the next chapter the frames of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL are studied by 
comparing these systems with respect to formal characteristics and content. The goal 
of the latter comparison is to provide a basis for the construction of clinical cases 
that can be classified in both systems. In the third, fourth, and fifth chapter, effects 
of classification and the mentioned classification systems are considered, along with 
the influences of some additional variables that have been (mainly) suggested by the 
results of Chapter 2. Chapter 3 concentrates on effects with regard to (as yet) 
descriptive features of diagnostic hypotheses and hypothesis sets, such as the number 
of hypotheses generated. In Chapter 4 then effects with regard to qualitative aspects 
are the focus, including the possibility of operationalization. In the subsequent 
chapter, effects with regard to the content of diagnostic hypotheses are considered. 
This chapter also reports two pilot studies to investigate whether the generated sets 
of hypotheses are complete with respect to plausible hypotheses. The thesis finishes 
with a discussion of methods and findings in Chapter 6. 
8 Holt (1988), for example, thinks that the procedures of Amoult and Anderson (1988) are 
tímeconsuming and expensive. 
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The major research chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) have been written in such a 
way that they can be read independently of the remaining chapters of the thesis. This 
means that some parts of these chapters also occur in other chapters. 
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Comparison of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL 
In this chapter an attempt is made to gain more insight into the "frames" of the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL. In the first part (section 2.1), a description of the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL is given. The second part (section 2.2) concerns a 
comparison of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL with regard to several formal aspects, 
such as a the way of construction. Part three (section 2.3) constitutes the main part 
of this chapter and reports on the determination of correspondences between 
syndrome-definitions of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL. The direct purpose of this 
study was to obtain a basis for the construction of cases that are classifiable in both 
the DSM-III-R and the CBCL, thereby preventing the risk of an arbitrary real-life 
case not being classifiable in one or both of the taxonomies. This is discussed in 
section 2.4. The case descriptions were subsequently used as task materials in an 
experiment designed to investigate potential effects of classification according to the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL on hypothesis-generation. The experiment and its results 
are the subject of the following three chapters. 
2.1 A description of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL 
2.1.1 The DSM-III-R 
The DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) is the revised version of the third edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders that was published in 1980 by 
the American Psychiatric Association. The two previous editions appeared in 1952 
and 1968 (for the history of the DSM, see Blashfield, 1984). The manual is a method 
for clinicians to classify or "diagnose" mental disorders. The concept of mental 
disorder in the DSM-III-R is defined as follows: "A clinically significant behavioral 
or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in a person and that is associated 
with present distress (a painful symptom) or disability (impairment in one or more 
important areas of functioning), or a significantly increased risk of suffering death, 
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pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom" (APA, 1987, p. xxii/401).1 The 
content of the mental disorders has been formulated on the basis of discussions and 
negotiations within groups of experts (see the advisory committees listed in the 
manual). 
The disorders are partitioned in 17 different sections, which may contain 
subgroups. For classification of child disorders, the section "Disorders usually first 
evident in infancy, childhood, or adolescence" is most important. It consists of 36 
classifications, partitioned in subgroups like Disruptive Behavior Disorders, Eating 
Disorders and Tic Disorders. Disorders of other sections, usually assigned to adults, 
can be assigned to children if the criteria are met. Sometimes for these disorders 
age-specific associated features are described (e.g., for Schizophrenia). Each disorder 
has a special code corresponding to those of the ICD-9-CM (i.e., Clinical Modifica-
tion of the World Health Organization's International Classification of Diseases, 9th 
Revision; see appendix E of the DSM-III-R). 
The DSM-III-R is one of the most comprehensive psychopathological taxonomies 
(Cantwell & Baker, 1988). Sometimes it is considered to be too inclusive by 
admitting academic skills disorders, language and speech disorders, and motor skill 
disorders into apsychiatric taxonomy (e.g., Dreger, 1982). Reasons for the inclusion 
of these disorders are provided by Cantwell and Baker (1988), and include the fact 
that specific developmental disorders are frequently associated with impaired social 
skills, peer relationships, and self-esteem and thus constitute reason for clinical 
intervention. 
In spite of the comprehensive coverage it is quite possible that the symptoms of 
a child are not classifiable in the DSM-III-R (Cantwell, 1988). In that case the 
clinician can use the residual category of "Unspecified Mental Disorder". Potential 
(adult) categories needing further study for inclusion in DSM-III-R are presented in 
its appendix A. It is also possible that the problem of the child does not warrant the 
label of mental disorder. The V codes at the end of the DSM-III-R (e.g., parent-child 
problem, childhood or adolescent anti-social behavior) can be used in such situations. 
1 "In addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable response to a 
particular event, e.g., the death of a loved one. Whatever its original cause, it must 
currently be considered a manifestation of behavioral, psychological, or biological 
dysfunction in the person. Neither deviant behavior, e.g., political, religious, or sexual, nor 
conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are mental disorders unless 
the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the person, as described above" 
(APA, 1987, p. xxii/401). 
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Characteristics of the DSM-III-R 
There are several noteworthy characteristics of the DSM-III-R. First, the system 
attempts to be generally descriptive or atheoretical. Disorders are defined on the basis 
of their clinical manifestations rather than their presumed etiology. In that way 
DSM-III-R can be acceptable to clinicians of different theoretical orientations. Also, 
a descriptive approach acknowledges that disorders can be explained in conceptually 
diverse ways (Kazdin, 1983). Only in the case of known etiology - like the organic 
mental disorders and reactive disorders - the etiology is part of the diagnostic 
criteria. 
In order to enhance interjudge reliability, specific diagnostic criteria have been 
outlined, which must be met for the classification to be made. The criteria may 
include different types of information such as a subset of key symptoms of a 
particular size, obliged key symptoms, duration and onset of the symptoms, and 
exclusion rules. In general, these essential features require minimal interpretation on 
the part of the clinician. Although sometimes called that way (e.g., Dreger, 1982) the 
criteria are not "operational" in terms of standardized assessment operations. As an 
example, the diagnostic criteria of Conduct Disorder are outlined in Table 2.4 
(section 2.3). 
The DSM-III-R attempts to provide a comprehensive description of individual 
disorders. In addition to the diagnostic criteria, the DSM-III-R gives some 
information about associated features, age of onset, course, impairment, complica-
tions, predisposing factors, prevalence, sex ratio, familial partem, and differential 
classification of the disorders. If clinicians do not want to use the comprehensive 
manual, they can use the Quick Reference for the Diagnostic Criteria ("mini-D"). Of 
this shortened version a Dutch translation is available (Koster van Groos, 1988). 
The DSM-III-R has a multiaxial format. Five axes have been designed, among 
other things to direct attention to different relevant facets of the clinical problem and 
its circumstances (Cantwell & Baker, 1988; Kazdin, 1983). A complete evaluation 
in terms of the DSM-III-R requires evaluation on all of the five axes, but the mental 
disorders or dysfunctions are included by the axes I and II. Axis I refers to all 
clinical syndromes, with the exception of developmental and personality disorders 
which are coded on axis II. Axis I also includes the V codes. Separation of clinical 
disorders on two separate axes was inspired by the fact that personality and 
developmental disorders tend to be overlooked when all the disorders are on the same 
axis (Cantwell, 1988). On axis III relevant physical disorders and conditions are 
coded. Axis IV provides a 6-points rating scale for coding the severity of psychoso-
cial stressors that may contribute to the development, recurrence, or exacerbation of 
the disorder involved. Axis V indicates the highest level of adaptive functioning at 
the time of the evaluation and for at least a few months during the past year, on the 
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Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF Scale). This scale ranges from 90 (no 
symptoms) to 1. 
Classification of mental disorders thus concerns the axes I and II. In addition to 
one classification on each of the two axes, multiple classification is possible within 
one axis as long as the disorders do not exclude each other according to the 
diagnostic criteria. In the diagnostic hierarchy of the DSM-III-R, disorders higher in 
priority (e.g., organic mental disorders and pervasive disorders) exclude disorders 
with the same symptoms that are of lower priority. The hierarchical structure of the 
DSM-III-R is reflected by the decision trees of the major disorders in appendix В of 
the manual. 
Reliability and validity of the DSM-III-R 
Several criteria for evaluation of psychopathological taxonomies have been outlined 
(e.g., Blashfield & Draguns, 1976; Rutter & Gould, 1985; Skinner, 1981; Spitzer & 
Williams, 1985). Of course, reliability and validity are important ones. 
To reach a classification, the clinician matches the condition of the client with the 
diagnostic criteria of the disorders. The symptom index and the decision trees for 
differential diagnosis can provide some help. In spite of this, the interjudge reliability 
of the DSM-III(-R) classifications is usually found to be mediocre or low (e.g., 
Achenbach, 1988; Cantwell, 1988). Special instruments have been developed to 
enhance proper classification with the DSM-III(-R), such as computer programs (e.g., 
Tinger, 1990). Also some structured interviews, such as the various versions of the 
DISC and the DICA, yield DSM-III(-R) categorizations (see for an overview 
Edelbrock & Costello, 1988b; Verhuist, 1992a). Structured interviews also reduce the 
information variance resulting from the lack of specification of standard assessment 
procedures (Achenbach, 1988; Cantwell, 1988). There has been little research on the 
test-retest reliability of the DSM-III(-R) (Achenbach, 1988). 
As was said before, the DSM disorders have been mainly based on consensus 
between experts in the field guided by their experiences and opinions. And although 
the DSM-III and the DSM-III-R have initiated much research, the empirical basis of 
many disorders remains to be demonstrated (e.g., Kazdin, 1983; Rutter & Gould, 
1985; Verhulst, 1992b). 
The DSM-IV 
The development of the DSM is an ever continuing process of adjustment and 
refinement. The recently published fourth edition (APA, 1994) is meant to 
incorporate the latest insights. An example of an adjustment concerns the Atten-
tion-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder that integrates the Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder and the Undifferentiated Attention-Deficit Disorder (without hyperactivity) 
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of the DSM-III-R, but differentiates between three subtypes (Combined Type, 
Predominantly Inattentive Type, Predominantly Hyperactive-Impulsive Type). The 
general characteristics of the DSM-III-R described above, have been preserved in the 
DSM-IV. 
2.1.2 The CBCL 
The CBCL and the RCBP 
The main part of the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 
1983a) consists of 118 behavior problem items designed to be answered by parents 
or parent surrogates of children aged 4 through 16. Most of the behavioral items 
originate from Achenbach's factor analytic study of case history data in the Sixties 
and have been adapted to parents. The items refer to behavior of the preceding six 
months of the child. Parents score a behavior problem item as 0 for not true of their 
child, 1 for somewhat or sometimes true, and 2 for very or often true. One of the 
reasons for choosing parents as informants was that parents typically know more 
about their child's history, than any other adult (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983b). 
The completed checklist is then scored using the Revised Child Behavior Profile 
(RCBP), which contains items of the checklist arranged in dimensional syndrome 
scales. These syndromes were originally derived through factor analytic techniques 
applied to the CBCLs of children referred to outpatient mental health settings. 
Because the prevalence and patterning of behaviors may vary with sex and age, 
separate analyses were performed for each sex at the ages 4-5, 6-11 and 12-16. Eight 
or nine syndromes per age and sex group were obtained in that way, with a total of 
51. Some of the syndromes were found in all six groups (e.g., Aggressive, Somatic 
complaints, Schizoid), although their exact compilation of items differs per group. 
There were also syndromes that are peculiar to one age and/or sex (e.g., Cruel, found 
in the samples of 6-11 and 12-16 year old girls). 
Second order factor analyses of the first-order factors or "narrow-band" 
syndromes produced two "broad-band" factors, labeled Internalizing and Externa-
lizing. The Internalizing scale mainly involves problems within the self, such as 
unhappiness and fears. The Externalizing broad-band syndrome, on the other hand, 
mainly involves conflicts and problems with others, like aggressive and delinquent 
behavior. For five of the six age and sex groups there is also a scale called Mixed, 
containing narrow-band syndromes not highly correlated with the Internalizing or 
Externalizing scale. 
To compare the behavior problem scores of referred children with those of 
nonreferred of the same age and sex, Achenbach and Edelbrock had a sample of 
parents of normal children complete the CBCL. This formed the basis for converting 
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raw scores to standard scores (T scores) and percentiles. А Γ score of 70, correspon­
ding with the 98th percentile, represents the border between the clinical and the 
normal range. Standard scores are computed for narrow- and broad-band scales as 
well as for the entire behavior problem part. Computer programs for scoring are 
available. 
Research among the Dutch population showed only small differences with respect 
to empirical syndromes and scores. For that reason, in the Dutch version of the 
CBCL the original American norms have been maintained (Verhulst, Koot, 
Akkerhuis & Veerman, 1990). 
Profile types 
The syndromes of the RCBP represent a taxonomy of behavior problems, similar to 
the mental disorders of the DSM-III-R. They can, subsequently, be used as a basis 
for constructing taxonomies of children.1 Achenbach and Edelbrock performed 
cluster analyses on profile data in order to identify groups of children or "profile 
types" with similar profile patterns. The idea behind this is that such a pattern may 
provide a more effective taxon than would each separate syndrome taken one by one. 
For each sex/age group, six or seven profile types were found. Like the hierarchy of 
syndromes, the profile types mainly cluster together in two broad groups, which can 
be distinguished by their preponderating "Internalizing" or "Externalizing" 
characteristics. There is also a "Mixed" group. The computer scoring programs of the 
RCBP give intraclass correlations (ICC) between a child's profile and the centroids 
of profile types identified for its age/sex group at all levels of the hierarchy. 
The social competence items and scales 
In addition to the behavior problem items, the CBCL knows several social 
competence items to be scored as "less than average", "average", or "more than 
average" compared with other children of the same age, or "don't know". The social 
competence items are scored on a profile with three a priori scales: Activities, Social, 
and School. They have been normed for the same age/sex groups and on the same 
non-clinical sample as the behavior problem scales. 
Reliability and validity of the behavior problem syndromes of the CBCL 
Achenbach (1985, 1988) summarizes findings for reliability and stability of the 
behavioral syndromes scored from ratings by parents, teachers, and mental health 
2 According to Achenbach and Edelbrock (1983b), the syndromes of the RCBP merely 
represent a multivariate description of behavior problems. They use the concept of 
taxonomy only in connection to a typology of children. 
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workers. In general, the results for test-retest reliability may be rated as high and 
those for interrater reliability as fair. Verhuist et al. (1990) also show acceptable 
reliability results. Hence, the COTAN judges the reliability of the Dutch adaptation 
of the CBCL as "good" (Evers, Van Vliet-Mulder & Ter Laak, 1992). However, low 
correlations occurred (Achenbach, 1985, 1988) when there were major differences 
between both the situation (e.g., home versus school versus clinic) and the type of 
rater (e.g., parent versus teacher versus clinician). This may reflect differences in the 
judgement of the different types of informants as well as differences in the child's 
behavior in their presence (Achenbach, 1985, 1988). 
The problem with the validity of the CBCL (and other multivariate systems) is 
that the derived syndromes depend, among other things, on the inclusion of items in 
the initial item pool, the type of informants, the sample of clinical subjects, and the 
choice of the statistical analysis (Edelbrock, 1987; Morey, Skinner & Blashfield, 
1986; Rutter & Gould, 1985; Quay, 1986a, 1986b). Nevertheless, several indications 
for the validity of the CBCL were found, including correspondences between the 
CBCL and other multivariate systems (Achenbach, Conners, Quay, Verhuist & 
Howell, 1989; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978; Quay, 1986a), similar syndromes 
found in several other countries including the Netherlands (Verhuist et al. 1990), and 
discriminative validity (Achenbach, 1985, 1988). The judgement of the validity of 
the Dutch CBCL by the COTAN was "good" again (Evers et al., 1992). 
Multiaxial assessment and taxonomy 
Because different informants (parents, teachers, mental health workers, observers, or 
the children themselves) may provide different diagnostic information, Achenbach 
(1985) proposes a comprehensive diagnostic work-up based on different types of 
data. In his view, assessment and taxonomy should take place on five axes: parent 
reports (axis I), teacher reports (axis II), cognitive assessment (axis III), physical 
assessment (axis IV), and direct assessment of the child (axis V). Examples of 
assessment procedures on each axis have been given, taking the child's age into 
account (Achenbach, 1985; Achenbach & McConaughy, 1987). Some of the proposed 
procedures have been developed by Achenbach and co-workers, such as the Teacher 
Report Form (TRF; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1986), and the Youth Self-Report 
(YSR; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1987). 
The 1991 profiles of the CBCL 
In addition to the profiles of the CBCL of 1983 (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a), 
Achenbach (1991b) provided a profile that displays a subset of items arranged in 
eight "cross-informant syndromes" in November 1991. These syndromes are common 
to all sex/age groups and have counterparts in the Youth Self-Report and the 
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Teacher's Report form (Achenbach, 1991a). Norms for the 1991 profile were 
obtained for each sex at ages 4-11 and 12-18. The 1991 version has yet to be adapted 
in a number of countries outside the USA, including the Netherlands. Anyhow, since 
the research for this thesis started before 1991, the cross-informant syndromes were 
not used. 
2.2 A comparison of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL with respect to formal 
principles 
Several formal aspects of psychopathological classification systems in general and of 
the DSM-III-R and the CBCL in particular will be discussed on taxonomie, taxonic, 
and clinical attribute level. Often these formal principles represent substantive 
choices. 
2.2.1 Taxonomie level 
Construction. Construction approaches and their products can be separated into three 
types (cf. Millón, 1987). In clinically based taxonomies, taxa are abstracted from 
clinical observation, experience, and intuition (Achenbach, 1985; Blashfield, 1984; 
Millón, 1987; Quay, 1986a). Usually, they gain their importance in virtue of 
consensus and authority. In contrast, the taxa of empirically based taxonomies have 
been identified through statistical (multivariate) analyses of observed covariation 
between attributes (Achenbach, 1985; Blashfield, 1984; Millón, 1987; Quay, 1986a). 
Factor analysis is the most common method, but other methods, such as cluster 
analysis, are possible as well (Blashfield, 1984). Generally, clinically based 
taxonomies are associated with traditional psychiatry ("traditional" approach, or 
"Kraepelinian" approach, or "medical model") whereas the development of 
statistically based taxonomies has been stimulated by biologists and psychologists 
("empirical", or "quantitative", or "numerical", or "multivariate" approach) (e.g., 
Morey et al., 1986). A third approach to construction is the use of theory and 
theoretical constructs as a basis for generating the taxa of a taxonomy. The elements 
of a theoretically based taxonomy are linked according to theoretical (explanatory) 
relationships. The three approaches of construction have been combined by Skinner 
(1981) in his proposal for evaluation of psychopathological classifications. 
As was discussed before, the taxa of the DSM-III-R are based on clinical 
judgement while those of the CBCL are based on factor analysis and cluster analysis. 
Although clinically based and empirically based taxonomies can have some 
theoretical underpinnings (e.g., the psychodynamic influences in the DSM-I and the 
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DSM-II) both the DSM-III-R and the CBCL are deliberately atheoretical or 
descriptive (APA, 1987; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a). 
Structure. Millón (1987) differentiates between three structural frameworks. Viewed 
spatially, they can be seen as reflecting a vertical, horizontal, or circular structure. 
In the vertical or hierarchical framework, there is a hierarchical relationship among 
the taxa (Blashfield, 1984; Skinner, 1981). The classification process is usually 
conceptualized in terms of a hierarchical tree in which lower order taxa are subsets 
of higher order taxa of the same branch. Further, specificity increases as one moves 
further down the hierarchy. That is, lower order taxa are more specific and 
differentiated than taxa higher in the hierarchy. Both the DSM-III-R and the CBCL 
have been hierarchically structured, as was discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Another hierarchical rationale employed in several taxonomies is the ordering of taxa 
in accord with classificational priority (Millón, 1987). For the DSM-III-R we 
mentioned the fact that organic mental disorders and pervasive disorders preempt the 
classification of categories of lower priority with the same features. However, this 
does not apply to the dimensions and the profile types of the CBCL. The horizontal, 
also known as the multiaxial framework, orders different classes of attributes or types 
of information in a series of aligned or parallel categories (Kazdin, 1983). The 
multiaxial format of the DSM-III-R was discussed before. Previously, we also stated 
that the CBCL is part of a multiaxial approach to assessment and taxonomy. Finally, 
the circular framework, also referred to as the circumplex or circumplical model, is 
a special case of a dimensional model in which the dimension(s) wrap(s) around on 
itself to form a circular arrangement (Blashfield, 1984). Similar taxa are located in 
adjoining or nearby segments of the circle, while psychologically antithetical taxa are 
located as bipolar opposites on the circle. The circumplex model has been primarily 
used as a structural tool for ordering personality disorders (for examples, see 
Blashfield, 1984; Millón, 1987). 
2.2.2 Taxonic level 
The following formal aspects mainly focus on lower order taxa, that is, disorders in 
the DSM-III-R, and narrow-band syndromes and profile types in the CBCL. 
Composition. Taxa can be understood as having a categorical or dimensional 
composition (Blashfield, 1984; Millón, 1987; Quay, 1986a; Skinner, 1981). 
Categories are qualitative, discrete types or classes, which are classified in a 
yes-or-no fashion. The categorical conception also implies that a patient is assigned 
to just one concept (Blashfield, 1984; Quay, 1986a). In contrast, dimensions are 
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quantitative gradations of severity, in which normality and abnormality are viewed 
as the limits of a continuum. This means that every person has a syndrome to a 
greater or lesser degree. Dimensions are not mutually exclusive. That is, the 
dimensional model represents clients in terms of all dimensions included in the 
model, and it is recognized that individuals can be clinically deviant on several 
different dimensions without implying that they have several separate disorders. In 
general, the categorical approach has been associated with traditional psychiatric 
classification, whereas the dimensional model has been embraced by psychologists. 
Nevertheless, multivariate techniques can be used to form categories as well as 
dimensions. Both the categorical and the dimensional model have pros and cons as 
well as advocates and opponents (e.g., Achenbach, 1990; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 
1983b; Blashfield, 1984; Cantwell & Baker, 1988; Dreger, 1982; Millón, 1987; 
Quay, 1986a). 
The disorders of the DSM-III-R are categories which can be either present or 
absent. The disorders are not always "purely" categorical in that some disorders have 
quantifications of severity (e.g., "mild", "moderate", "severe"). In addition, multiple 
classification is possible, be it in a limited sense. The syndromes of the CBCL are 
dimensions that are combined in the multidimensional RCBP. Nevertheless, every 
dimension has a qualitative cut-off point which forms the border between the normal 
and the clinical range. The profile types of the CBCL, resulting from cluster analysis, 
are differentiated categories of children. As was said before, a child is assigned to 
the profile type it most closely resembles on the basis of the intraclass correlations. 
These form a quantitative aspect of the qualitative profile type. However, minimum 
cut-off points for the intraclass correlations may be specified by the user. 
When particular dimensional models of psychopathology have been proposed, 
they are almost always associated with a particular assessment device. Categorical 
models, on the other hand, are rarely tied to particular assessment devices (Blash-
field, 1984). This also holds for the DSM-III-R and the CBCL (Achenbach, 1985). 
Definition. The definition of taxa can have a monothetic or polythetic character 
(Millón, 1987; Nelson & Maser, 1988). If the defining rules are monothetic the 
attributes of ataxon are individually necessary and jointly sufficient. Such taxa have 
distinct boundaries. The fact that all attributes have to be present for the classification 
to be made results in homogeneous representatives. Taxonomies with monothetic 
rules are called classical. The classical model is conceived to be satisfactory for the 
classification of many medical diseases, but inappropriate for psychopathological 
syndromes (Millón, 1987; Nelson & Maser, 1988). Polythetic rules bring forth 
so-called prototypal taxonomies. They require only a optional and minimal subset of 
the taxonic attributes to be present. No single attributes are necessary or sufficient; 
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any subset consisting of a minimal number of elements satisfies. Consequently, the 
representatives of a polythetic taxon are heterogeneous and its boundaries are more 
open or "fuzzy". 
Most disorders of the DSM-III-R have a polythetic format (e.g., Conduct 
Disorder), but there are also monothetic disorders (e.g., Pica).3 In addition, the 
diagnostic criteria of some disorders (e.g., Insomnia and Major Depressive Episode) 
require a criterion or symptom always to be present in addition to an optional and 
minimal subset of symptoms, which may be denoted as semi-polythetic (Nelson & 
Maser, 1988). The syndromes of the CBCL are clearly polythetically defined: only 
an optional subset of the items is required, so much that the score falls into the 
clinical range (either a smaller number of items having a score 2, or a larger number 
of items having a score 1, or a combination of both kinds). No single behavior is 
crucial, not even the item after which the syndrome is labeled. The profile types are 
also prototypal in character. Their centroids are prototypes to which the profile of a 
child bears more or less resemblance, as is expressed by the intraclass correlations. 
Domain. Usually, the taxa of a psychopathological taxonomy are of the syndromal 
or personological type. Syndromal taxa pertain to patterns of co-occurring and 
covarying symptoms (i.e., syndromes and diseases). Personological taxa represent 
groups of patients who have certain characteristics (e.g., syndromes) in common that 
distinguish them from other patients (Millón, 1987). In the view of Millón (1987) a 
syndromal taxon is located within a larger personological taxon ("a patient") and the 
features of a personological taxon are more holistic, stable over time and consistent 
across situations than those of a syndromal taxon.4 As has been described before, the 
disorders of the DSM-III-R are of the syndromal type. According to Millón (1987), 
however, the personality disorders of the DSM-III-R, that are both durable and 
pervasive, are personological taxa. Moreover, some authors claim that the DSM-III-
(-R) is a classification of patients, not disorders (e.g., Blashfield, 1984, p. 151). 
Nevertheless, the DSM-III-R explicitely states that it does not classify people, but the 
disorders that people have (APA, 1987, p. xxiii), and it makes no exception for 
personality disorders. The dimensions of the CBCL are also of the syndromal type. 
3 Basically, Pica comprises only one symptom (repeated eating of a nonnutrive substance 
for at least one month). Some other DSM-III-R disorders with a monothetically formulated 
criterion (still) permit some heterogeneity concerning the criterion, such as Undifferen-
tiated Somatoform Disorder. 
4 Millón ( 1987) goes further than this dichotomy by also discriminating situational taxa that 
should play a part in psychopathological taxonomies. These relate to the environment 
(conditions, relations, psychosocial factors) and surround personological taxa. 
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The profile types, on the other hand, refer to groups of children manifesting similar 
profile characteristics (although nothing is told about the stability and consistency of 
the profile types). 
2.2.3 Clinical attribute level 
Clinical attributes are the basic units of which (lower order) taxa have been 
composed. 
Type. As was discussed before, both the DSM-III-R and the CBCL syndromes are 
made up of symptoms (including signs). In addition, the DSM-III-R personality 
disorders are constituted by (inflexible and maladaptive) personality traits (described 
by Pervin, 1980, as a disposition to behave in a particular way as expressed in a 
person's behavior over a range of situations) (APA, 1987; Millón, 1987). Some 
behavior problem items of the CBCL also resemble traits (e.g., item 34: "Feels others 
are out to get him/her"; item 89: "Suspicious"). However, the items of the CBCL 
concern the past six months and do not consider the child's long-term functioning. 
Apart from "concurrent" attributes such as symptoms, signs, and traits, Millón (1987) 
discusses time-related or "longitudinal" attributes, including etiological factors and 
course. However, knowledge about longitudinal attributes is sparse, unreliable, and 
often accompanied by philosophical and methodological issues, which makes them 
as yet inappropriate as the basic constituents of taxa (Kazdin, 1983; Millón, 1987). 
Degree of inference. Related to the type of clinical attribute and the way of 
construction is the degree to which attributes refer to observable phenomena. The 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL are not only atheoretical, but also address themselves 
mainly to observable clinical phenomena that require a minimal amount of inference 
on the part of the observer. Nevertheless, the criteria for some DSM-III-R disorders 
require much more inference. This is the case with the personality disorders (APA, 
1987; Millón, 1987), but even more with the criteria of some disorders that concern 
the severity of the disturbance, such as interference with normal activities or 
impairment of functioning.5 A few items in the CBCL also require some inference 
on the part of the parent (e.g., item 26: "Doesn't seem to feel guilty after misbeha-
ving"; item 89: "Suspicious"). 
5 For example, criterion В of Schizophrenia reads: "During the course of the disturbance, 
functioning in such areas as work, social relations, and self-care is markedly below the 
highest level achieved before onset of the disturbance (or, when the onset is in childhood 
or adolescence, failure to achieve expected level of social development)". 
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Structure. Besides on taxonic level, the distinction between categorical and 
dimensional applies to clinical attribute level (Achenbach, 1990; Millón, 1987). In 
the DSM-III-R, the presence of symptoms is indicated categorically ("yes-or-no"), 
whereas the behavior problem items of the CBCL are scored dimensionally 
(numerical intensity ratings). 
The above-mentioned formal aspects of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL have been 
summarized in Table 2.1. 
2.3 Correspondences between syndrome-definitions of the DSM-III-R 
and the CBCL6 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Classification is one of the most fundamental scientific activities: it is impossible to 
study an entity (e.g., depression) or determine its relations until it can be described 
and distinguished from others. In psychopathology, classification may serve functions 
like communication, information retrieval, description, prediction, and theory 
formation (Blashfield, 1984). Unfortunately, there is little agreement as to which 
mental disorders actually exist and what structural features they possess. As a 
consequence, the existing psychopathologie classification systems differ in many 
respects (Achenbach, 1985; Millón, 1987; Morey et al., 1986). 
In terms of their impact on research and practice, the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of mental disorders (APA, 1987) and the Child Behavior Checklist 
(Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a) are the dominant classification systems in the field 
of developmental psychopathology. As was described in section 2.1 and 2.2, they 
differ with respect to construction principles (clinically versus statistically based), 
structural features (e.g., mainly categorical versus mainly dimensional), and type of 
instrument (handbook versus checklist). Not surprisingly, there are also numerous 
differences with regard to the syndromes these two instruments discern (Achenbach 
& McConaughy, 1987). 
6 This study is a more compact version of an extensive technical report (Vermande, 
Weusten, Coppen & Kracht, 1993). 
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In Chapter 1 the following line of reasoning was discussed: from studies in 
cognitive science it is known that casting the same information into alternative 
frames can lead to different decisions (Slovic, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1988; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). The differences between the DSM-III-R and the 
CBCL, especially with respect to taxonic discernment and content, raise the question 
of whether these systems have different consequences for clinical assessment and 
intervention. This question is of interest in view of the evaluative criterion of 
feasibility or clinical utility of classification systems (Cantwell & Baker, 1988; Rutter 
& Gould, 1985; Skinner, 1981; Spitzer & Williams, 1985). As mentioned briefly 
before, classification can guide mental health professionals in identifying causative 
factors, making prognoses and recommending (differential) treatment (Achenbach & 
Edelbrock, 1978; Blashfield, 1984; Wenar, 1990). For example, in De Bruyn's (1992) 
normative-prescriptive model of psychological assessment, classification is the 
starting point for the generation of hypotheses concerning causal and sustaining 
factors, which, after confirmation, form the basis for a treatment plan. The question 
of different effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification for clinical assessment and 
intervention is all the more relevant because of the fact that in clinical practice one 
usually employs either a clinically based (e.g., the DSM-III-R) or a numerically 
derived (e.g., the CBCL) classification system, but seldom are both approaches 
combined (Edelbrock & Costello, 1988a).7 
Research of the above mentioned question would be promoted by a mapping of 
correspondences and differences between DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL syndrome 
scales. Correspondent relations between DSM-III(-R) disorders and CBCL scales 
have been established descriptively (Achenbach, 1982; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 
1983a, 1987; Verhuist et al., 1990) and empirically (Edelbrock & Costello, 1988a). 
The descriptive correspondences are the result of approximate, prima-facie 
comparisons (e.g., Achenbach, 1985, p. 93). However, in view of the research 
question mentioned above, determination of global overlap is insufficient: to 
determine which DSM-III-R and CBCL classifications actually correspond, the 
comparison should consider the matching of individual symptoms and items as well 
as the fulfilment of (cut-off) criteria of both systems. The empirical correlational 
study of Edelbrock and Costello (1988a) is also unsuited for the purpose mentioned 
above. To be sure, this study dealt with identified classifications, thus meeting 
required criteria and cut-off scores, but high correlations between DSM disorders and 
CBCL dimensions do not necessarily mean that there is any overlap or that the 
7 A survey of 90 clinicians (psychologists and educational scientists) in the Netherlands 
showed 75% of those who use a classification system to use either the DSM-III-R or the 
CBCL (Vermande, Van den Bereken & De Bruyn, 1991). 
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overlap is sufficiently large to meet the criteria of both systems. For example, 
Edelbrock and Costello (1988a, p. 233) obtained a significant correlation between the 
DSM-IH's Overanxious Disorder and the CBCL's Somatic Complaints, whereas 
somatic complaints are only one of several components of Overanxious Disorder. 
Moreover, the comparisons described above resulted in relations between one 
DSM disorder and one CBCL scale. Because of the variability in the size of classes, 
however, it is not only useful to determine correspondences between one DSM 
disorder and one CBCL scale, but also to examine other types of relations, such as 
one DSM-III-R disorder corresponding to the combination of two CBCL dimensions 
and vice versa. 
The present study offers a descriptive comparison between DSM-III-R disorders 
and CBCL scales that is more detailed than the descriptive studies mentioned above, 
in that it considers the matching of individual DSM symptoms and CBCL items, as 
well as satisfaction of the DSM's diagnostic criteria and the CBCL's cut-off scores. 
Except for correspondences between one DSM-III-R disorder and one CBCL 
dimension, the study also examined other types of relations. The results of this study 
can be used subsequently as a basis for investigating potential differences of 
DSM-III-R and CBCL classification for clinical assessment and intervention. The 
results have been used in this thesis as a starting-point for the construction of cases 
that are classifiable in both the DSM-III-R and the CBCL. 
In addition, the comparison may serve two other functions. First, finding 
correspondence between DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL scales would strengthen the 
validity of these systems (Quay, 1986b). Second, a better understanding of the 
relations between DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL dimensions would facilitate 
communication among mental health practitioners who use these approaches, and 
promote the transfer of information. 
2.3.2 Method 
The comparison was accomplished in four steps: (1) selection of DSM-III-R 
disorders and CBCL scales; (2) translation of DSM-III-R disorders into CBCL items; 
(3) representation of DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL scales; and (4) development of 
a computer program to perform the comparison. These steps are described below. 
Selection of CBCL scales and DSM-III-R disorders 
As the research for this thesis started before the publication of the 1991 CBCL 
profiles (Achenbach, 1991b), the syndrome scales from the 1983 Revised Child 
Behavior Profiles (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983 a) were used. The six profiles 
comprise 51 scales, presented in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 Scales of the six Revised Child Behavior Profiles based on the CBCL 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Boys aged 4-5 
Social Withdrawal 
Depressed 
Immature 
Somatic Complaints 
Sex Problems 
Schizoid 
Aggressive 
Delinquent 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Boys aged 6-11 
Schizoid or Anxious 
Depressed 
Uncommunicative 
Obsessive-Compul-
sive 
Somatic Complaints 
Social Withdrawal 
Hyperactive 
Aggressive 
Delinquent 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Boys aged 12-16 
Somatic Complaints 
Schizoid 
Uncommunicative 
Immature 
Obsessive-Compul-
sive 
Hostile Withdrawal 
Delinquent 
Aggressive 
Hyperactive 
Girls aged 4-5 Girls aged 6-11 
27 Somatic Complaints 35 Depressed 
28 Depressed 36 Social Withdrawal 
29 Schizoid or Anxious 37 Somatic Complaints 
30 Social Withdrawal 38 Schizoid-Obsessive 
31 Obese 
32 Aggressive 
33 Sex Problems 
34 Hyperactive 
39 Hyperactive 
40 Sex Problems 
41 Delinquent 
42 Aggressive 
43 Cruel 
Girls aged 12-16 
44 Anxious Obsessive 
45 Somatic Complaints 
46 Schizoid 
47 Depressed With-
drawal 
48 Immature Hyper-
active 
49 Delinquent 
50 Aggressive 
51 Cruel 
CHAPTER 2 
The starting point for the selection of DSM-III-R disorders were the behavioral 
and emotional disorders of the chapter entitled "Disorders Usually First Evident in 
Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence". Disorders that did not fit the age range of the 
CBCL (such as disorders of infancy) were deleted. Because the CBCL only contains 
behavioral characteristics, disorders in which a possible cause is part of the diagnostic 
criteria were also deleted (e.g., Reactive Attachment Disorder of Infancy or Early 
Childhood, which requires that "grossly pathogenic care" is presumed to be 
responsible for the disturbed behavior). Disorders without specific diagnostic criteria 
(e.g., Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified) were considered 
as too vague for inclusion. The remaining disorders were supplemented with some 
disorders not specifically outlined for, but also applicable to children, including 
disorders of the kind that appeared in earlier comparisons (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 
1983a, 1987; Edelbrock & Costello, 1988a; Verhuist et al., 1990). Table 2.3 presents 
the resulting 47 DSM-III-R disorders that have been involved in the comparison. 
Translation of DSM-III-R disorders into CBCL items 
The next step involved the "translation" of the behavioral features of the 47 
DSM-III-R disorders into the (usually) more concrete and smaller number of CBCL 
problem items. For example, the fourth symptom of criterion A of DSM's Conduct 
Disorder ("has deliberately engaged in fire-setting") has a counterpart in item 72 of 
the CBCL ("Sets fires"). The open CBCL items 113 ("Please write in any problems 
your child has that were not listed above") and 56h ("Other physical problems 
without known medical cause (describe)") have not been used for the translation of 
the DSM disorders, because they do not occur in any of the CBCL scales. The 
original American versions of the CBCL and the DSM-III-R were used, and the 
scoring instructions of the CBCL (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a, p. 187-188) were 
followed. 
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Tabel 2J DSM-III-R disorders involved in the comparison with the CBCL 
1 
2* 
3* 
4* 
5 
6* 
7* 
8 
9 
10» 
11* 
12* 
Autistic Disorder 
Attention-deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder 
Conduct Disorder 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder 
Separation Anxiety Disorder 
Avoidant Disorder of Childhood 
or Adolescence 
Overanxious Disorder 
Anorexia Nervosa 
Bulimia Nervosa 
Pica 
Gender Identity Disorder of Child-
hood 
Transsexualism 
25* 
26* 
27* 
28* 
29* 
30* 
31* 
32 
33 
34 
35* 
36* 
Schizophrenia 
Delusinal (Paranoid) Disorder 
Schizophreniform Disorder 
Manic Episode 
Major Depressive Episode 
Dysthymia 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
Body Dysmorphic Disorder 
Hypochondriasis 
Somatization Disorder 
Somatoform Pain Disorder 
Undifferentiated Somatoform 
13 Gender Identity Disorder of Ado-
lescence or Adulthood Nontrans-
sexual Type (GIDAANT) 
37* 
14 
15* 
16* 
17* 
18* 
19* 
20* 
21* 
22 
23* 
24 
Tourette's Disorder 
Chronic Motor or Vocal Tic Dis-
order 
Transient Tic Disorder 
Functional Encopresis 
Functional Enuresis 
Cluttering 
Stuttering 
Elective Mutism 
Identity Disorder 
Stereotypy/Habit Disorder 
Psychoactive Substance Abuse 
38 
39 
40* 
41 
42* 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Disorder 
Insomnia Disorder (primary or 
related to another mental disor-
der) 
Paranoid Personality Disorder 
Schizoid Personality Disorder 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder 
Borderline Personality Disorder 
Histrionic Personality Disorder 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder 
Avoidant Personality Disorder 
Dependent Personality Disorder 
Obsessive Compulsive Persona-
lity Disorder 
Passive Agressive Personality 
Disorder 
Note. Asterisks denote disorders that could be translated into CBCL items wel enough to meet 
their diagnostic criteria. 
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In translating, some of the DSM criteria were left out. First, the few negative criteria, 
requiring the absence of certain symptoms,8 could not be translated, because of the 
non-occurrence of similar items in the CBCL. Further, of the positive behavioral 
criteria of the DSM-III-R, criteria with regard to normal behavior9 and minimal 
duration10 were left aside. In the CBCL normal behavior appears in the special 
social competence items which are not part of the syndromes. The time span of the 
CBCL covers the previous six months, whereas classification of a number of 
DSM-III-R disorders requires a longer period of time. Inclusion of these types of 
criteria would lead to unduly restrictive results. 
In translating the DSM disorders, a strict procedure was followed. In case of 
doubt whether a certain CBCL item was a proper counterpart of a DSM symptom, 
the CBCL item was excluded. The reason for this procedure is that, in view of the 
purpose of the study, missing a correspondence (false negative) is considered less 
serious than admitting an improper correspondence (false positive). 
The translation was first performed individually by a professor of child and 
adolescent psychiatry and the author, and then discussed until consensus was reached. 
Most of the problems in translating arose when DSM criteria or (to a lesser degree) 
CBCL items were abstract or open. Examples of abstract DSM criteria are those 
regarding the severity of the disturbance, such as interference with normal activities 
or impairment of functioning (see, for instance, Stereotypy/Habit Disorder, Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder, Manic Episode, Schizophrenia). For example, criterion В of 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder reads: "The obsessions or compulsions cause marked 
distress, are time-consuming (take more than an hour a day), or significantly interfere 
with the person's normal routine, occupational functioning, or usual social activities 
or relationships with others". Sometimes, instances of more concrete behavior could 
be taken from the description of the disorder preceding the diagnostic criteria. In 
other cases, the translators had to rely on their own knowledge and experience and 
those of consultants. Likewise, the CBCL contains items that are relatively open 
(e.g., item 84, "Strange behavior (describe)") or abstract (e.g., item 41, "Impulsive 
or acts without thinking"). In spite of these difficulties, the proportion of agreement 
with an independent translator (graduate student) with respect to ten randomly 
8 E.g., criterion С of GIDAANT: "No persistent preoccupation (for at least two years) with 
getting rid of one's primary and secondary sex characteristics and acquiring the sex 
characteristics of the other sex (as in Transsexualism)". 
9 E.g., criterion В of Elective Mutism: "Ability to comprehend spoken language and to 
speak". 
10 E.g., criterion A of Somatization Disorder: "... and persisting for several years". 
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selected DSM disorders ranged from .56 to 1.00, with an average of .87 and a 
median of .94. 
Because we wanted the results of our comparison to be as reliable and certain as 
possible, without being unduly restrictive, we checked the effect of leaving out the 
abstract DSM criteria in the comparison and confining ourselves to core symptoms. 
It appeared that the resulting correspondences were much less in number than when 
the abstract criteria were included. For example, if criterion В of Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder is omitted, there will be no correspondence with the CBCL 
scale Obsessive Compulsive of boys 6-11 (items 47, 50, and 100 missing). In clinical 
practice such correspondences may appear. For that reason, and because the 
intertranslator agreement is satisfactory, we decided to retain these abstract DSM 
criteria in the final comparison. 
The difference in level of abstraction between DSM symptoms and CBCL items 
meant that sometimes two or more CBCL items were available for the translation of 
one DSM symptom or criterion. For example, the third symptom of criterion A of 
DSM's Oppositional Defiant Disorder ("often actively defies or refuses adult requests 
or rules, e.g., refuses to do chores at home") can be translated in the CBCL items 22 
("Disobedient at home") and 23 ("Disobedient at school"). Occasionnally, the reverse 
situation of one rather abstract CBCL item corresponding to two more specific DSM 
symtoms occurred. 
Not all of the DSM-III-R disorders could be translated well enough to meet their 
diagnostic criteria. Symptoms in DSM-III-R are often less specific in the CBCL (e.g., 
symptoms of Separation Anxiety) or, are not included (e.g., symptoms of Autistic 
Disorder). In all, 28 DSM-III-R disorders remained to be used in the next step. They 
are marked with an asterisk in Table 2.3. A complete translation of all pertinent 
DSM disorders as well as accounts of the translations are given in Vermande, 
Weusten, Coppen & Kracht (1993). As an example, in Table 2.4, the full translation 
of the DSM syndrome Conduct Disorder is given. 
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Table 2.4 Translation of the diagnostic criteria for Conduct Disorder into CBCL items 
DSM-III-R criteria 
A A disturbance of conduct lasting at 
least six months, during which at 
least three of the following have 
been present: 
(1) has stolen without confron-
tation of a victim on more 
CBCL items 
81 Steals at home 
82 Steals outside the home 
than one occasion (including 
forgery) 
(2) has run away from home over-
night at least twice while 
living in parental or parental 
surrogate home (or once 
without returning) 
(3) often lies (other than to avoid 
physical or sexual abuse) 
(4) has deliberately engaged in 
fire-setting 
(5) is often truant from school 
(for older person, absent from 
work) 
(6) has broken into someone el-
se's house, building, or car 
(7) has deliberately destroyed 
others' property (other than by 
fire-setting) 
(8) has been physically cruel to 
animals 
(9) has forced someone into sex-
ual activity with him or her 
(10) has used a weapon in more 
than one fight 
67 Runs away from home 
43 Lying or cheating 
72 Sets fires 
101 Truancy, skips school 
21 Destroys things belonging to his/her 
family or other children 
106 Vandalism 
IS Cruel to animals 
(11) often initiates physical fights 37 Gets in many fights 
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(12) has stolen with confrontation 
of a victim (e.g., mugging, 
purse-snatching, extortion, 
armed robbery) 
(13) has been physically cruel to 57 Physically attacks people 
people 
В If 18 or older, does not meet criteria 
for Antisocial Personality Disorder. 
Mild. Few if any conduct problems in 
excess of those required to make the diag­
nosis, and conduct problems cause only 
minor harms to others. 
Moderate. Number of conduct problems 
and effect on others intermediate between 
"mild" and "severe". 
Severe. Many conduct problems in excess 
of those required to make the diagnosis, 
or conduct problems cause considerable 
harm to others, e.g., serious physical in­
jury to victims, extensive vandalism or 
then, prolonged absence from home. 
312JO group type 39 Hangs around with children who get 
The essential feature is the predominance in trouble 
of conduct problems occurring mainly as 
a group activity with peers. Aggressive 
physical behavior may or may not be 
present 
312.00 solitary aggressive type 
The essential feature is the predominance 
of aggressive physical behavior, usually 
towards both adults and peers, initiated by 
the person (not as a group activity). 
(No additional items) 
(No additional items) 
(No additional items) 
25 Doesn't get along with other child­
ren 
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312.90 undifferentiated type - (No additional items) 
This is a subtype for children or ado­
lescents with Conduct Disorder with a 
mixture of clinical features that cannot be 
classified as either Solitary Aggressive 
Type or Group Type. 
Representation of translated DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL scales 
Basically, the disorders of the DSM-III-R and the scales of the CBCL are described 
as rules. For example, the rule for Conduct Disorder runs as follows: 
If at least three of the following 13 symptoms are present 
And the disturbance lasts at least six months 
And not the person does meet the criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder 
Then Conduct Disorder is involved. 
In this rule-like structure the logical connective "or" is implicit. There are two types 
of "or". First there is the "or" caused by the "at least" (as in the first condition). At 
least three out of thirteen, allows not only all different sets of three symptoms out 
of thirteen, but also all the different sets of four, five, six, ...., thirteen symptoms. 
Due to the translation of DSM-III-R disorders into CBCL items, a second type of 
"or" occurs: sometimes a symptom can be translated by more than one item (previous 
section). The complexity of the rules is increased by the presence of so many "or's". 
We decided to describe the rules for the disorders and the scales as facts. The 
way we represented the DSM-III-R and CBCL classes as facts enabled us to give a 
compact and uniform description of complex information. This uniformity was 
achieved by allowing recursion in the syntax of the facts (specifically, using nested 
lists). According to this representation a DSM fact looks as follows: 
disorder('NAME',RLIST). 
NAME and RLIST are variables. For NAME the names of the different disorders can 
be entered. The list RLIST (requirement list) is a LIST of one or more elements (i.e., 
CBCL items) and a number N that indicates bow many elements minimally are 
required. The power of this representation lies in the possibility that every element 
of the LIST can be an RLIST. The most simple disorder has the following structure: 
d i s o r d e r ( ' A ' , [ [ b ] , 1 ] ) . 
That is, one out of b (thus b is required). A more complicated version is 
d i s o r d e r ( ' A ' , [ [ b , c , d ] , 2 ] ) . 
Or, minimally two out of b, c, d (thus either {b,c} or {b,d} or {c,d} is required; 
{b,c,d} is also possible). When element с is an RLIST, the notation is, for example, 
d i s o r d e r ( ' A ' , [ [ b , [ [ e , f ] , 1 ] , d ] , 2 ] ) . 
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which means that the possibilities are {b,e}, {b,f}, {b,d}, {e,d}, {f>d}, {b,e,f}, 
{e,f,d}, {b,e,d}, {b,f,d} and {b,e,f,d}. For example, Conduct Disorder is represented 
as: 
d i sorder ( 'Conduct D i s o r d e r ' , [ [ [ [ [ [ 8 1 , 8 2 ] , 1 ] , 6 7 , 4 3 , 7 2 , 
101, [ [ 2 1 , 1 0 6 ] , 1 ] , 1 5 , 3 7 , 5 7 ] , 3 ] , [ [ 3 9 , 2 5 ] , 0 ] ] , 2 ] ) . 
It has to be read as follows: Conduct Disorder consists of two parts, namely 
[ [ [ [ 8 1 , 8 2 ] , 1 ] , 6 7 , 4 3 , 7 2 , 1 0 1 , [ [ 2 1 , 1 0 6 ] , 1 ] , 1 5 , 3 7 , 5 7 ] , 3 ] and 
[ [ 3 9 , 2 5 ] , 0 ] , which are both required. The first part says that at least three of 
the following items must be present: 81 or 82; 67; 43; 72; 101; 21 or 106; 15; 37; 
and 57. The second part says that the items 25 and 39 can be additional symptoms 
(in case of the group type and solitary aggressive type of Conduct Disorder 
respectively), but that they are not required. An RLIST with N = 0 thus always 
succeeds. However, such an RLIST is not trivial because it may increase the number 
of overlapping items in a comparison with CBCL scales. 
Representations of the translated DSM-III-R disorders are presented in Table 2.5. 
Note that untranslatable DSM symptoms are not indicated separately. 
Table 2.5 Representations of the translated DSM-III-R disorders 
d i s o r d e r ( ' A t t e n t i o n - d e f i c i t H y p e r a c t i v i t y D i s o r d e r ' , 
[ [ [ [ 1 0 , 1 0 , 8 , 4 1 , 4 1 , 8 , 8 , 8 , [ [ 1 0 , 4 1 , 6 8 , 1 0 4 ] , 1 ] , 9 3 , 4 1 , [ [ 8 , 4 
1 ] , 2 ] , [ [ 4 1 , 3 6 ] , 1 ] ] , 8 ] , [ [ 4 8 , 6 1 ] , 0 ] ] , 2 ] ) . 
d i sorder ( 'Conduct D i s o r d e r ' , 
[ [ [ [ [ [ 8 1 , 8 2 ] , 1 ] , 6 7 , 4 3 , 7 2 , 1 0 1 , [ [ 2 1 , 1 0 6 ] , 1 ] , 1 5 , 3 7 , 5 7 ] , 3 ] 
, [ [ 3 9 , 2 5 ] , 0 ] ] , 2 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' O p p o s i t i o n a l D e f i a n t D i s o r d e r ' , 
[ [ [ [ 9 5 , 3 , [ [ 2 2 , 2 3 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 1 6 , 9 4 ] , 1 ] , 8 6 , 9 0 ] , 5 ] , [ [ 2 5 , 4 8 ] , 0 ] 
] , 2 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' A v o i d a n t Disorder of Childhood or A d o l e s c e n c e ' , 
[ [ [ [ 2 5 , 2 9 , 7 1 , 7 5 , 1 1 1 ] , 5 ] , [ [65] , 0 ] ] , 2 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' O v e r a n x i o u s D i s o r d e r ' , 
[ [ [ [ 2 9 , 2 9 , [ [ 2 , 2 4 , 4 9 , 5 1 , 5 4 , 5 6 1 , 5 6 2 , 5 6 3 , 5 6 4 , 5 6 5 , 5 6 6 , 5 6 7 ] 
,1], 71, 45], 4] , [ [100, 29, 30], 0] ] , 2]) . 
disorder('Pica', [[28],1]). 
disorder('Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood (fema-
les) ', [[110,73],2]). 
disorder('Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood (males)', 
[[[[110],1], [[5,731,1]],2]). 
disorder('Transsexualism', [[[[110,73],2], [ [5],0]],2]) . 
disorder('Chronic Motor or Vocal Tic Disorder/Transient 
Tic Disorder', [ [46],1]). 
disorder('Functional Encopresis', [ [6],1]). 
disorder('Functional Enuresis', [ [107,108],1]). 
disorder('Cluttering/Stuttering', [ [79],1]). 
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d i s o r d e r ( ' E l e c t i v e Mutism', [ [ 6 5 ] , 1 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' S t e r e o t y p y / H a b i t D i s o r d e r ' , 
[ [ [ [ [ [ 3 6 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 1 0 0 ] , 0 ] ] , 2 ] , [ [ [ [ 4 6 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 3 6 , 1 0 0 ] , 1 ] ] , 2 ] 
, [ [ [ [ 4 4 , 5 8 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 3 6 ] , 1 ] ] , 2 ] ] , 1 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' S c h i z o p h r e n i a ' , 
[ [ [ [ [ [ 8 5 , [ [ 4 0 , 7 0 ] , 1 ] , 1 3 , 8 4 ] , 2 ] , 8 5 , 4 0 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 1 1 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 4 8 
, 5 7 , 6 1 , 1 0 1 , 1 1 1 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 1 1 1 , 6 1 , 8 4 , 8 5 , [ [ 4 0 , 7 0 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 8 0 , 1 0 2 
] . 1 ] ] , 0 ] ] , 3 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' D e l u s i o n a l D i s o r d e r ' , 
[ [ [ [ 8 5 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 4 0 , 7 0 ] , 0 ] ] , 2 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' S c h i z o p h r e n i f o r m D i s o r d e r ' , 
[ [ [ [ [ [ 8 5 , [ [ 4 0 , 7 0 ] , 1 ] , 1 3 , 8 4 ] , 2 ] , 8 5 , 4 0 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 1 1 1 , 6 1 , 8 4 , 8 
5, [ [ 4 0 , 7 0 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 8 0 , 1 0 2 ] , 1 ] ] , 0 ] ] , 2 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' M a n i c E p i s o d e ' , 
[ [ [ [ 8 6 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 7 6 , 9 3 , 8 , 1 0 , [ [ 7 3 1 , 8 4 ] , 1 ] ] , 4 ] , [ [ 1 3 , 1 9 , 3 6 , 4 8 
, 6 1 1 , 1 ] , [ [ 4 0 , 7 0 , 8 4 , 8 5 ] , 0 ] ] , 4 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' M a j o r D e p r e s s i v e E p i s o d e ' , 
[ [ [ [ [ [ [ [ 8 6 , 1 0 3 ] , 1 ] , [ [ [ [ 8 0 , 1 1 1 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 2 4 , 5 3 , 5 5 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 77 , 
100] , 1 ] , [ [ 1 0 , 5 8 , 1 0 2 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 54 ,102 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 3 5 , 5 2 , 8 5 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 
8 , 1 3 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 1 8 , 3 6 % 9 1 ] , 1 ] ] , 4 ] ] , 2 ] , [ [ [ [ 8 0 , 1 1 1 ] , 1 ] , [ [ [ [ 8 6 
, 1 0 3 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 2 4 , 5 3 , 5 5 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 77 ,100 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 1 0 , 5 8 , 1 0 2 1 , 1 ] , [ 
[ 5 4 , 1 0 2 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 3 5 , 5 2 , 8 5 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 8 , 1 3 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 1 8 , 3 6 \ 91] , 1] ] 
, 4 ] ] , 2 ] ] , 1 ] , [ [ 2 4 , 6 1 , 1 1 1 , 4 0 , 7 0 , 8 5 ] , 0 ] ] , 2 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' D y s t h y m i a ' , 
[ [ [ [ 8 6 , 1 0 3 ] , 1 ] , [ [ [ [ 2 4 , 5 3 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 7 7 , 1 0 0 ] , 1 ] , [ [ 5 4 , 1 0 2 ] , 1 ] 
, 3 5 , 8 ] , 2 ] ] , 2 ] ) . 
d i s o r d e r ( ' O b s e s s i v e Compulsive D i s o r d e r ' , 
[ [ [ [ 9 , 6 6 ] , 1 ] , [ [14a , 2 4 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 4 5 , 4 7 , 5 0 , 6 1 , 9 9 , 1 0 0 , 1 0 3 , 1 1 1 
,112],1]],2]). 
disorder('Somatoform Pain Disorder',[[561,562,566],1]). 
disorder('Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder', 
[ [2,24,49,51,54,563,564,565,567] , 1] ) . 
disorder('Insomnia Disorder', 
[[[[100],1], [[8,54,61,86,102,109] ,1]],2]) . 
disorder('Schizotypal Personality Disorder', 
[[85,29,85, [[40,70],1] ,84,25, [ [34,89],1]],5]) . 
disorder('Histrionic Personality Disorder', 
[[[[19, 731, 95, 87], 4 ] , [ [74] , 0] ] , 2] ) . 
Note. The superscript 1 (in Manic Episode and Histrionic Personality Disorder) means: this 
item occurs only in the case of adolescents (age group 12-16). The superscript 2 (in Major 
Depressive Episode and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder) means: this item occurs only in the 
case of young children (age group 4-5). 
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The representation of Attention-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (Table 2.5) shows 
that each of the rather abstract CBCL items 8, 10, and 41 has been used as a 
translation for three or more distinct DSM symptoms. This kind of situation does not 
occur in the representation of any other DSM disorder. In order to preclude lenient 
results, it was decided that every item could be a translation of two DSM symptoms 
at the most. Possible other symptoms translated by that item could not contribute to 
the fulfilment of the DSM criterion (in step 4). 
Representing CBCL scales was less complicated than representing DSM disorders: 
no single item is crucial to a CBCL scale (polythetic format). Neither are there any 
"or's" of the second type to be considered. Furthermore, RLISTs with N = 0 do not 
occur. This means that apart from the relevant items, only the minimally required 
number of items had to be considered. Because DSM often requires a symptom to 
be considerably more frequent than normal (see for instance Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder), we assumed that every item counts as two points. For example, the scale 
Schizoid of boys 4-5, for which a score of minimal six points is considered to be 
clinical, is represented as: 
s c a l e ( ' S c h i z o i d ' , [ [18,40,53,66,67,70,76,85,100],3]) . 
Only when the presence of a symptom is not prominent according to DSM-III-R (e.g. 
criterion В of Delusional Disorder), the relevant items were counted as 1 point. 
Development of the computer program 
The next step in the comparison was the development of a computer program which 
matches DSM-III-R disorders with CBCL scales. An initial algorithm was developed 
and tested in Prolog (the syntax of the representations of the DSM-III-R and CBCL 
syndromes fits the syntax of this programming language; see, e.g., Clocksin & 
Mellish, 1984). The final version was implemented in Spitbol. The algorithm is 
subdivided into two modules, one for tracing correspondences between a single 
DSM-III-R disorder and a single CBCL scale, and one for finding other types of 
correspondence. The first module determines the common items or overlap for every 
combination of a DSM-III-R disorder with a CBCL scale (see the cells of the matrix 
of Table 2.6). If there is no overlap, then the DSM disorder and the CBCL scale are 
completely disjunct. If the overlap meets the criteria of both the DSM-III-R disorder 
and the CBCL scale, then a full correspondence is found. In all other cases of 
overlap, partial correspondences are involved. The second module attempts to 
improve the overlaps (of both correspondences and partial correspondences). For that 
purpose, every other DSM disorder as well as every other CBCL scale of the relevant 
age/sex group is added to each combination of an overlapping DSM disorder and 
CBCL scale. When the overlap has increased, it is determined whether the criteria 
of the DSM disorders and the CBCL scales are met (i.e., whether a correspondence 
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is involved). This procedure yields a list with new correspondences and a new set of 
overlaps. The same procedure is then applied to the new set of overlaps, which again 
produces a list of new correspondences and new overlaps. The procedure ends when 
no single overlap can be improved. More detailed information about the program can 
be found in the technical report (Vermande et al., 1993). 
In the second module, disorders that can not co-occur according to DSM-III-R 
(like Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Conduct Disorder) have not been combined. 
However, disorders that in the opinion of DSM-III-R can go together under special 
conditions (e.g., "occurrence not exclusively during the course of a Mood disorder") 
have been used to form combinations. The program considers the fact that some 
DSM disorders are restricted to a certain age range (e.g., Transsexualism and Gender 
Identity Disorder of Childhood) and a certain sex (e.g., the male and female version 
of Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood). 
2.3.3 Results 
Comparing single syndromes: first-order correspondences 
The first module of the matching-algorithm compares every DSM-III-R disorder with 
every CBCL scale. The results may be denoted as first-order correspondences. For 
girls aged 6-11, the complete results of the first-order comparison are given in Table 
2.6. Tables with the results of the remaining five age/sex groups can be found in 
Vermande et al. (1993). In Table 2.6, the rows are for DSM-III-R disorders and the 
columns are for CBCL profile scales. An empty cell means that a combination of a 
DSM disorder and a CBCL scale has nothing in common. In all, about 60% of the 
cells in the tables are empty. Some DSM-III-R disorders show no overlap with any 
CBCL scale. For example, in Table 2.6, Pica, the Tic Disorders, Functional Enuresis, 
and Functional Encopresis show no overlap. In the filled cells, numbers refer to the 
CBCL items that a particular pair of one DSM disorder and one CBCL scale have 
in common. Several kinds or degrees of correspondence are noted. 
50 
COMPARISON OF THE DSM-IU-R AND THE CBCL 
1 
ve 
•о 
<u 
es 
ca 
¿η 
'Ski 
О 
Vi 
75 
и 
M 
s 
IS 
О. 
-J 
и 
β 
и 
« 
"О 
в 
a 
и 
ь 
« 
Ό 
i . 
e 
•3 
ой 
I 
V . 
о 
и 
E 
.•S 
о 
E 
E 
о 
υ 
«β 
IS 
_u 
Ξ 
я 
Η 
г 
υ 
> 
'а 
< 
Ή 
о 
э 
«Г 
.г 
S 
«л 
ε 
M CL 
¡s « 
f! 
• u 
'δ
 и 
.а и 
ао О 
¿1 
5δ 
та 
о Я 
•а 
2 
о. 
оо" 
оо о 
—"" СП 
•* 0 \ 
os 
•ч- _ 
о" о 
^ , со 
оо те 
5 
1 і ч 
1 »< η 
П . 
с> 
'Я 
ел « 
m оо 
о 
Ω 
1 
•о 
с 
δ 
О 
. 00 > 
N t » 
< Ч « τι-" 
о CS, Oj. 
t r i * 
m fN oo 
о 
o\ 
00 
TT 
cn 
I N 
73 
Ici 
о а 
о. ts 
ss 
» η 
t > 
vi" 
v£> 
vT 
D 
1 
'5 
> 
< 
о 
о 
ел 
VO 
- _ г " 1 
-.' i ·ρ ν ; 
й *> VO VO 
« « Í ve J? 
Ν Ι Λ V i V i 
i n 
о 
Q 
'χ 
S 
а 
cd 
•β 
с 
о 
•a 
υ 
•о 
5 d 
'S 
.а 
υ н 
•а -а 
о e 
"β & 
§ щ 
и. ш 
51 
CHAPTER 2 
Ξ 
υ 
§8 
< 
с 
υ 
э 
σ* 
.S 
S 
ο ε 
ел 0 . 
fcl 
3 8 
« о 
£1 
e 
il 
о о 
и U 
•а 
1 
« 5 > 
Ό 
(Λ 
СЛ 
к 
о. 
& 
•а 
S .а 
.S а 
U £1 
С S 
э с 
Р- Ш 
0\ 
г~ 
"Ob ы> 
•S .ε 
l ì 
E 
•я 
3 
υ 
> 
ш 
о 
о 
о. . 
te 
E IS 
ел Я 
ο β 
Ч-„ 
« η 
О 
αο 
0 0 
• * 
m" 
Ч · " 
0 0 
о" (—_ 
θ " « η 
· * OS 
о 
о" 
00, „ 
—
" 
S 
'S I 
.§ 
J 3 
υ 
о » 
«о 
r-Г 
» 
0 0 * 
•ч-„ 
O s m 
— O s 
o\ 
oo" 
4-, 
o" 
0 0 ЧО 
-I I 
"-1 - Is 
о • e m • _ r ._ 
" 1 * " | § s 
Q 
•a 
e 
.g 
'от 
3 
a 
r i 
о 
о" 
-
' с 
ï 
il 
m 
•g 
.2 
fi" 
U 
'i 
VC 
OO 
vq 
fW 
o" 
" О 
OO OO 
О g 
r- —' 
o" —" 
4 . Οχ 
oo" w-T 
— ' 0 0 
r» 
•Ч-" 
rî 
e „ 
Ï5 
m e 
r i — 
»г m 
«Λ о 
m —• 
ci. 
Ш 
υ > 
'и 
4 s. Is 
VC 
OO 
0 0 
δ 
r-
r-
ч·" 
m 
о 
r i 
о 
r - i 
о 
•Χ" 
a 
В 
VC 
S 
í 
r* 
•ч· 
п->" 
о 
в" _г 
*\ « 
vT -* 
• * - C l " Г ) 
О О — 
m -* ~* 
Q' 
и 
'К з 
SI 
52 
COMPARISON OF THE DSM-III-R AND THE CBCL 
*t5 
s 
υ 
4> 
> v> 
1 
** 
e 
ν 
э 
σ" 
.5 
S 
i 
J¿ 
Ч s 
й о 
υ С (Л cu 
M X ¡3 
ι Ш 
'S "* Ij 
ю О 
£1 
5(3 
та 
» 
я 
• a ì 
8 s6 
^ 
υ 
a 
к 
о, & 
-
Я 
л" 
«Г 
1 
eu 
g 
ε 
и Q 
Ι 
I Is** hu 
•o 
ä° ? 1 
D и 
S 
>0 
00 
CS 
oo 
s 
^ 
«л 
CS 
о 
Q 
.S 
о 
ОТ 
С 
»Λ 
«S 
αο 
о" 
О v> 
•ч- oo 
e 
CU 
•a 
! 
CA α 
Ш 
<·- чэ о-
ο S — 
g 'и и 
•S С > 
и ь. и 
a l * 
а & vi 
• Id о 
if "g * 
S S e 
c «S _ 
« t¡> . 
•Ο g Ό 
с a s 
a-'S ? 
S i-а 
73 η 8 
В і н С 
•S 2-8 
в g в 
·- 3 °· 
I j g 
-ill 
ñ 8 A q. 8.» 
If* 
£ 8 ta 
S -a s 
u о І 
sis 'S 
i § l ir¡ i § 5'S 
•с 
о .£ 
8 fe s 
-Sä 
-5 y -о 
^ (Л II 
es ·•, -w 
* d ? 
a и 
υ
 g 
» «I 
_ u en 
См С и 
° 0.4= • 
« è o¿ 
- Л -с •= 
О -Й • -
 с 
; і »"Б 
а I Г -3 
Q W я я 
53 
CHAPTER 2 
When the overlap is sufficient to meet the criteria of either one of the classifica-
tion systems, an unidirectional correspondence is involved. In such cases, the 
presence of the same set of symptoms leads to identification of a syndrome when the 
one classification system is used, but not when the other classification system is used. 
When the overlap is sufficient to meet the criteria of the DSM-III-R disorder, the left 
border of the relevant cell is marked with a bold line (for example, in Table 2.6: the 
overlap of Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Aggressive). When the overlap exceeds 
the cut-off score of the CBCL scale, the upper border of the cell is marked by a bold 
line (for example, in Table 2.6: the overlap of Overanxious Disorder and Somatic 
Complaints). In all, there are 93 unidirectional correspondences, 61 meeting the 
diagnostic criteria of the DSM-III-R and 32 falling in the clinical range of the CBCL. 
A combination of a bold left and a bold upper border line indicates that the criteria 
of both systems are met, that is, that a full or bidirectional correspondence is 
involved. This is, for example, the case with Conduct Disorder and Delinquent in 
Table 2.6. In all, 31 cases of bidirectional correspondence were found: 6 for boys 
4-5, 6 for boys 6-11, 2 for boys 12-16, 4 for girls 4-5, 6 for girls 6-11, and 7 for 
girls 12-16. They are presented in Table 2.7. Only a subset of the selected 
DSM-III-R disorders (10 out of 47) and CBCL scales (25 out of 51) occur in Table 
2.7. These results thus show that a majority of the DSM-III-R disorders have no 
counterpart among the profile scales of the CBCL and that a majority of the CBCL 
scales have no counterpart among the DSM-III-R categories. 
First-order comparisons involve just one DSM-III-R disorder and one CBCL scale 
at a time. Accordingly, the resulting correspondence may be called a one-to-one 
correspondence. However, sometimes a row or column syndrome turned out to have 
multiple bidirectional correspondences, that is, correspondences with more than one 
syndrome of the other classification system (see Table 2.7). With regard to 
DSM-III-R disorders, such a multiple correspondence occurred only once: Conduct 
Disorder corresponds with both Delinquent and Cruel of girls 6-11 (see also Table 
2.6). With regard to CBCL scales, six cases of multiple bidirectional correspondence 
appeared. In all cases, the CBCL scale corresponds with two single DSM disorders. 
An example is Schizoid-Obsessive of girls 6-11 (see also Table 2.6), which 
corresponds with both Schizophreniform Disorder and Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder. As is shown in Table 2.6, the first order results also involve instances of 
a multiple unidirectional correspondence, (i.e., a row or a column containing more 
than one unidirectional correspondence). 
54 
COMPARISON OF THE DSM-IH-R AND THE CBCL 
Table 2.7 One-to-one correspondences found in this study 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
-
-
+ 
-
-
-
-
+ 
-
-
-
• 
-
+ 
DSM-III-R disorder 
Attention-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
Conduct Disorder 
Conduct Disorder 
Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood 
(males) 
Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood 
(females) 
Schizophrenia 
Schizophreniform Disorder 
Schizophreniform Disorder 
Major Depressive Episode 
Major Depressive Episode 
Major Depressive Episode 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
Somatoform Pain Disorder 
Undifferentiated Somatoform 
Disorder 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder 
CBCL profile scale 
Hyperactive 
Delinquent 
Cruel 
Sex Problems 
Sex Problems 
Schizoid or Anxious 
Schizoid 
Schizoid-Obsessive 
Social Withdrawal 
Depressed Withdrawal 
Obsessive-Compulsive 
Obsessive-Compulsive 
Schizoid-Obsessive 
Anxious Obsessive 
Depressed 
Somatic Complaints 
Somatic Complaints 
Schizoid 
Group 
4 
1,2,3,5 
5,6 
1 
4 
2 
1,6 
5 
4,5 
6 
2 
2 
5 
6 
1 
1,2,6 
1-6 
6 
Note. Group 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 respectively stand for boys aged 4-5, boys aged 6-11, boys 
aged 12-16, girls aged 4-5, girls aged 6-11, and girls aged 12-16. Plus (+) and minus (-) signs 
refer respectively to agreements and disagreements with the results of the approximate 
relations of Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987), presented in Table 2.9. 
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Comparing combinations of syndromes: higher-order correspondences 
Multiple first-order correspondences, both unidirectional and bidirectional, are of 
interest for the second module of the matching-algorithm, because they suggest 
possible combinations of single syndromes that may result in fìlli or bidirectional 
correspondences. For example, the DSM-III-R disorder Schizophrenia corresponds 
unidirectionally to both the CBCL's Social Withdrawal for girls 6-11 and the 
CBCL's Schizoid-Obsessive for girls 6-11 (Table 2.6). When these two unidirectional 
correspondences are combined, the resulting overlap meets the criteria of the Social 
Withdrawal scale, the Schizoid-Obsessive scale, and Schizophrenia, and the resulting 
relation is a bidirectional correspondence between one DSM-III-R disorder with the 
combination of two CBCL scales. 
Compared with the first-order or one-to-one correspondences, combining two or 
more DSM syndromes and/or two or more CBCL scales resulted in more complex 
types of correspondence. The complexity of these higher-order correspondences 
increased as more DSM disorders and more CBCL scales were combined. For some 
age/sex groups, ultimately some very complex types of correspondence turned up, 
such as seven DSM disorders corresponding with five CBCL scales. Although 
interesting from an academic point of view, such complex types of correspondence 
are unikely, the more so because the co-occurrence of several DSM disorders is 
subject to certain restricions (see the last paragraph of the section on the development 
of the computer program). Therefore, we will only present types of correspondence 
involving no more than four syndromes in total. They are listed in Table 2.8. For 
every type of correspondence, an instance of an actual correspondence is given by 
placing the DSM-III-R disorder(s) on the left, the CBCL scale(s) on the right, and 
the overlapping items in the middle. A full presentation of all instances of these 
results is given in Vermande et al. (1993). 
In total, 12 one-to-two correspondences were found, 1 for the group of boys 4-5, 
2 for boys 6-11, 0 for boys 12-16, 1 for girls 4-5, 4 for girls 6-11, and 4 for girls 
12-16. With regard to the two-to-one type of correspondence, a total number of 49 
was found, the numbers per age/sex group being respectively 6, 17, 5, 9, 4, and 8. 
For the two-to-two type of correspondence, the total is 130, and the numbers per 
age/sex group are 30, 31, 5, 18, 28, and 18. A three-to-one type of correspondence 
appeared 46 times, the single numbers being 1, 27, 1, 13, 0, and 4. Finally, only 
twice was a one-to-three correspondence found, both times for the group of girls 
12-16. 
The higher-order correspondences show more explicitely and more often what 
could already be inferred from the multiple one-to-one correspondences of the first 
module, namely that the same set of symptoms can be grouped differently by the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL. 
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Degree of resemblance of corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes 
Inspecting the correspondences of a given type gives the impression that the 
DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes involved can bear a strong or weak resemblance, 
depending both on the number of the common symptoms and the number and content 
of the unique symptoms which each of them contain. Unfortunately, attempts to 
convert this subjective impression into an objective measure failed. This had several 
reasons. First, the abstract or open DSM-III-R criteria mentioned in the section about 
the translation, have not been explicated into single, concrete symptoms. That is, for 
these criteria the complete set of symptoms is unknown. Further, as was discussed 
in the same section, it sometimes occurred that one DSM symptom could be 
translated into two or more CBCL items, and vice versa. Measures for the degree of 
resemblance like the percentage of overlap cannot handle these problems. An 
additional problem is that such measures do not consider the content of the unique 
symptoms. Unique symptoms may be rather similar to the common symptoms with 
respect to their content or meaning, but they can also refer to totally different 
features (especially in the case of CBCL scales). This affects the degree of 
resemblance of corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes. For those reasons, 
it was decided to determine the degree of resemblance subjectively. The interrater 
reliability proved to be sufficient (Cohen's kappa = .80). 
The one-to-two, two-to-one, and two-to-two types mentioned in Table 2.8 are all 
instances of strongly resembling DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes. For example, the 
DSM's Conduct Disorder and the combination of the CBCL scales Delinquent and 
Cruel of girls 6-11 (one-to-two correspondence) have many common symptoms, 
while the few unique symptoms of the DSM and CBCL syndromes are similar. An 
example of a one-to-one correspondence with a strongly resembling DSM-III-R 
disorder and CBCL scale (Table 2.7) concerns the relation between Major Depressive 
Episode and Depressed Withdrawal of girls 12-16 (overlapping items: 54,77, 80, 86, 
102, 103, 111). 
Examples of weakly resembling DSM and CBCL syndromes for the types of 
correspondence mentioned above are listed below: 
One-to-one: Gender Identity of Childhood (for females) [73, 110] Sex Problems 
(girls 4-5). 
One-to-two: Major Depressive Episode [13, 54, 80, 85, 86, 100, 103] Obses-
sive-Compulsive + Uncommunicative (boys 6-11). 
Two-to-one: Insomnia Disorder (related to another mental disorder) + Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder [9, 14,29,45,50, 100, 109] Schizoid or Anxious 
(girls 4-5). 
Two-to-two: Conduct Disorder + Obsessive Compulsive Disorder [37, 39, 66, 67, 
72, 81, 82, 100, 106] Delinquent + Schizoid (boys 4-5). 
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For example, in contrast with the DSM's Conduct Disorder and the combination of 
the CBCL scales Delinquent and Cruel (girls 6-11), the DSM's Major Depressive 
Episode and the combination of the CBCL scales Uncommunicative and Obses-
sive-Compulsive (boys 6-11) do not bear a close resemblance, especially because of 
the number and content of the unique symptoms of the Obsessive-Compulsive scale. 
The degree of resemblance is less easily determinable in the more complex types 
of correspondence. 
2.3.4 Discussion 
The results with regard to the first-order correspondences may be summarized as 
follows: (a) About 30 (bidirectional) correspondences between one DSM-III-R 
disorder and one CBCL scale were found, in which only a subset of the selected 
DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL scales occurs. Thus, the majority of the DSM-III-R 
disorders has no counterpart among the profile scales of the CBCL, while most of 
the CBCL profile scales have no counterpart among the DSM-III-R categories; (b) 
These correspondences include 6 cases in which a single CBCL profile scale 
corresponds to two DSM-III-R disorders, and 1 case in which a single DSM-III-R 
disorder corresponds to two profile scales; (c) In more than 90 cases, the common 
items of a DSM-III-R disorder and a CBCL scale were only sufficient to meet the 
criteria of either one of the classification systems (unidirectional correspondences). 
Together with the first result (a) this leads to the conclusion that in many cases, the 
presence of the same set of symptoms can lead to identification of a syndrome when 
the one classification system is used, but not when the other system is used. 
The results with respect to the higher-order correspondences may be summarized 
as follows: (d) Well over 200 (bidirectional) higher-order correspondences were 
found. They show that the same set of symptoms can be grouped differently by the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL, in more than 100 cases resulting in a different number 
of syndromes that is identified in each of the two systems (e.g., one versus two, one 
versus three). Regarding both first-order and (the more simple types of) higher-order 
correspondences it appeared that (e) corresponding DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL 
syndromes can bear a strong or weak resemblance. 
Before considering the implications of our findings and relating them to the 
results of others, a discussion of some methodological issues concerning the validity 
of the results is in place. The main methodological problem is the fact that translating 
DSM symptoms into CBCL items requires judgement on the part of the translator. 
Such judgement can be influenced by the translator's personal style, knowledge and 
experience. For example, it appeared that translators (consultants and authors) who 
were predominantly active as clinicians were often less strict than translators who 
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were mainly working as researchers. Differences in translation may cause differences 
in the number and/or content of overlapping items, and hence differences in the DSM 
disorders and CBCL dimensions that are found to correspond, especially in cases of 
weak resemblance. However, we feel confident that the results of our analysis are 
essentially robust, especially because the intertranslator agreement was sufficient. The 
problem of judgement plays a part in all studies in which syndromes of different 
classification systems are matched (e.g., Quay, 1986b, p. 153). The present study has 
the advantage that person-bound matching occurred only on the level of symptoms 
(which are in most cases rather concrete) and that the matching of syndromes was 
completed by a computer program on the basis of diagnostic criteria and cut-off 
scores. This means that the matching of syndromes is less affected by judgemental 
inaccuracies due to the name of a syndrome and its associations, the number of 
common and unique items, and other sources of subjectivity. Moreover, in contrast 
to earlier matching studies, the present analysis is completely accessible to 
verification by others since the matching procedure and its result are reported in 
detail. That is, the basic translation of the DSM disorders, the representation of DSM 
disorders and CBCL scales, and the items that corresponding DSM disorders and 
CBCL dimensions have in common are available, along with a description of the 
matching algorithm (also see Vermande et al., 1993). In addition, a satisfactory 
degree of interjudge reliability was obtained. 
Another problem concerning the translation of DSM-III-R symptoms into CBCL 
items, not mentioned in other studies, is the fact that most but not all behavioral 
criteria have been included. The (few) negative criteria could not be translated and 
criteria with regard to normal behavior and a minimal duration of more than six 
months have been omitted. In our opinion, inclusion of these criteria would lead to 
unduly restrictive results. However, it must be noted that this omission reduces the 
degree of correspondence of the relevant DSM disorders with CBCL dimensions. 
In total, the results show a rather large number of correspondences (about 270), 
which is understandable in view of the polythetic format ("at least y items out of χ 
items") of most DSM and CBCL syndromes. The fact that the number of correspon­
dences varies widely over the various age/sex groups is more surprising. The large 
number of correspondences is in part due to our assumption that every item of a 
CBCL scale counts as two points (to meet DSM's repeatedly stated requirement that 
a symptom has to occur considerably more frequently than normal). By counting 
CBCL items (sometimes or always) as one point, fewer instances of overlap would 
reach the clinical range of the CBCL and fewer correspondences would turn up. On 
the other hand, the number of correspondences has been lowered because not all 
possible DSM-III-R disorders have been involved, the number of different symptoms 
of a DSM disorder for which the same CBCL item can count as a translation was 
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restricted to two (see the section on representation), and (possibly) by employing a 
strict translational procedure. 
Because the present comparison between DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL 
dimensions followed a different method than earlier studies (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 
1983a, 1987; Edelbrock & Costello, 1988a; Verhuist et al., 1990), it is necessary to 
compare our results to those of others. Two of the earlier studies employ the 
DSM-ΙΙΙ-Λ: Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987) and Verhuist et al. (1990). The 
relations presented by Verhuist et al. (1990) are partly based on a comparison of the 
DSM-III-R with replicated empirical syndromes (Achenbach et al., 1989). Therefore, 
we will concentrate on the findings of Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987, Table 8-3, 
p. 139-140; also presented in Achenbach & McConaughy, 1987, Table 7.2, p. 154). 
The relevant data are reproduced here in Table 2.9. Achenbach and Edelbrock 
established 14 "approximate relations" between DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes. 
The agreement between these relations and the one-to-one correspondences found in 
this study is limited, both with respect to number and content. As for number, it 
appears that a detailed comparison discovers much more correspondences than a 
global approach (31 versus 14). As for content, it appears that the detailed approach 
followed in the present comparison specifies the age/sex group of the CBCL scales, 
whereas the approximate comparison of Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987) does not 
(although in their comparison of 1983 Achenbach and Edelbrock (1983 a) did specify 
age/sex groups). Note that specification of the age/sex group is relevant because 
scales with the same label have been composed of different sets of items and can 
have different cut-off points. By not indicating age/sex groups, Achenbach and 
Edelbrock suggest that all scales with the same label correspond with the DSM 
disorder in question. This is clearly not the case, as is shown by the relation between 
Attention-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Hyperactive, which only applies to girls 
4-5 (see Table 2.7). Next, only six of the relations established by Achenbach and 
Edelbrock (1987) occur in the one-to-one correspondences found in this study. These 
include the relation between (Group Delinquent) Conduct Disorder and Delinquent, 
between Attention-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Hyperactive, between Gender 
Identity Disorder of Childhood and Sex Problems (boys 4-5), between Schizotypal 
Personality Disorder and Schizoid, between psychotic disorders and Schizoid, and 
between Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and Obsessive-Compulsive. In the set of 
relations determined by Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987), some are clearly missing. 
Examples are the relation between Conduct Disorder and Cruel (girls 6-11 and 
12-16), Major Depressive Episode and Depressed Withdrawal (girls 12-16), and 
Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder and Somatic Complaints (all age/sex groups). 
Conversely, the findings of Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987) contain some relations 
that are clearly improper. For example, (Solitary Aggressive) Conduct Disorder and 
61 
CHAPTER 2 
Aggressive have too few items in common to meet the high cut-off points of the 
Aggressive scales (the scale of girls 4-5 is the only one which comes close, see 
Vermande et al., 1993). The same holds for the relation between Dysthymia and the 
Depressed scales (fulfilment of the criteria of Dysthymia is also a problem here most 
of the time). Another example is the relation between Somatization Disorder and 
Somatic Complaints. Somatization Disorder requires more physical symptoms (at 
least 13 out of 35) than the Somatic Complaint scales contain. The DSM's 
Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder and sometimes Somatoform Pain Disorder are 
more appropriate here. 
Table 2.9 Approximate relations determined by Achenbach and Edelbrock 
DSM-III-R disorder CBCL profile scale Group 
Solitary Aggressive Conduct Disorder 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder 
+ Group Delinquent Conduct Disorder 
+ Attention-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
Overanxious Disorder 
Overanxious Disorder 
+ Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood 
(males) 
Schizoid Personality Disorder 
+ Schizotypal Personality Disorder 
+/- Psychotic Disorders 
Somatization Disorder 
+ Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
Major Depression 
Dysthymia 
Aggressive 
Aggressive 
Delinquent 
Hyperactive 
Anxious-Obsessive 
Schizoid-Anxious 
Sex problems boys 4-5 
Social Withdrawal 
Schizoid 
Schizoid 
Somatic Complaints 
Obsessive-Compulsive 
Depressed 
Depressed 
Note. Adapted from Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987). Plus (+) and minus (-) signs refer 
respectively to agreements and disagreements with the one-to-one correspondences found in 
the present study and presented in Table 2.7. 
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Considering that the relations indicated by Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987) are only 
approximate, we still cannot agree with their conclusion that "in making DSM 
diagnoses, scores in the clinical range on the empirically-derived scales would argue 
in favor of the corresponding DSM diagnoses listed in the left-hand column" of their 
table (p. 138). 
The set of relations determined by Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987) allows for 
inference of some one-to-two and two-to-one correspondences by combining 
one-to-one relations with a common syndrome. Thus, on the basis of a global 
approach too, the conclusion can be drawn that the DSM-III-R and the CBCL can 
identify a different number of syndromes. However, since the determination of other 
types than one-to-one correspondences was an additional goal of this study, we also 
looked for two-to-one and one-to-two correspondences other than being combinations 
of single one-to-one relations. Together with the more complicated types of 
correspondence we found, these correspondences form additional support for the 
conclusion in question. In all, it may be concluded that the present detailed 
comparison gives a more precise and complete image of the matching relations 
between DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL dimensions than the global approach, such 
as is presented by Achenbach and Edelbrock (1987). 
As a by-product, the present study may provide a basis for mental health 
practitioners to switch more easily from the one system to the other. In fact, the 
representations of the DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes (Table 2.5) are being used 
by Krol (current research) for the development of a computer program that gives 
both a DSM-III-R and a CBCL classification of observed symptoms. 
In addition, the application of the RLIST formalism to other domains (including 
the legal) is being studied by Weusten and Coppen (current research). For that, an 
expanded version of the RLIST formalism has been developed. In the expanded 
syntax, N can be an element of Ζ (thus including negative digits). This allows the 
use of the logical operator "not". 
Although it was not the main purpose of the present study, some issues with 
respect to the validity of the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems may be addressed too. 
It should be stressed, however, that a comparison like the present study can mainly 
raise questions rather than conclusions about the validity of the classification systems 
involved. As was discussed before, the validity of the DSM-III-R and CBCL is 
bolstered if their syndromes appear in the one-to-one correspondences (Table 2.7), 
especially when strong resemblance is involved. Examples of good matches are 
Conduct Disorder and Delinquent (boys 6-11), Schizophreniform Disorder and 
Schizoid (girls 12-16), and Major Depressive Episode and Depressed Withdrawal 
(girls 12-16). However, some relations between syndromes of the two systems are 
not as good as could be expected. An example is the weak matching of Atten-
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tion-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder with the several Hyperactivity scales. This can be 
explained by the fact that the DSM symptoms are often more specific instances of 
the items 8 ("Can't concentrate, can't pay attention for long"), 10 ("Can't sit still, 
restless, or hyperactive") and 41 ("Impulsive or acts without thinking"), and together 
form a more coherent description of the disturbance than appears from the statistical 
analysis of the CBCL. Unfortunately, a large number of DSM-III-R disorders and 
CBCL scales do not occur in the bidirectional correspondences. 
Table 2.3 showed that there are DSM-III-R disorders of which the symptoms do 
not occur (sufficiently enough) in the CBCL. Of course, such disorders can still be 
genuine syndromes. After all, "if something does not go into the analysis, it cannot 
come out" (Quay, 1986a, p. 10). An example is Autistic Disorder, which is generally 
recognized as a distinct psychopathological entity (e.g., Rutter & Schopler, 1988, p. 
427), also by Achenbach himself (Achenbach, 1982,1988). But even if the symptoms 
of Autistic Disorder and other rare syndromes found in the DSM-III-R (such as 
Anorexia Nervosa and Tourette's Disorder) would be represented in the CBCL, any 
one research sample would include too few children having these syndromes to 
appear in the principal components analytic results (Edelbrock, 1987). 
The fact that some disorders of the DSM-III-R are merely items in the CBCL 
(e.g., Pica, Transient Tic Disorder, Functional Encopresis, Functional Enuresis, 
Cluttering, Stuttering, Elective Mutism), a priori explains the absence of these 
disorders in one-to-one correspondences (Table 2.7). In the CBCL, each full scale is 
constructed to consist of at least six items, with a minimal cut-off score of 4 points. 
It was to be expected that the smallest DSM disorders would appear in the more 
complex types of correspondence. However, several items do not occur in any scale 
of the six Revised Child Behavior Profiles and thus cannot correspond with DSM 
disorders. These items are listed under the heading "Other problems" on the RCBP 
forms. For example, Pica (item 28) is only part of the Immature scale of boys 4-5, 
and Functional Enuresis (item 107/108) with item 108 only of Immature of boys 
12-16. Functional Encopresis (item 6) is not comprised by any of the 51 scales. The 
items 28 and 6 have been deleted from analysis in the groups of girls 6-11 and boys 
and girls 12-16 because they were reported for less than 5% of the children 
(Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a, p. 14). The same holds for item 107 for the groups 
aged 12-16. In the remaining RCBPs, they are missing because of low correlations 
with other items. Item 108 is always missing for that reason. The observations above 
show that in some age/sex groups, pica, encopresis and (especially) enuresis may be 
disturbances in themselves. It may also be concluded that it does not seem 
appropriate to put (a priori) the same minimum size to different syndromes. 
What about DSM disorders that could be translated rather well into CBCL items, 
are not very rare among referred children, consist of a set of symptoms, and still are 
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not present in one-to-one correspondences (Table 2.7)? Such disorders have little 
overlap with CBCL scales and/or are too mild to fall in the clinical range of the 
CBCL. The validity of such disorders may thus seem to be fairly low (although a 
definitive conclusion in this respect cannot be drawn). An example is the DSM's 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder. Its overlap with the six Aggressive scales is sufficient 
to meet the DSM's criteria, but (rather) insufficient to fall into the clinical range of 
the CBCL. Only the overlaps in the scales of boys 6-11 and girls 4-5 come close. 
The criteria of Oppositional Defiant Disorder are thus too liberal. Since the 
Aggresive scales consist of 22-25 items, it seems that Oppositional Defiant Disorder 
is just a mild version of a larger Aggressive syndrome. Earlier critics (Achenbach et 
al., 1989; Edelbrock, 1987) have leveled this charge as well. Another example is 
Dysthymia (although it has to be noted that its required minimal duration of one year 
cannot be met by the CBCL). Its overlap with scales such as Depressed (boys 4-5 
and 6-11, girls 6-11), Uncommunicative (boys 6-11), Social Withdrawal (girls 6-11), 
and Depressed Withdrawal (girls 12-16) is not enough to reach the clinical range of 
the CBCL or to meet the criteria of both systems. Contrary to Dysthymia, Major 
Depressive Episode does show correspondence with the latter two scales. Since the 
core symptom, as well as most of the other symptoms of Dysthymia, appear in Major 
Depressive Episode, it should be considered whether Dysthymia is but a mild version 
of Major Depressive Episode. This issue was also raised by Achenbach and 
McConaughy (1987), although they based their argument on the alleged relation of 
Dysthymia and Major Depression with the Depressed scales. Of course, in such a 
consideration, DSM's requirement with respect to minimal duration should play a 
centra] role. Incidentally, the absence of correspondence between Major Depressive 
Episode and the Depressed scales in the one-to-one correspondences (Table 2.7), 
knowing that the symptoms of the former are well represented in the CBCL, is 
unexpected. A different and more heterogeneous symptomal composition (i.e., too 
little overlap) seems to be the main reason. 
In all age/sex groups, the combination of the DSM's Undifferentiated Somatoform 
Disorder and Somatoform Pain Disorder corresponding with the CBCL's Somatic 
Complaints is present (Vermande et al., 1993). This can also be inferred from the 
first-order results (Table 2.7). Since all three pain symptoms of the CBCL (items 
56a, 56b, and 56f) are always part of the Somatic Complaints scales and are never 
listed under the heading "Other problems", it must be considered whether the 
DSM-III-R does justly separate (these) pain symptoms from a syndrome with other 
somatic complaints. 
The preponderance of unidirectional correspondences meeting DSM criteria as 
opposed to CBCL cut-off scores (mentioned in the section on the first-order results) 
and the discussion above, give the impression that DSM-III-R disorders tend to 
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contain fewer symptoms than CBCL dimensions. The one-to-two and one-to-three 
correspondences show that this is not always the case. When a DSM disorder 
(almost) totally comprises two distinct CBCL dimensions, the question rises whether 
the DSM discriminates justly between two different entities, or whether the CBCL 
syndromes are robust (e.g., also appearing in other empirical taxonomies). A clear 
example is Conduct Disorder including both the Delinquent and Cruel scales of girls 
6-11. 
Finally, the greater part of the CBCL problem items are included as symptoms 
in the DSM-III-R disorders involved. Nevertheless, it appeared that the Depressed 
and Aggressive scales, as well as two separate scales for a disturbance of conduct (in 
case of girls), have not been differentiated by the DSM-III-R. Other scales that were 
not clearly reflected in a single DSM-III-R category are Obese (girls 4-5), Sex 
Problems (girls 6-11), Immature (boys 4-5 and 12-16), and Hostile Withdrawal (boys 
12-16). 
Type of correspondence and degree of resemblance with respect to the 
1991 CBCL syndromes 
After having finished this study, the determination of correspondences between 
DSM-III-R disorders and the new 1991 CBCL syndromes was "a piece of cake". As 
could be expected, the number of correspondences resulting from this latter 
comparison is much smaller than when 1983 syndromes are involved. The syndromes 
of the 1991 profiles of the CBCL have the same item composition for boys and girls 
in the age groups 4-11 and 12-18 years (except for an additional Sex Problems scale 
only for 4- to 11-years-olds). Only the norms differ per age/sex group (Achenbach, 
1991b). Nevertheless, the new results also involve one-to-one, one-to-two, 
two-to-one, and two-to-two types of correspondence, and the degree of resemblance 
of corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL/4-18 syndromes can also be determined as 
being either particularly strong or weaker. 
2.4 A basis for case construction 
The major purpose of this study was to provide a basis for investigating differential 
effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification with regard to clinical assessment and 
intervention, in particular with regard to the generation of explanatory hypotheses. 
More specifically, the results of this study should provide a basis for the construction 
of cases that are classifiable in both the DSM-III-R and the CBCL. Because the 
results do not only comprise correspondences, but also the symptoms that correspon-
ding syndromes have in common, this construction task can be quite simplified. 
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Moreover, the results concerning higer-order correspondences and the degree of 
resemblance between corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes revealed 
specific aspects of the classification frames that are worth to investigate. The 
higher-order correspondences suggest that not only effects of individual DSM and 
CBCL classifications should be investigated. For example, it is relevant to know 
whether a possible difference between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL systems is 
moderated by the different number of syndromes identified by them. It might be 
argued that a case favours a particular classification system when it contains more 
of the latter's syndromes. Cases having a one-to-two correspondence, for instance, 
are simultaneously representing two CBCL dimensions and just one DSM-III-R 
disorder. Information on the CBCL classification might be more effective in these 
cases. Analogously, a possible difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems 
could be moderated by the degree of resemblance of their syndromes, for example, 
more difference could be expected in case of weak resemblance. 
A discussion of the actual construction of the cases is part of the next two 
chapters. 
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3 
Effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification on 
descriptive characteristics of psychodiagnostic 
hypotheses' 
3.1 Introduction 
Classification of mental disorders is a central activity in clinical psychology and 
psychiatry. By producing order out of a jumble of symptoms, it is supposed to 
constitute the foundation for the processes of generating hypotheses, formulating a 
prognosis and recommending a treatment (Blashfield, 1984; Cantwell & Baker, 1988; 
De Bruyn, 1992). Classification therefore may have a serious impact on the 
diagnostic process. However, exactly how classification influences the course of the 
diagnostic process is not yet clear. There is, moreover, the possibility that different 
classification systems have different effects. This study explores the effect of 
classification and classification systems on one particular aspect of the diagnostic 
process: the generation of hypotheses concerning conditions wich cause and maintain 
the identified problem. 
The classification systems used in this study include the revision of the third 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders (DSM-III-R: 
APA, 1987) and the system based on the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL: 
Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a; Achenbach, 1991b). These systems are used widely 
in the field of developmental psychopathology (Edelbrock & Costello, 1988a). The 
DSM-III-R grew out of the Kraepelinian tradition (Achenbach, 1985; Blashfield, 
1984). Its classes or taxa are abstracted from clinical observation and experience and 
have a categorical (yes/no) form (Quay, 1986a). To reach a classification, the 
clinician matches the condition of the client with the description of the disorder. For 
most of the disorders, specific "diagnostic criteria" are outlined, which must be met 
for the classification to be made. The manual consists of different sections. For the 
classification of childhood disorders, the section entitled "Disorders usually first 
evident in infancy, childhood, or adolescence" is most important. However, disorders 
listed in other sections, which are usually assigned to adults, can be assigned to 
1 This chapter has been published in the European Journal of Psychological Assessment 
(Vermande, Van den Bereken & De Bruyn, 1994). 
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children if the criteria are met. Multiple classification is possible in a limited sense, 
because disorders can differ in priority (Millón, 1987). The CBCL consists largely 
of 118 behavioral/emotional problem items designed to be completed by parents (or 
parental surrogates) of children aged 4 through 16. Parents score a problem item as 
0 for not true of their child, 1 for somewhat or sometimes true, and 2 for very or 
often true. The completed checklist is then scored on the Revised Child Behavior 
Profile, containing items of the checklist arranged in dimensional syndromes. These 
syndromes were derived from principal components analysis of CBCLs completed 
by parents of referred children. Achenbach and Edelbrock performed separate 
analyses for each sex at ages 4-5, 6-11, and 12-16. To obtain a demarcation between 
a clinical and a normal range of scores, they also had a sample of parents of 
nonreferred children complete the CBCL. The syndromes of the profile, representing 
a taxonomy of behavior problems, can be used subsequently as a basis for 
classification of the child into a certain "profile type". The DSM-III-R and the CBCL 
thus display differences with respect to construction principles, structural features, 
and type of instrument. Not surprisingly, there also are numerous differences with 
regard to the classes or taxa these two instruments discern (Achenbach & McCo-
naughy, 1987). 
To the extent that the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems are alternative descriptions 
of the same pathologic behavior, they should have the same effects on hypothesis-
generation and other aspects of the diagnostic process. However, the phenomenon of 
"framing effect" which is frequently observed in human decision making (Slovic, 
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) makes a differential 
effect of the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems not unlikely. For clinical practice such 
a differential effect would be rather disadvantageous since diagnosticians usually 
employ either a clinically based (e.g., the DSM-III-R) or a numerically derived (e.g., 
the CBCL) classification system and rarely combine both approaches (Edelbrock & 
Costello, 1988a). 
In the present study, the effect of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification on 
hypotheses was investigated by means of case descriptions. Since the DSM-III-R and 
the CBCL are quite different instruments with respect to underlying construction 
principles and domain of content, we had to ensure that the case descriptions to be 
used would be classifiable in both systems. Therefore, we first carried out a detailed 
comparison of DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL syndromes to determine the extent 
to which they matched in terms of symptoms (Vermande, Weusten, Coppen & 
Kracht, 1993).2 This matching revealed several types of correspondence. The 
2 See Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
70 
EFFECTS ON DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC HYPOTHESES 
simplest type is a "one-to-one" correspondence. For example, "Major Depressive 
Episode" in the DSM-III-R corresponds to "Depressed Withdrawal" (girls aged 
12-16) in the CBCL. Other types are more complex, involving a "two-to-one", 
"one-to-two", "three-to-one" or even a "two-to-three" correspondence. An example 
of a "one-to-two" correspondence is "Conduct Disorder" in the DSM-III-R which 
corresponds to the combination of the CBCL syndromes "Delinquent" and "Cruel" 
(girls aged 6-12). In addition, it was found that corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL 
syndromes can have a strong or weak resemblance. When both syndromes are almost 
completely defined by the same set of symptoms, resemblance is strong. But when 
each syndrome has a fair number of symptoms over and above the symptoms they 
have in common, resemblance is weaker. Both type of correspondence and degree of 
resemblance were systematically incorporated in the construction of the case 
descriptions used in this study. 
According to Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka (1978), in the medical domain, the 
number of hypotheses is influenced by the complexity of the problem. Moreover, it 
is possible that the influence of classification or a certain classification system is 
noticed only with complex cases. For that reason, the cases in this study have been 
divided into simple and complex cases. The division was tentatively based on the 
type of correspondence of the cases. Cases which are classified by both the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL as one taxon ("one-to-one" correspondence), were 
considered as simple cases. Complex cases were identified by either one of the 
classification systems as more than one taxon (in this study "one-to-two" and 
"two-to-one" correspondences). 
The effect of classification systems on hypothesis-generation may be studied in 
many respects. In the present study we focussed on descriptive characteristics of 
hypotheses and hypothesis collections. "Descriptive" refers to hypotheses as they are 
formulated by diagnosticians, apart from the question of whether their characteristics 
are desirable or not. We focussed on two different sets of data. The first set 
represents characteristics which are immediately observable without much prior 
analysis. It consists of the number of hypotheses generated, which can be counted 
directly, and the minimum and maximum subjective probability associated with each 
hypothesis, based on respondent ratings. The second set requires a structural analysis 
of each hypothesis, including the application of a category system to identify the 
various components and their relations. This set includes the (estimated) number of 
direct and indirect explanatory factors as well as different types of hypotheses, like 
composite hypotheses and explanation chains. 
To summarize, the present study investigated the effect of classification by the 
DSM-III-R and CBCL systems on some descriptive characteristics of psychodiagnos-
tic hypotheses and hypothesis collections. Diagnosticians were asked to generate 
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hypotheses for six written case descriptions; two cases were "simple" (one 
DSM-III-R disorder corresponding to one CBCL syndrome), two were "complex 
[1:2]" (one DSM-III-R disorder corresponding to two CBCL syndromes), and two 
were "complex [2:1]" (two DSM-III-R disorders corresponding to one CBCL 
syndrome). In each pair of cases, the degree of resemblance between the DSM-III-R 
and CBCL syndromes was weak in one case and strong in the other case. 
In particular, this study addressed the following questions: (a) Is there an effect 
of classification as opposed to absence of classification on some descriptive 
characteristics of clinical hypotheses and hypothesis collections? (b) Do the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL affect these characteristics differently? (c) Does the 
complexity of the case affect these characteristics? (d) Is a possible effect of 
classification on these characteristics moderated by the complexity of the case? (e) 
Is a possible difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems with respect to 
these characteristics moderated by the complexity of the case? (f) Is a possible 
difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated by the different 
number of the taxa identified by them? (g) Is a possible difference between the 
DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated by the degree of resemblance of their 
taxa? and (h) Is a possible difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems 
moderated by both the different number of the taxa identified by them and the degree 
of resemblance of their taxa? These research questions will be amplified later in 
combination with a description of the data analysis. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Design 
The effect of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification was investigated with three groups 
of diagnosticians. The first group used six case descriptions supplemented with a 
classification in terms of the DSM-III-R ("DSM-condition"). The second group used 
the same case descriptions, supplemented with a CBCL classification ("CBCL-condi-
tion"). The third group used the case descriptions only ("control group"). The 
experimental design thus combined one between-subjects factor having three levels 
(the DSM-III-R condition, the CBCL condition and the control condition) with one 
within-subjects factor having six levels (the six cases). 
72 
EFFECTS ON DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC HYPOTHESES 
3.2.2 Subjects 
Subjects were 86 psychodiagnostic practitioners. They performed the experimental 
task while participating in a free workshop on clinical judgement and decision 
making. They knew that the results would be used for research purposes, but they 
were not aware of the exact nature of the study. Specifically, they did not know that 
classification information was an experimental factor. The subjects came from child 
divisions of in- and outpatient mental health settings throughout the Netherlands. 
Their diagnostic work experience ranged from 1 month to 25 years, with an average 
of 7.6 years. The subjects were assigned to either the DSM-III-R condition, the 
CBCL condition or the control condition, in such a way that the conditions were 
matched on level of experience, type of education received (psychology or special 
education), gender, employment (inpatient or outpatient mental health setting), and 
type of mental health setting (ambulatory mental health service ("RIAGG"), 
psychiatric institution, private practice, or otherwise). Initially, 124 diagnosticians 
signed up for the workshop and the experiment. Due to cancellations, in the end 33 
clinicians took part in the DSM condition, 30 in the CBCL condition and 23 in the 
control condition. These cancellations did not affect the matching. 
3.2.3 Task materials 
The relevant task materials consisted of six written case studies and written 
presentations of the associated DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL syndromes. Case 
descriptions were one page (A4) in length. They contained the child's personal 
details (name, gender, age, grade), information about members of the family, referral 
information, the nature of the complaint, a description of the problems, and 
background information. Background information was purposely brief, to elicit a 
variety of hypotheses. The cases were constructed on the basis of correspondence 
type and degree of resemblance of corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL taxa as 
described earlier. All the cases were about girls and are characterized in Table 3.1. 
They are presented in their entirety in Appendix A. 
The actual content of the case descriptions was based on clinical records and 
information provided by clinicians. The cases contained problem descriptions that 
were sufficient to apply the classifications, but they were made more realistic by the 
inclusion of a few symptoms that were not covered by the classifications. The face 
validity of the cases and appropriateness of the DSM-III-R and CBCL classification 
for each case was checked by experts on the relevant disorders. 
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The DSM-III-R classification consisted of the description of the disorder as given 
in the manual (Dutch version). The symptoms occurring in the case were marked by 
a tick. When appropriate, both the special type of the disorder (e.g., "undifferen­
tiated") and the severity of the disorder (e.g., "moderate") were indicated. The CBCL 
syndromes were represented as a list of defining behavior problems (in Dutch) 
together with their ratings (in most cases the value was 2). In addition, they were 
shown in syndrome profiles (in English), with the labels of nonapplicable syndromes 
omitted. By way of illustration, the DSM-III-R and CBCL classifications of case 2 
are presented in Appendix B. 
3.2.4 Procedure 
The subjects completed the task in a university lecture room during a three hour 
session (9.30-12.30 алп.). The task consisted of two subtasks. The first subtask 
required the subjects to generate hypotheses in response to the six case descriptions 
and the associated classification information (in the DSM and CBCL condition). The 
subjects were given all six cases (in a random sequence) and written instructions. The 
instructions described a clinical hypothesis as "a (yet to be tested) supposition that 
a certain factor, or a combination of factors, totally or partly explains a problem". 
In short, a hypothesis was defined as "a potential explanation". The instructions of 
the classification conditions also contained a short description of the DSM-III-R or 
the CBCL where appropriate. The subjects were asked to study each case carefully. 
Subjects in the classification conditions also were asked to study the classification 
information and to verify its appropriateness. All subjects were instructed to write 
down as many hypotheses for the case as they could generate. The phrase "as many 
as" was unstressed. This procedure had to be repeated for all six cases. Subjects were 
not allowed to discuss cases with one another. They had to accomplish the first 
subtask within about two hours and then proceed to the second subtask. A pilot study 
had shown this to be a sufficient amount of time. If it was apparent that the subjects 
would run out of time, they were allowed to skip the second subtask and complete 
the first one. 
The second subtask asked for information concerning the collection of the 
hypotheses generated for each case as a whole. Subjects first had to rank each 
hypothesis according to its plausibility with the most plausible hypothesis getting a 
" 1 " . They then had to indicate after each hypothesis what if any information they 
would need to establish whether the hypothesis was tenable. In a pilot study, it was 
found that answers to this question often clarified the formulation of the hypotheses 
to other persons. Finally, the subjects were asked to assign to each hypothesis a 
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percentage expressing the degree of subjective probability or confidence. The 
majority of the subjects finished both subtasks within two hours. 
The choice of a "paper-and-pencil" study over a high-fidelity simulation stems 
from the former's greater possibility for experimental manipulation of selected 
variables, thus diminishing the influence of subjects and allowing inexpensive but 
extensive observations (McGuire, Solomon & Bashook, 1976). The price to be paid 
for these advantages is a decrease in face validity, although Elstein et al. (1978) 
reported that many of the phenomena observed in high-fidelity research also can be 
observed in simulations of the type used in this study. 
After completing the experimental tasks, the subjects were asked to complete a 
questionnaire designed to control for nuisance variables. Relevant items were 
experience with the substance of the six cases, actual use of a classification system 
(DSM-III-R, CBCL or other), practice of explicit hypothesis-generation, and 
theoretical orientation (psychodynamic, behavioral, biomedical, cognitive, family 
systems, sociological, other and/or eclectic). 
As an example, the instruction, questionnaire and subtasks for the CBCL group 
are presented in Appendix С 
3.2.5 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables were determined for every diagnostician and every case 
description (i.e., for every single hypothesis collection). The following variables were 
obtained readily: the number of hypotheses, the minimum subjective probability and 
the maximum subjective probability. The latter variable is particularly relevant 
because it is associated with the hypothesis that the diagnostician will first consider 
in his or her further activities. The remaining variables needed a preliminary 
structural analysis of the hypothesis formulations. First, the following components 
were identified: "problems" (to be explained by the hypothesis), "factors" (i.e., states 
or events which, according to the clinician, completely or partly explain the develop­
ment or sustainment of a problem or which explain another factor), "relations" 
(between problems and factors or between factors), "synonyms" (for a problem or 
a factor), "references" (to a scientific law, explanatory mechanism, theory or model) 
and "comments" (i.e., specific information from the case on which the hypothesis or 
a factor is based according to the diagnostician). The interrater reliability for this 
categorization expressed as Cohen's kappa ranged from .65 to .95. The "relations" 
were further distinguished according to three types of explanations (causal, 
correlational and an is-relation) and a subordination relation (between generalizations 
or abstractions and their specifications or concretizations). Finally, "problems", 
"factors" and "relations" were represented graphically in a causal network with 
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arrows, reciprocal arrows and equality symbols representing causal, correlational and 
is-relations, respectively. Merely implicitly denoted explanations were shown as 
dashed lines. Subordination relations were represented as connective lines. An 
example of a causal network is shown in Figure 3.1. In this study, we will deal 
mainly with the explanatory factors present in a hypothesis. 
Figure 3.1 Causal network of the hypothesis "Peggy's depression is related to traumatic 
experiences (death of her father, separation of her best friend). She 
constantly pushes herself to the limit at school, due to insufficient intelli-
gence". 
depression 
insufficient constantly pushes herself , ' 
intelligence * to the limit at school 
(IF) (DF) 
DF: direct factor, IF: indirect factor, P: problem; 
> causal relation; 
<—> correlational relation; 
- - > implicitly denoted relation; 
subordination relation. 
The number of hypotheses obtained in the experiment (2367 in all) forced us, in view 
of our limited resources, to restrict the structural analysis to a sample of the 
hypotheses generated for each case. We decided to analyse every first, middle and 
last hypothesis, thereby controlling for potential order and sequence effects. After the 
structural analysis, the following variables were determined: mean number of direct 
factors and mean number of indirect factors per hypothesis (averaged over the first, 
middle and last hypothesis). A direct factor is a factor which immediately leads to 
the problem to be explained, without intermediate factors. In case of causal and 
intentional hypotheses (Elster, 1983; Fullesdal, Wallee & Elster, 1986), it is the 
factor immediately before the problem. In functional hypotheses, in which the 
problem is explained by its favourable effect (Elster, 1983; Fellesdal et al., 1986), 
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the direct factor may immediately follow the problem.3 An indirect factor is a factor 
that leads to another factor (which itself may be direct or indirect). Direct and 
indirect factors appearing in more than one hypothesis were counted only once. In 
case of subordination relations, specifications or concretizations were counted. The 
procedure followed thus far provides a measure of the (average) explanatory content 
of a hypothesis. However, this measure does not convey information on the 
explanatory content of the collection of hypotheses as a whole, since the same "mean 
number of (in)direct factors per hypothesis" may be obtained for diagnosticians 
differing with respect to the total number of hypotheses in their respective 
collections. An appropriate index of the explanatory content of a collection would be 
the number of direct and indirect factors per hypothesis collection. Since only the 
first, middle and last hypothesis in each collection were analysed, this number could 
only be determined exactly for collections with three hypotheses or less. For 
collections with more than three hypotheses, this number was estimated by 
multiplying the mean number of direct factors and the mean number of indirect 
factors per hypothesis with the total number of hypotheses in the collection. 
As a further result of the structural analysis, we distinguished between simple 
hypotheses, containing just one direct factor, and composite hypotheses, containing 
two or more direct factors. The proportion of composite hypotheses is an index of 
a diagnostician's tendency to generate composite hypotheses. Finally, a hypothesis 
may contain direct factors only (in which case it is called a non-chain), or it may be 
an explanatory chain or genetic explanation (Groeben & Westmeyer, 1975; 
Stegmüller, 1983), containing one or more indirect factors. The proportion of 
explanation chains is an index of the scope of the diagnostician's explanation of the 
problem at hand. These proportions again are based on the first, middle and last 
hypothesis of each collection. 
Cohen's kappas for direct factors, indirect factors, composite hypotheses and 
explanation chains ranged from .78 to .88, .49 to .87, .50 to .83 and .62 to .90, 
respectively.4 
It should be noted that the dependent variables in this study may be correlated. 
The structural variables "number of direct factors per hypothesis collection" and 
"number of indirect factors per hypothesis collection" are principally independent. 
That is, an increase in the number of direct factors by itself does not imply anything 
for the number of indirect factors. However, both variables were actually obtained 
by multiplying the average number, as found for the first, middle and last hypothesis, 
3 See Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
4 The instructions for the structural analysis and the scoring of the dependent variables are 
available on request 
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with the total number of hypotheses; each of these may be correlated with the latter 
variable and both may become mutually correlated. The "proportion of composite 
hypotheses" and "the proportion of explanation chains" are not only intrinsically 
independent of each other, but also independent of the "number of hypotheses", since 
their values are based on just three hypotheses at most (the first, middle and last 
hypothesis). However, they may be empirically correlated with the number of factors 
per hypothesis collection. Specifically, with an increasing number of direct factors, 
more composite hypotheses are perhaps likely to occur. Similarly, the more indirect 
factors that are present, the more explanation chains may be found. Because of these 
possible dependencies between the dependent variables, we used a multivariate testing 
procedure. 
The dependent variables are of potential relevance to the diagnostic process. 
However, at present their exact implications and hence desirability are not yet clear. 
To illustrate, the height of subjective probability can play a part in the testing of the 
hypothesis, but exactly how it affects hypothesis testing (e.g., sooner acceptance in 
case of higher probability) is not yet evident. 
3.2.6 Research questions and data analysis 
The effects of the independent variables were analysed by means of a priori contrasts 
corresponding to the research questions of most interest. The between-subjects factor 
"classification conditions" has 3 degrees of freedom for testing hypotheses (including 
the general mean) and the within-subjects factor "cases" has 6 degrees of freedom. 
The effects associated with the within-subjects factor were analysed by means of 
contrasts between different kinds of cases (see Hand & Taylor, 1987). The 
coefficients of these contrasts are shown in Table 3.1. (Note that these contrasts 
happen to be orthogonal). In all, the design permits statistical testing of 3x6=18 
hypotheses, but we tested only 8 specific contrasts, to be denoted as the questions a 
through h (see Table 3.2). We do not know of any previous study dealing with 
similar independent and dependent variables. Consequently, both the formulation of 
our research questions and the expectation as to the results were intuitively based. 
The first two contrasts are concerned with main effects of the factor classification. 
The question of whether hypothesis-generation in general (i.e., irrespective of 
particular cases) is affected by classification (question a) was answered by testing the 
difference between the DSM-group and the CBCL-group on the one hand and the 
control group on the other hand with respect to performance averaged over the six 
cases. Comparing the DSM-group with the CBCL-group should reveal possible 
differences between the classification systems used in this study (question b). The 
next question concerns the main effect of case complexity (question c). 
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That is, are there differences between the hypotheses produced for simple cases 
(cases 1 and 2 in Table 3.1) and the hypotheses for complex cases (cases 3 through 
6 in Table 3.1)? Since this question seeks a main effect of the factor cases, it is 
tested by comparing the mean performance (averaged over the three groups) on two 
kinds of cases. The remaining questions are concerned with possible interactions 
between the between-subjects factor and the within-subjects factor. In general they 
ask whether differences in performance between groups (as specified in the first two 
questions) are different when the cases vary in a particular way. The possibility that 
the effect of classification is only noticeable with complex cases is tested by 
comparing the effect of classification (as specified in question a) for both simple and 
complex cases (resulting in question d) and by comparing the effect of DSM-IH-R 
and CBCL (as specified in question b) for simple and complex cases (resulting in 
question e). The next question (question f) concerns the effect of DSM-III-R versus 
CBCL (specified in b) with respect to cases having a one-to-two correspondence 
(cases 3 and 4) or a two-to-one correspondence (cases 5 and 6). It might be argued 
that a case favours a particular classification system when it contains more of the 
latter's taxa. The cases having a one-to-two correspondence, for instance, are 
simultaneously representing just one DSM-III-R disorder and two CBCL syndromes. 
Information on the CBCL classification might be more effective in these cases. 
Analogously, the difference between performance in the DSM group and the CBCL 
group (as specified in b) might be less for cases having a strong resemblance than 
for cases with a weak resemblance (resulting in question g). That is, when a 
DSM-III-R disorder and a CBCL syndrome are mainly defined in terms of the same 
symptoms and have only a few unique symptoms (as happens in cases 1, 3 and 5), 
the effect of the classification information on the generation of hypotheses should be 
highly similar, in contrast to the situation where the definitons of the taxa rely 
heavily on unique symptoms (cases 2, 4 and 6). Finally, if the last two hypotheses 
are correct, a higher order interaction effect may be expected (question h). The 
difference between the DSM-group and the CBCL-group may reflect the effect of 
correspondence type which is different for strongly and weakly resembling cases. 
The specified research questions a through h are intuitively meaningful. Other 
combinations of the between and within contrasts appear to be less useful (see the 
empty cells in Table 3.2; e.g., comparing the effect of degree of resemblance in the 
classification and non-classification groups). For each of the questions a through h, 
we have the set of seven dependent variables described earlier. As noted above, some 
of the variables may be correlated to a substantial degree. Hence we employed 
multivariate F-tests and considered univariate results only when the multivariate test 
was significant. For the questions a, c, d and f the tests were one-tailed, for the 
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remaining questions they were two-tailed. The actual analysis of the data was done 
by means of the SPSS-procedure MANOVA (SPSS, 1990). 
3.3 Results 
Five subjects did not complete the full set of six cases for various reasons (feeling 
ill, lack of time, or disagreement with a given classification). The data of these 
subjects are not included in the analyses. Since only 52 subjects provided probability 
estimates for all six cases, it was decided to analyse these dependent variables 
separately in order to avoid substantial loss of data (due to SPSS MANOVA's 
listwise deletion strategy in case of missing data). The remaining five dependent 
variables were analysed as a set. However, in order to facilitate interpretation, their 
results are presented in logically distinct subsets. In Table 3.3 the pooled within-
groups correlation matrix for the dependent variables is presented. 
Table 33 Pooled within-groups correlation matrix for the seven dependent variables 
NHY MIP MAP NDF NIF PCH PEC 
NHY 
MIP 
MAP 
NDF 
NIF 
PCH 
PEC 
-
-.17 
.20 
.90 
.26 
-.12 
-.23 
-
.70 
-.12 
.11 
.20 
.26 
-
.21 
.20 
.12 
.16 
-
.42 
.28 
-.02 
-
.38 
.73 .48 
Note. NHY = number of hypotheses; MIP = minimum subjective probability; MAP = 
maximum subjective probability; NDF = number of direct factors; NIF = number of indirect 
factors; PCH = proportion of composite hypotheses; PEC = proportion of explanation chains. 
3.3.1 Number of hypotheses 
Table 3.4 shows the number of hypotheses in each hypothesis collection for the 18 
cells in the design defmed by the group factor (DSM, CBCL, and control) and the 
case factor (cases 1 through 6). The grand mean is 4.69 {SD = 2.32). The results of 
statistically testing the questions a through h may be summarized as follows. There 
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is no significant difference between the classification groups and the control group 
(question a). Similarly, there is no difference between both classification groups 
(question b). Complex cases elicit significantly more hypotheses than simple cases 
(question c): the marginal means are 4.80 and 4.47 (F (1, 78) = 4.97, ρ = .015). 
There is, however, no interaction of case complexity with the classification factor 
(questions d and e). The difference between both classification groups is equal at 
each type of correspondence (1:2 or 2:1; question f) and at each degree of 
resemblance (strong or weak; question g). Finally, these three factors in combination 
do not produce a significant interaction effect (question h). 
In the remainder of this paper, we report the results only for those research 
questions that were statistically significant. 
Tabel 3.4 Mean number of generated hypotheses as a function of case and classification 
condition (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Case 
Group 
DSM-IU-R 
(n=32) 
CBCL 
(n=28) 
Control 
(n=21) 
1 
5.0 
(2.0) 
4.6 
(2.5) 
5.2 
(1.9) 
2 
4.3 
(1.7) 
3.8 
(1.6) 
3.9 
(1.8) 
3 
5.5 
(2.3) 
4.4 
(2.7) 
5.0 
(2.1) 
4 
5.0 
(2.7) 
5.0 
(3.4) 
5.0 
(2.9) 
5 
5.4 
(2.4) 
4.5 
(2.6) 
5.0 
(2.6) 
6 
4.3 
(2.0) 
3.8 
(2.2) 
4.8 
(2.4) 
3.3.2 Subjective probability 
Except for one diagnostician for one case, the hypotheses of a hypothesis collection 
were not mutually exclusive, their probabilities summing to more than 100%. Two 
measures were obtained that may serve as an indication of the order in which a 
subject is likely to take a particular hypothesis into consideration: assigned subjective 
probability and assigned rank order. Both measures indicate the potential relevance 
in the eyes of the subject of the hypothesis in each collection. For each subject, the 
Pearson product-moment correlation between these measures was computed 
(aggregated over the six cases) to summarize the extent to which the measures 
represented consistent and valid information and were meaningful dependent 
variables, with a value of-1.0 implying maximal consistency. Only 52 subjects (i.e., 
64% of the respondents) provided probability estimates for all six cases. All 
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correlation values were negative, with a maximum of-.91 and a median of-.63, 
except for three subjects having a value of 0.0 and one having a positive value (.52). 
Of the negative values, 40 were statistically significant (p < .05). Non-significance 
in the remaining cases was mainly due to the low number of generated hypotheses. 
Thus, the vast majority of the subjects appeared capable of consistently ordering the 
relevance of the hypotheses. 
Since the probability estimates are more differentiated than the rankings, the 
former are more suitable for studying the potential effects of the design factors. 
Table 3.5 shows the cell means of the minimum and maximum subjective 
probabilities associated with each hypothesis collection (expressed as percentages). 
Table 3.5 Mean percentages for minimum and maximum subjective probability (MIP, 
MAP) of generated hypotheses as a function of case and classification 
condition (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Group 
DSM-III-R 
(n=19) 
MIP 
MAP 
CBCL 
(n=19) 
ΜΓΡ 
MAP 
Control 
(n=14) 
MIP 
MAP 
1 
47.7 
(26.6) 
84.5 
(12.3) 
42.1 
(23.2) 
76.5 
(14.1) 
42.5 
(24.9) 
82.5 
(10.3) 
2 
36.8 
(22.5) 
78.9 
(15.0) 
35.8 
(23.3) 
64.5 
(22.8) 
43.1 
(30.5) 
80.7 
(21.6) 
3 
40.3 
(17.7) 
79.5 
(18.7) 
41.3 
(28.9) 
71.3 
(19.8) 
43.6 
(25.4) 
81.1 
(21.0) 
Case 
4 
41.8 
(25.9) 
77.4 
(15.7) 
33.2 
(19.4) 
66.6 
(22.1) 
34.3 
(20.6) 
76.1 
(9.2) 
5 
39.6 
(20.0) 
80.8 
(14.9) 
42.1 
(22.3) 
80.2 
(14.2) 
30.4 
(20.2) 
81.1 
(10.2) 
6 
49.7 
(22.3) 
81.5 
(13.4) 
42.1 
(21.3) 
69.9 
(17.3) 
41.1 
(22.5) 
78.9 
(16.8) 
With respect to the levels of minimal probability, it is noteworthy that they are in 
general fairly high with means ranging from 30.4% to 49.7%. However, there are no 
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statistically significant differences associated with classification system and case 
structure. Maximal probability appears to be influenced by kind of classification 
system, particularly in combination with degree of resemblance. The means of the 
maximal probabilities (averaged over the six cases) were 80% in the DSM-group, 
72% in the CBCL-group and 80% in the control group. The difference between the 
DSM-group and the CBCL-group (question b) is almost statistically significant: F{1, 
49) = 3.99, ρ = .052. Since the DSM-group performs at the same level as the control 
group, this difference is actually due to the fact that subjects in the CBCL group 
assign on average lower probabilities. The difference is stronger when the 
corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL taxa have a weak resemblance (79% vs. 67%) 
than when resemblance is close (82% vs. 76%; Д 1 , 49) = 6.55, ρ = .014; question 
g). Thus, the CBCL classification in general appears to induce in the subjects a lower 
degree of confidence in the most plausible hypothesis than does the DSM classifica­
tion. 
3.3.3 Direct and indirect factors per hypothesis collection 
The mean number of direct and indirect factors per hypothesis collection is presented 
in Table 3.6. With regard to the number of direct factors per hypothesis collection, 
there is a main effect of case complexity (question c). Complex cases elicit 
significantly more direct factors than simple cases (6.1 vs. 5.7, F(l, 78) = 4.15, ρ = 
.023). In addition, there is an interaction effect of classification versus nonclassifica-
tion with simple versus complex cases (question d, F(l, 78) = 4.14, ρ = .023). With 
simple cases, the mean of the classification condition is larger than the one of the 
control group (5.8 vs. 5.3), whereas the reverse is true with complex cases (5.9 vs. 
6.5). The only significant effect on the estimated number of indirect factors per 
hypothesis collection concerns again question c, degree of case complexity (F(l, 78) 
= 9.53, ρ = .002), complex cases eliciting less indirect factors than simple cases (3.5 
vs. 4.3). 
85 
CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.6 Mean estimated number of direct and indirect factors of generated hypothesis 
collections (NDF, NIF) as a function of case and classification condition 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Group 
DSM-m-R 
(n=32) 
NDF 
NIF 
CBCL 
(n=28) 
NDF 
NIF 
Control 
(n=21) 
NDF 
NIF 
1 
6.7 
(2.8) 
4.1 
(5.4) 
6.3 
(3.9) 
5.2 
(3.7) 
5.6 
(2.6) 
6.5 
(4.5) 
2 
5.2 
(2.4) 
3.5 
(3.6) 
4.9 
(2.8) 
3.1 
(3.3) 
4.9 
(2.9) 
4.0 
(4.7) 
3 
6.6 
(3.1) 
3.6 
(4.3) 
5.6 
(4.4) 
3.3 
(3.9) 
6.7 
(3.4) 
3.5 
(3.0) 
Case 
4 
5.8 
(2.9) 
3.4 
(4.7) 
6.3 
(3.5) 
3.2 
(3.3) 
6.8 
(4.4) 
5.2 
(4.2) 
5 
6.8 
(3.4) 
2.8 
(3.3) 
5.7 
(2.9) 
3.1 
(3.6) 
6.7 
(3.7) 
3.7 
(3.3) 
6 
5.5 
(2.6) 
3.0 
(3.3) 
5.2 
(2.8) 
4.0 
(4.3) 
5.7 
(2.8) 
3.7 
(4.1) 
3.3.4 Composite hypotheses and explanation chains 
Table 3.7 presents the proportions of composite hypotheses and explanation chains 
for the three groups and the six cases. The effect of case complexity was almost 
significant (question c, F(l, 78) = 2.70, ρ =.052). For complex cases, the proportion 
of composite hypotheses is larger than for simple cases (.25 vs. .23). In both 
complexity types, the larger part of the hypotheses is of the simple type. Further, the 
interaction of classification versus non-classification and simple versus complex cases 
is significant (question d, F\\, 78) = 12.01, ρ = .001). With simple cases, the 
proportion of composite hypotheses is larger in the classification conditions than in 
the control group (.26 vs. .16), whereas the opposite holds for complex cases (.24 vs. 
.30). 
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Table 3.7 Mean proportion of composite hypotheses (PCH) and mean proportion of 
explanation chains (PEC) as a function of case and classification condition 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Group 
DSM-III-R 
(n=32) 
PCH 
PEC 
CBCL 
(n=28) 
PCH 
PEC 
Control 
(n=21) 
PCH 
PEC 
1 
.27 
(.30) 
.47 
(35) 
.30 
(.29) 
.61 
(.33) 
.13 
( Π ) 
.64 
(.32) 
2 
.23 
(.25) 
.43 
(.29) 
.23 
(.23) 
.43 
(-35) 
.18 
(.21) 
.53 
(.36) 
3 
.20 
(.23) 
.44 
(30) 
.21 
(.26) 
.37 
(.40) 
.27 
(.29) 
.45 
(.26) 
Case 
4 
.14 
(.21) 
.39 
(.33) 
.26 
(.29) 
.38 
(32) 
.31 
(.23) 
.55 
(.28) 
5 
.25 
(.25) 
.38 
(.26) 
.33 
(34) 
.46 
(.39) 
.37 
(30) 
.49 
(.33) 
6 
.25 
(.27) 
.40 
(.35) 
.27 
(.31) 
.49 
(.37) 
.27 
(.29) 
.37 
(.35) 
With respect to the proportion of explanation chains, complex cases elicit a smaller 
proportion than simple cases (.42 vs. .51, F(l, 78) = 9.04, ρ = .002). Stated 
differently, with complex cases, slightly more non-chains are generated, whereas with 
simple cases the proportions of chains and non-chains are nearly equal. 
3.4 Discussion 
The results may be summarized as follows. First, none of the dependent variables 
show a main effect with classification (question a). Differences between the 
classification groups and the control group only appear in interaction with case 
complexity (question d), and then only with respect to the number of direct factors 
per hypothesis collection and with respect to the proportion of composite hypotheses. 
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That is, only when the dependent variable somehow pertains to direct factors. The 
effect consists in higher scores after classification of simple cases and the reverse 
with complex cases. Apart from interacting with the classification factor, the factor 
case complexity by itself has a main effect on several dependent variables (question 
c). Both the number of hypotheses and the values of the two variables involving 
direct factors (number of direct factors and proportion of composite hypotheses) are 
higher with complex cases than with simple cases. When indirect factors are involved 
(number of indirect factors and proportion of explanation chains) complex cases yield 
lower values than simple cases. Different effects of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL 
classifications (question b), only occur with respect to maximum subjective 
probability. Diagnosticians in the CBCL group assign lower maximum probabilities 
than diagnosticians in the DSM-III-R group (the latter performing at the same level 
as the control group). This effect is even stronger in cases of weaker resemblance 
(question g). With respect to the remaining dependent variables, the DSM-III-R 
group and the CBCL group do not differ (question b) and it does not make any 
difference whether cases are simple or complex (question e), nor whether their 
correspondence type is 1:2 or 2:1 (question f), nor whether they are of strong or 
weaker resemblance (question g). There also is no evidence for a differential 
interaction effect of correspondence type and resemblance in both classifiation groups 
(question h). 
Before considering the implications of our findings, we need to discuss some 
methodological issues of potential relevance to the validity of the results. The three 
groups proved to be quite similar with respect to the nuisance variables mentioned 
in the Method section, except for the amount of experience with the substance of 
case 6, which was significantly less in the control group. This fact, however, was not 
reflected in the relevant cell means. Further, we checked whether subjects, although 
being assigned to one condition (DSM-III-R, CBCL, or control), actually had the 
classification of another condition in mind (DSM-III-R or CBCL). This could be 
done, since subjects could assign their own label to the cases and were asked whether 
they used any particular classification system in their practice. It appeared that five 
subjects in the control group might have had a DSM-III-R classification in mind, two 
times with case 2, and three times with case 3. Without these cases, however, the 
overall partem of the results remains the same. 
Another complicating factor are the subjective probability ratings, which were 
provided by only 52 out of the 81 subjects. We must consider the possibility that the 
"probability raters" are different from the other subjects and that some of the effects 
found are associated with "probability giving" rather than with the experimental 
factors under study. We first ensured that the matching of the three groups on the 
"background variables" (i.e., variables concerning the a priori matching and of the 
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questionnaire) had been preserved. Next, we ascertained that the experimental groups 
did not differ as to the proportion of probability raters. We then compared the 
probability raters with the other diagnosticians with respect to the background 
variables. The two groups did not differ except with respect to "experience with case 
1", which is significantly more often present in probability raters than in the 
remaining subjects. Finally, we compared both groups with respect to the primary 
response variable (number of hypotheses). Probability raters generated fewer 
hypotheses for every case than other subjects, although the differences for case 6 and, 
surprisingly, case 1 are not statistically significant. This finding that probability raters 
form a sample of all subjects who seem to behave somewhat differently, suggests that 
our results regarding probability must be tentative. However, this behavior of the 
probability raters cannot account for the results concerning the number of hypotheses 
reported earlier. Specifically, the set of cases affected by probability-giving is {2, 3, 
4, 5}, whereas the set of complex cases is {3, 4, 5, 6}. Nevertheless, both sets are 
subject to opposite effects. The number of hypotheses is higher with complex cases 
(than with simple cases), but probability-rating is associated with lower numbers of 
hypotheses. In view of the present discussion, we may safely conclude that our 
findings are not due to the behavior of a particular subset of respondents. Incidental-
ly, it is not very likely that the fact that 29 subjects did not give probability ratings 
was due to lack of time, since only three subjects indicated a lack of time and only 
a few subjects stayed in the experimental room until the end. The discussion of this 
issue leaves us with two conclusions: only 64% of the diagnosticians in our study 
responded to the request of associating probabilities with the hypotheses they had 
been generating and these diagnosticians typically generated fewer hypotheses than 
the remaining subjects. The first conclusion is consistent with the observations of 
others (Elstein et al., 1978; Kassirer, 1982) that clinicians apparently are reluctant to 
describe their data in a probabilistic format. The second conclusion points to an 
intriguing phenomenon that certainly warrants further investigation. 
Having established that our data are sufficiently sound, we may proceed to discuss 
their meaning and implications and to relate them to other findings. First, only once 
a different effect of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification was found. This is certainly 
a fortunate circumstance for clinical practice, in which diagnosticians usually employ 
either one of these systems. The difference concerns the fact that diagnosticians in 
the CBCL group assign lower maximum probabilities to their hypotheses than 
diagnosticians in the DSM-III-R group. This effect is even stronger in cases of 
weaker resemblances of DSM and CBCL classes. There is no difference between the 
DSM-III-R condition and the control group. This suggests that the effect is specific 
to the CBCL. Apparently the CBCL reduces the confidence diagnosticians have in 
their favourite hypothesis, whereas DSM-III-R classification has no such effect. An 
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explanation may be found in the difference between the nature of the DSM-III-R and 
the CBCL taxa. DSM disorders are based on observations and experiences of clinical 
experts and are found to correspond fairly well to clinical intuition or implicit 
taxonomies (e.g., Cantor, Smith, French & Mezzich, 1980 (DSM II); Van Mechelen 
& De Boeck, 1989). The syndromes of the CBCL, on the other hand, are based on 
empirical data that have been analysed by means of sophisticated statistical methods. 
In general, they correspond very poorly with the intuitive categories of clinicians 
(Krol, 1992). In addition, the disorders of the DSM have a long tradition, whereas 
the syndromes of the CBCL are relatively new. It is well known that clinicians do 
not adopt new categories easily. Instead, traditional categories persist (Morey, 
Skinner & Blashfield, 1986). Taken together, diagnosticians may feel somewhat 
uncomfortable or even confused when using CBCL syndromes, resulting in lower 
confidence. 
Considering the minimum subjective probabilities provided by the respondents 
(Table 3.5), it appears that they are rather high (30-50%). Since the probability 
ratings are supposed to express the subjective degree of confidence, this suggests that 
in general the diagnosticians in this study were fairly confident with respect to their 
hypotheses. These rather high minimal confidence levels may reflect the phenomenon 
of overconfidence (Doubilet & McNeil, 1988; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1988), but 
this interpretation needs independent corroboration. 
Leaving aside the complications associated with "probability-rating" and number 
of hypotheses, the diagnosticians in our study produce in general between four and 
five hypotheses in each case. This is in agreement with other studies where 
diagnosticians have to consider multiple hypotheses simultaneously. The number of 
generated hypotheses is usually found to be four to seven (e.g., Elstein et al., 1978; 
Kassirer, 1982; Krems & Prediti, 1991). This small number of hypotheses has often 
been interpreted as being due to the limited capacity of short-term memory (Elstein 
et al., 1978; Kassirer, 1982). In our study subjects could write down their hypotheses 
one by one, as they were retrieved from long-term memory, thus there was less need 
to rely on short-term memory for temporarily storing a set of potentially relevant 
hypotheses. Therefore, our finding is not easily explained in terms of the limited 
capacity of short-term memory. 
The finding that the diagnosticians in our study respond differently to simple and 
complex cases confirms our intuitive division of the cases based on correspondence 
type. Complex cases elicited more hypotheses, more direct factors and more 
composite hypotheses, whereas simple cases elicited fewer hypotheses, more indirect 
factors, and more explanation chains. The proportion of composite hypotheses and 
the proportion of explanation chains was correlated with the number of factors per 
hypothesis collection. These dependencies may account for the fact that with complex 
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cases, the number of direct factors increases with the proportion of composite 
hypotheses. They may also account for the fact that with complex cases, the number 
of direct factors decreases with the proportion of explanation chains. However, the 
dependencies between the variables cannot account for the different facts themselves: 
complex cases having fewer explanation chains and more composite hypotheses. In 
all, it looks as if diagnosticians tend to maintain a certain constant level of overall 
complexity in their problem-solving behavior, particularly in their explanations. 
When cases are complex, they offer more direct factors and (consequently) more 
composite hypotheses, but they are compensating this complexity by lowering the 
number of indirect factors and (consequently) the number of explanation chains. 
When cases are simple, they offer more complex explanations by including more 
indirect factors and (consequently) more explanation chains. 
The positive findings discussed so far are certainly intriguing and merit further 
study. Of more immediate and practical concern, however, are the negative findings. 
Why are there so few differences between the DSM-group and the CBCL-group and 
why is there no effect of classification in itself? First, we must face the issue of 
statistical power. Was the design powerful enough to detect possible differences 
between the groups? To answer this question, we should be able to specify the effect 
size, or how large the difference between the groups should have been to be of 
substantive interest. Before this study we did not have the information required to 
answer this question. Specifically, we did not have the values of the standard 
deviations. For the number of hypotheses, this value turns out to be 2.3. A difference 
between two group means as large as .5 times the (common) standard deviation is 
considered to be a "medium effect" (Cohen, 1988). In our case this would mean an 
average difference of about one hypothesis. Following Cohen (1988, p. 42-43), with 
the given numbers of subjects (60 in the classification group and 21 in the control 
group), the power for detecting a difference of one hypothesis, with a one-tailed test 
at alpha = .05, is about .62. Similarly, the power for detecting the same difference 
between the DSM-group (n = 32) and the CBCL-group (n = 28) is about .61 for a 
one-tailed test and about .47 for a two-tailed test. These values are not very high, but 
they are acceptable in view of the difficulty of obtaining larger numbers of subjects. 
Given these figures for the power of a study like ours and the data in Table 3.4, one 
might be inclined to maintain the possibility of a real, but small difference between 
the three groups that was likely not to be detected by our statistical tests due to lack 
of power. In five cases the CBCL-group scores were consistenly lower than the 
DSM-group scores (by about .7 hypothesis), but there is no consistent partem of 
differences between the classification groups and the control group. 
One might be attempted to discard the whole issue of differences in number of 
hypotheses by pointing out that the numbers are irrelevant as long as the right 
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hypothesis is included in the collection. This objection is not valid in our study, 
because the problems were not constructed as having a "correct solution". Our 
problems were deliberately incomplete and open, the information contained in the 
case descriptions was not sufficient to derive one final and definite conclusion as to 
the causes of the problems. To establish whether classification facilitates the 
identification of the "right hypothesis" would require a completely different kind of 
study. 
What other explanations could account for the lack of effects associated with 
classification and classification systems? First, it could be that our case descriptions 
were not sufficient to bring out possible effects of added classification information. 
An effect of classification might become manifest when cases are less schematic or 
less prototypical, containing more distractive and unclassified symptoms. Moreover, 
the diagnostic task may have been too static. Subjects were not able to consult 
relevant literature or ask for additional information like test results, for example. A 
final possibility is that subjects started to generate hypotheses while reading the case, 
thus before studying the classification information. In the domain of medical 
diagnosis, this phenomenon of early hypothesis-generation has been well established 
(Elstein et al., 1978). According to this explanation, hypotheses generated early are 
so dominantly present in memory that new information is not properly processed nor 
used. Although these explanations cannot be completely ruled out, they become less 
plausible in the light of a complementary study (Vermande, Van den Bereken & De 
Bruyn, in press).5 In that study we focussed on qualitative instead of descriptive 
characteristics of hypotheses. Again, no effects of classification in itself were found, 
but the DSM-III-R group performed better than the control group and the CBCL 
group with respect to several qualitative criteria. In a third, forthcoming study we are 
investigating potential effects of classification and classification systems with respect 
to the content of hypotheses and the presence of plausible hypotheses in the 
hypothesis collections.6 
5 In this thesis Chapter 4. 
6 In this thesis Chapter 5. 
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Effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification 
on qualitative aspects of psychodiagnostic 
hypotheses1 
4.1 Introduction 
Classification is a major activity in clinical psychology and psychiatry. It helps us 
deal with complex phenomena by allowing us to abstract away from and structure 
a welter of information. Although classification may be a goal in and of itself, it also 
plays a role in the generation of clinical hypotheses, the formulation of a prognosis, 
and the recommendation for treatment (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978; Blashfield, 
1984; Cantwell & Baker, 1988; De Bruyn, 1992; Haynes, Spain & Oliveira, 1993; 
Wenar, 1990). For example, in De Bruyn's normative-prescriptive view of clinical 
assessment, the identification of a psychopathological disorder constitutes the input 
for the generation and testing of hypotheses to explain the disorder. This outcome 
then constitutes a central component of the treatment recommendation (De Bruyn, 
1992). Classification, thus, can seriously influence clinical assessment, but exactly 
how classification influences the assessment process is not yet clear. 
In this exploratory study, the effect of classification on one particular element of 
clinical assessment is examined: the generation of hypotheses regarding the 
conditions that cause and maintain the identified problem. The need for hypothesis-
generation and testing in clinical assessment has long been recognized (De Groot, 
1950; Shapiro, 1951) and is now widely accepted (Carey, Flasher, Maisto & Turkat, 
1984; De Bruyn, 1992; Haynes et al., 1993; Strohmer, Biggs, Haase & Keller, 1983; 
Westmeyer, 1972). Nevertheless, we are not aware of any empirical study of the 
effects of classification on the generation of clinical hypotheses. 
Several clinically-relevant classification systems are currently available. In the 
present study, two of the most influential systems in the field of developmental 
psychopathology are considered: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental 
disorders (DSM-III-R: APA, 1987) and the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL: 
1 A revised (less complex) version of this chapter has been accepted by the Journal of 
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment (Vermande, Van den Bereken & De Bruyn, 
in press). 
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Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a; Dutch adaptation by Verhulst, Koot, Akkerhuis & 
Veerman, 1990). The DSM-III-R grew out of the Kraepelinian tradition (Achenbach, 
1985; Blashfield, 1984). The classes or disorders found in the DSM-III-R have been 
abstracted from clinical observation and experience and have a categorical (yes/no) 
form (Quay, 1986a). To reach a classification, the clinician matches the condition of 
the client with the description of the disorder. For most of the disorders, specific 
"diagnostic criteria" to be met for application of the classification have been outlined. 
There are 118 behavioral/emotional problem items found in the CBCL, which the 
parents (or guardians) of children between the ages of 4 and 16 are asked to respond 
to. Parents score a problem item as 0 for not true of their child, 1 for somewhat or 
sometimes true, or 2 for very or often true. The completed checklist is then scored 
using the Revised Child Behavior Profile, which contains items of the checklist 
arranged in eight or nine dimensional syndrome scales. These scales were originally 
derived from a principal components analysis of the CBCLs completed by the parents 
of a large number of referred children. Separate analyses for each sex at the ages of 
4-5, 6-11, and 12-16 years were undertaken.2 A demarcation between the clinical 
and the normal range of scores was then obtained by also including a sample of 
parents of nonreferred children. 
The DSM-III-R and the CBCL differ with respect to construction principles 
(clinically versus statistically based), structural features (mainly categorical versus 
mainly dimensional), and formats (handbook versus checklist). There are also 
numerous differences with regard to the classes or syndromes these two instruments 
distinguish (Achenbach & McConaughy, 1987). In a preparatory study, we compared 
47 of the disorders found in the DSM-III-R and all of the 51 scales found in the 
CBCL with respect to the symptoms constituting these syndromes (Vermande, 
Weusten, Coppen & Kracht, 1993).3 This was done by a computer program. A 
correspondence between DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes was defined to be present 
when the number of common symptoms met the threshold required for each of the 
classification systems. Several types of correspondence were found. The simplest type 
is a "one-to-one" correspondence. For example, "Major Depressive Episode" in the 
2 In addition to the profile of the CBCL of 1983 (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983aX 
Achenbach (1991b) provided a profile that displays a subset of items arranged in eight 
"cross-informant syndromes" in November 1991. These syndromes are common to all 
sex/age groups and have counterparts in the Youth Self-Report and the Teacher's Report 
Form (Achenbach, 1991a). Norms for the 1991 profile were obtained for each sex at ages 
4-11 and 12-18. As we initiated our research before the publication of mis new profile, 
the syndromes from the 1983 profile were relied on. The 1991 profile also has yet to be 
adapted in a number of countries, including the Netherlands. 
3 In this thesis section 2.3. 
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DSM-III-R corresponds to "Depressed Withdrawal" (girls aged 12-16) in the CBCL. 
Other types of correspondence proved to be more complex and could be "two-to-
one", "one-to-two", "three-to-one", "one-to-three", or even more complicated. An 
example of a "one-to-two" correspondence revolves around the "Conduct Disorder" 
in the DSM-III-R, which corresponds to a combination of the "Delinquent" and 
"Cruel" (girls aged 6-11) scales in the CBCL. It was also found that the correspon-
ding DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes could have a particularly strong or weak 
resemblance. When both syndromes are almost completely defined by the same set 
of symptoms, resemblance is quite strong. When each syndrome is found to have a 
number of substantively different symptoms, the resemblance is clearly weaker. 
The differences between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL with respect to the 
definition of syndromes raise the question of whether these systems also differ with 
respect to the generation of clinical hypotheses. This question is quite relevant in 
light of the phenomenon of framing-effect, which is frequently observed in human 
decision making and refers to the fact that casting the same information into 
alternative frames can lead to quite different choices and decisions (see Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1984; Slovic, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1988). Given that diagnosticians 
usually employ a clinically-based (e.g., the DSM-III-R) or numerically-based (e.g., 
the CBCL) classification system and rarely combine the two (Edelbrock & Costello, 
1988a),4 the presence of a framing effect could be quite detrimental to clinical 
practice. 
In this study, clinicians were asked to formulate hypotheses for six written case 
descriptions. In the six cases, the above-mentioned variables type of correspondence 
and degree of resemblance were systematically incorporated. Two cases were of the 
"one-to-one" type of correspondence (one DSM-III-R disorder corresponding to one 
CBCL scale); two cases were of the "one-to-two" type (one DSM-III-R disorder 
corresponding to two CBCL scales); and two cases were of the "two-to-one" type 
(two DSM-III-R disorders corresponding to one CBCL scale). In each pair of cases, 
the degree of resemblance between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL syndromes was 
selected to be strong in one case and weak in the other case. Degree of case 
complexity, a variable found to influence hypothesis-generation in the medical 
domain (Elstein, Shulman & Sprafka, 1978), was also considered using the present 
six cases. The degree of case complexity can be based on the type of correspondence 
(Vermande, Van den Bereken & De Bruyn, 1994).5 Cases classified by both the 
4 A survey of 90 clinicians (psychologists and educational scientists) in the Netherlands 
showed 75% of those who use a classification system to use either the DSM-III-R or the 
CBCL (Vermande, Van den Bereken & De Bruyn, 1991). 
5 In this thesis Chapter 3. 
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DSM-III-R and the CBCL as one syndrome (which means a "one-to-one" correspon-
dence) can be considered simple cases. Cases classified by either one of the 
classification systems as more than one syndrome (in this study "one-to-two" and 
'4wo-to-one" correspondences) can be considered complex cases. 
The choice of a "paper-and-pencil" study over a high-fidelity simulation stems 
from the greater possibility for experimental manipulation offered by the former. The 
influence of subjects is diminished while inexpensive but extensive observation is 
made possible (McGuire, Solomon & Bashook, 1976). The price of these advantages 
is a decrease in face validity, although Elstein et al. (1978) have reported many of 
the phenomena observed in high-fidelity research to also be observed in simulations 
of the type used in this study. 
For a treatment to be effective it should generally be attuned to the conditions 
that elicited and/or the conditions that are maintaining the problem. Initially, the 
clinician can only formulate hypotheses about these conditions. These hypotheses or 
possible explanations can then be explicitly tested, and a treatment plan drawn up 
once the conditions have been confirmed (e.g., Carey et al., 1984; De Bruyn, 1992; 
Haynes et al., 1993; Pameijer, 1992). In other words: clinical hypotheses can have 
far-reaching consequences for the client, and it is crucial that good hypotheses be 
generated. For example, if the hypothesis is merely a reformulation of the problem 
instead of a possible explanation, the clinician is likely to neglect certain possibilities 
for intervention. In this study, the quality of clinical hypotheses was investigated 
using the following criteria: explanatory value, possibility of operationalization, 
specificity, and redundancy. These criteria were selected from a large set, presented 
in Appendix D. 
To summarize, the present study addressed the following questions: (a) Is there 
an effect of classification as opposed to absence of classification on some qualitative 
characteristics of clinical hypotheses? (b) Do the DSM-III-R and the CBCL generate 
qualitatively different clinical hypotheses? (c) Does the complexity of the case affect 
the qualitative characteristics of clinical hypotheses? (d) Is the potential effect of 
classification on the qualitative characteristics of clinical hypotheses moderated by 
the complexity of the case? (e) Is the potential difference between the DSM-III-R 
and CBCL systems moderated by the complexity of the case? (f) Is the potential 
difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated by the different 
number of syndromes identified by the systems? (g) Is the potential difference 
between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated by the degree of resemblance 
between the syndromes they identify?, and (h) Is the potential difference between the 
DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated by both the different number of syndromes 
identified by the systems and the degree of resemblance between the syndromes? 
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These research questions will be amplified later on in combination with a description 
of the data analysis. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Design 
The effect of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification was investigated with three groups 
of diagnosticians asked to generate clinical hypotheses. The first group used six case 
descriptions supplemented each time with a classification in terms of the DSM-III-R 
("DSM-condition"). The second group used the same case descriptions, now 
supplemented with a CBCL classification ("CBCL-condition"). The third group used 
only the case descriptions ("control group"). The experimental design thus included 
a between-subjects variable with three levels (the DSM-III-R condition, the CBCL 
condition, and the control condition) and a within-subjects variable with six levels 
(the six cases). 
4.2.2 Subjects 
Subjects were 86 practitioners regularly confronted with clinical assessment. The 
experiment was performed while the practitioners were participating in a free 
workshop on clinical judgement and decision making. They knew the results would 
be used for research purposes but they did not know the exact nature of the study. 
In particular, they did not know that the classification information constituted one of 
the experimental variables. The practitioners came from the child divisions of mental 
health settings throughout the Netherlands (both inpatient and outpatient). Their 
assessment experience ranged from 1 month to 25 years, with an average of 7.6 
years. The subjects were assigned to either the DSM-III-R condition, the CBCL 
condition, or the control condition, with level of experience, type of education 
(psychology or special education), gender, employment (inpatient or outpatient 
mental health setting), and type of mental health setting (regional institute for 
ambulatory mental health care, psychiatric institution, private practice, or otherwise) 
matched across the different conditions. Initially, 124 diagnosticians signed up for 
the workshop and participation in the experiment. In the end, 86 participated: 33 in 
the DSM condition, 30 in the CBCL condition, and 23 in the control condition. The 
cancellations were not found to affect the matching. 
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4.2.3 Task materials 
The task materials consisted of six written case studies and written presentations of 
the relevant DSM-III-R disorders and CBCL scales. The case descriptions were one 
page single-spaced in length. They contained personal details on the child (name, 
gender, age, grade), information about members of the family, referral information, 
the nature of the complaint, a description of the problems, and further background 
information. The background information was purposely kept brief, in order to elicit 
a variety of hypotheses. As described in the introduction, the cases were constructed 
on the basis of the type of correspondence and the degree of resemblance between 
corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes. To control for any gender effects, 
all of the cases were about girls. The cases are characterized in Table 4.1. They are 
presented in their entirety in Appendix A. 
The actual content of the case descriptions was based on clinical records and 
information provided by clinicians. The problem descriptions were sufficient to apply 
the classifications but were made more realistic by including a few symptoms not 
covered by the classifications. The face validity of the cases and appropriateness of 
the DSM-III-R and CBCL classifications were agreed upon by experts. 
The DSM-III-R classification consisted of the description of the disorder as given 
in the manual (Dutch version). The symptoms occurring in the case were indicated 
with a checkmark. Where appropriate, the specific type of the disorder (e.g., 
"undifferentiated") and the severity of the disorder (e.g., "moderate") were indicated. 
The CBCL scales were represented as a list of defining behavior problems (in Dutch) 
together with their ratings (which had a value of 2 in most cases). In addition, the 
syndrome profiles from the CBCL (Revised Child Behavior Profile) were supplied, 
with the labels of the remaining, nonapplicable scales omitted. By way of illustration, 
the DSM-III-R and CBCL classifications of case 2 are presented in Appendix B. 
4.2.4 Procedure 
The subjects completed the task in a university lecture room during a 3-hour session 
(9:30 - 12:30 a.m.). The majority of the subjects finished the task within 2 hours. 
The task consisted of two assignments. The first assignment required the subjects to 
generate hypotheses in response to the six case descriptions and the associated 
classification information (in the DSM and CBCL condition). The subjects were 
given all six cases (in a random sequence) and written instructions. The instructions 
characterized a clinical hypothesis as "a (yet to be tested) supposition about a 
particular factor or combination of factors that may totally or partly explain a 
problem." In short, a hypothesis was defined as "a potential explanation." 
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The instructions for the subjects provided with classification information also 
contained a short description of the DSM-III-R or the CBCL. The subjects were 
asked to study each case carefully and, where relevant, to verify the appropriateness 
of the classification(s). The subjects were instructed to write down as many 
hypotheses regarding the case as they could, with the phrase "as many as" 
nevertheless unstressed. This procedure was repeated for all six cases. The subjects 
were not allowed to discuss the cases with each other. 
The second assignment required the subjects to indicate after each hypothesis 
what information, if any, they would need to establish the tenability of the 
hypothesis. A pilot study showed the answer to this question to often clarify the 
formulation of a particular hypothesis. 
After finishing the experimental tasks, the subjects were asked to complete a 
questionnaire designed to control for nuisance variables. The items on this 
questionnaire referred to experience with the content of the six cases, actual use of 
a classification system (DSM-III-R, CBCL, or other), experience with the generation 
of explicit hypotheses, and theoretical orientation (psychodynamic, behavioral, 
biomedical, cognitive, family systems, sociological, other, and/or eclectic). 
As an example, the instruction, questionnaire and subtasks for the CBCL group 
are presented in Appendix С 
4.2.5 Dependent variables 
Structural analysis of hypotheses 
In order to measure qualitative characteristics, a structural analysis of the hypothesis 
formulations was undertaken (Vermande et al., 1994).6 To start with, the following 
components were identified: problems (to be explained by the hypothesis); factors 
(i.e., states or events that, according to the clinician, completely or partly explain the 
development and/or sustainment of a problem or another factor); relations (between 
problems and factors or between factors); synonyms (for a problem or factor); 
references (to an explanatory mechanism, theory, model, or empirical fact); and 
comments (i.e., specific information from the case on which the hypothesis or a 
factor is based according to the clinician). 
The component factors was further divided into direct and indirect factors. A 
direct factor is a factor that immediately leads to the problem in question, without 
intermediate factors. With regard to causal and intentional hypotheses (Elster, 1983; 
Foliesdal, Walloe & Elster, 1986), the direct factor immediately precedes the 
6 In this thesis Chapter 3. 
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problem. With regard to functional hypotheses, where the problem is explained by 
its favorable effect (Elster, 1983; Fellesdal et al., 1986), the direct factor may 
immediately follow the problem.7 An indirect factor is a factor leading to another 
factor (which may, in turn, be either direct or indirect). In addition, the component 
relations was further divided into three types of explanations (causal, correlational, 
and an is-relation) along with the presence or absence of a subordinate relation 
(between generalizations and their specifications or abstractions and their concretiza-
tions). 
Finally, problems, factors, and relations were graphically represented in a causal 
network using one-way arrows, two-way arrows, and equal signs to represent causal, 
correlational, and is-relations, respectively. Implied explanations were denoted with 
dashed lines. Subordinate relations were denoted with simple connected lines. An 
example of a causal network is presented in Figure 4.1. In this study, however, we 
will deal mainly with the direct factors present in a hypothesis. 
Figure 4.1 Causal network for the hypothesis "The physical problems stem from the 
fact that she cannot keep up with the others at school. Insufficient intelli­
gence? They may also be connected to unfavorable circumstances at home 
(little attention from parents, responsibility for the other children)". 
insufficient she cannot keep up 
intelligence - - - - >
 отш
 the others at 
(IF) school 
(DF) 
unfavorable * 
circumstances at home 
bole attention responsibility 
from parents for other clulderen 
(DF) (DF) 
DF direct factor, IF indirect factor, Ρ problem, 
> causal relauon, 
4 — > cocrelaDonal relation, 
- - • implicitly denoted relation, 
subordination relation 
the physical 
" * problems 
(?) 
7 See Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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The dependent variables were measured for every diagnostician and every case 
description; that is, for every single set of hypotheses. However, the large number 
of hypotheses (2367 in all) forced us to restrict the structural analyses to a sample 
of the hypotheses generated for each case. It was decided to analyze every first, 
middle, and last hypothesis and thereby control for any potential order and sequence 
effects. It should be noted that the three experimental groups did not differ with 
respect to the number of hypotheses they generated (see Chapter 3). 
Dependent measures 
As no standard rating scale or set of criteria seem to exist for the evaluation of the 
quality of clinical hypotheses, we searched the literature for the characteristics of 
good hypotheses or sets of hypotheses. The major characteristics along with 
references are listed in Appendix D. References to clinical as opposed to methodolo-
gical literature are preceded by an asterisk. In general, the characteristics can be 
judged categorically (yes/no), or in degree or proportion. 
From the heterogeneous set of characteristics outlined in Appendix C, we selected 
four characteristics for the exploration of the effects of classification and the different 
classification systems on clinical hypothesis-generation. In selecting these characteris-
tics, the following were considered: the dependent variables should be easily and 
reliably scored (which ruled out a lot of characteristics such as clinical utility); the 
variables should be more or less present for every hypothesis (which ruled out 
characteristics concerning indirect factors, relations, and problems); and those 
variables that are either rarely met (e.g., mutual exclusiveness of the hypotheses in 
a set) or always met (e.g., logical consistency) should be omitted. A description of 
the selected characteristics and the interrater reliabilities obtained for each 
characteristic (expressed as correlations or Cohen's kappas) are presented below.8 
Proportion of direct factors with potentially explanatory value (k= .69). A factor 
has potentially explanatory value only when it can provide a real explanation for the 
problem. In some cases it is already clear before testing that the factor in question 
cannot possibly provide an explanation. Such a factor has no potentially explanatory 
value, and in the present study the following types of factors were noted to lack 
explanatory value: 
A tautological factor is simply a restatement of the problem (Bunge, 1985). For 
example, "A loss of contact with reality" as an explanation for schizophrenia. 
8 The instructions for the structural analysis and the scoring of the dependent variables are 
available on request 
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A circular factor 1 is simply a covering, descriptive label for the problem(s) to be 
explained (Davison & Neale, 1990; Haynes, 1992; Westmeyer, 1990). For example, 
"schizophrenia" in the hypothesis "The bizarre behavior is the result of schizophre-
nia . 
A circular factor 2 is simply a part of the problem or an operationalization of the 
problem. For example, "loss of energy" in the hypothesis "Peggy's depression is 
caused by loss of energy". 
A metaphorical factor is simply an analogy with somatic processes, physical 
processes, social processes, animals, computers, and the like (Bunge, 1985). For 
example, "Peggy's mental battery is empty". 
The proportion of direct factors with potentially explanatory value is the number of 
direct factors with potentially explanatory value divided by the total number of direct 
factors identified. Thus, the higher, the better. 
Proportion redundancy (with respect to direct factors) (r = .92). A synonymous 
factor is a factor with the same or much the same meaning as one or more of the 
other factors. For example, "Annie does not perform well at school" is synonymous 
with "Annie is a poor student". A synonymous factor may point to part of an 
explanation for the problem but, in fact, adds nothing. Synonymous factors are 
therefore considered superfluous elements. (Possible clarifications and repeated 
references to a factor are not considered synonyms.) The proportion redundancy is 
the number of synonymous direct factors divided by the sum of the number of 
synonymous direct factors and the number of unique factors. Thus, the smaller, the 
better. 
The following dependent variables were identified only in hypotheses containing 
direct factors with explanatory value. 
Possibility of operationalization (with respect to direct factors) (k = .68). 
Testability implies the possibility of operationalization or transformation into 
empirical variables (e.g., De Groot, 1969; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1988). This 
variable was scored dichotomously (yes/no). For example, if the problem is attributed 
to an unconscious mental phenomenon that does not always manifest itself in 
behavior, the score would be "no". In the case of two direct factors for a particular 
hypothesis, the most concrete factor was selected for scoring. 
Degree of specificity (with respect to direct factors) (r = .87). Specificity of a 
factor contributes to the degree of testability (Chalmers, 1976; Derksen, 1980; 
Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1988) as well as to the quality of the explanation 
(Haynes, 1992; Quinn, 1971; Stegmüller, 1983; Westmeyer, 1990). Specificity was 
measured using a 5-points scale, ranging from 0 (very specific) to 4 (very inspecific). 
In the case of two potentially explanatory direct factors per hypothesis, the factor that 
appeared to be most specific was selected for scoring. 
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4.2.6 Research questions and data analysis 
The effects of the independent variables were analyzed with a priori contrasts 
corresponding to the research questions of most interest. The between-subjects 
variable classification had 3 degrees of freedom for testing hypotheses (including the 
general mean) and the within-subjects variable cases had 6 degrees of freedom. The 
effects of the within-subjects variable were analyzed using contrasts between different 
kinds of cases (see Hand & Taylor, 1987). The coefficients of these contrasts are 
shown in Table 4.1, and it should be noted that these contrasts happen to be 
orthogonal. In all, the design permits statistical testing of 3x6=18 hypotheses, but we 
tested only 8 specific contrasts denoted as questions a through h in Table 4.2. 
Because of the exploratory nature of this study, both the formulation of our research 
questions and the expectations as to the results were intuitively based. 
The first two contrasts are concerned with the main effects of the variable 
classification. The question of whether or not hypothesis-generation, in general (i.e., 
irrespective of particular cases), is affected by classification (question a) was 
addressed by testing the difference between the control group versus the DSM and 
CBCL groups together. Further comparison of the DSM group with the CBCL group 
should reveal differences between the classification systems used in this study 
(question b). The next question concerns the main effect of the degree of case 
complexity (question c). Are there differences between the hypotheses produced for 
simple cases (cases 1 and 2 in Table 4.1) and the hypotheses for complex cases 
(cases 3 through 6 in Table 4.1)? As this question concerns a main effect of the 
variable cases, it is tested by comparing the mean performance (averaged across the 
three groups) for two kinds of cases. The remaining questions are concerned with 
possible interactions between the between-subjects and the within-subjects variables. 
Do the differences in performance between groups (as specified in the first two 
questions) vary across specific cases? The possibility that the effect of classification 
can only be observed with complex cases is tested by comparing the effect of 
classification (as specified in question a) for both simple and complex cases 
(resulting in question d) and by comparing the effect of DSM-III-R and CBCL (as 
specified in question b) for simple and complex cases (resulting in question e). The 
next question (question f) concerns the effects of DSM-III-R versus CBCL (specified 
in b) with respect to cases having a one-to-two correspondence (cases 3 and 4) or a 
two-to-one correspondence (cases 5 and 6). It might be argued that a case favors a 
particular classification system when it contains more of the syndromes included in 
that classification system. 
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The cases having a one-to-two correspondence, for instance, represent just one 
DSM-III-R disorder and two of the CBCL scales. Information from the CBCL 
classification might, therefore, be more effective in such cases. Analogously, the 
difference in performance by the DSM group and the CBCL group (as specified in 
b) might be less for cases with a strong resemblance than for cases with a weak 
resemblance between the DSM and CBCL syndromes (resulting in question g). That 
is, when a DSM-III-R disorder and a CBCL scale are mainly defined in terms of the 
same symptoms and have only a few unique symptoms (as happens in cases 1,3, and 
5), the effect of the classification information on the generation of hypotheses should 
be highly similar. This is in contrast to the situation where the definitons of the 
syndromes are largely in terms of unique symptoms (cases 2, 4, and 6). Finally, if 
the last two hypotheses should prove to be correct, a higher order interaction effect 
may be expected (question h). The difference between the DSM group and the CBCL 
group may reflect the effect of correspondence type, which may itself vary depending 
on the degree of resemblance. 
The research questions a through h were selected for their intuitive significance. 
Other combinations of the between- and within-subjects contrasts could clearly be 
considered but are not particularly interesting or useful in the context of this study 
(e.g., the effect of degree of resemblance for the classification and non-classification 
groups). 
The dependent variables were multivariately tested in logically distinct pairs. The 
first pair included those variables that could be evaluated for all of the hypotheses 
(i.e., proportion redundancy and proportion of direct factors with potentially 
explanatory value). The second pair included those variables that were evaluated for 
only hypotheses with explanatory value (i.e., possibility of operationalization and 
degree of specificity). When the multivariate test proved to be significant, we then 
considered univariate tests of significance, which were one-tailed for questions a, c, 
d, and f, and two-tailed for the remaining questions. For the actual analysis of the 
data the SPSS-procedure MANO VA (SPSS, 1990) was used. When relevant, we 
compensated for an apparent departure from normality by applying an aresme 
transformation (although the F-test seems quite robust with respect to violation of the 
normality assumption, Kirk, 1982) and/or using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney 
t/-test (SPSS, 1990). In particular this was the case with the proportion of factors 
with potentially explanatory value and the proportion redundancy. Five subjects did 
not complete the full set of six cases for various reasons (feeling ill, lack of time, or 
disagreement with a given classification). The data from these subjects were not 
included in the analyses. 
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4.3 Results 
For each dependent variable considered below, we only report those results that 
proved to be statistically significant. 
4.3.1 Proportion of factors with potentially explanatory value and 
proportion redundancy 
The cell means for the proportion of factors with explanatory value and the 
proportion redundancy per set of hypotheses are presented in Table 4.3. 
Table 4 J Mean proportion of direct factors with potentially explanatory value (PEV) 
and mean proportion redundancy (RED) as a function of case and classifi­
cation (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Classification 
DSM-III-R 
(n=31) 
PEV 
RED 
CBCL 
(n=26) 
PEV 
RED 
Control 
( i r t i ) 
PEV 
RED 
1 
.98 
(.07) 
.05 
(.11) 
.97 
(.09) 
.10 
(.16) 
.94 
(.13) 
.07 
(.13) 
2 
.95 
(.15) 
.05 
(.10) 
.93 
(.12) 
.09 
(.12) 
.91 
(.14) 
.12 
(.16) 
3 
1.00 
(00) 
.10 
(.15) 
.93 
(.17) 
.09 
(.15) 
.96 
(.11) 
.16 
(.17) 
Case 
4 
.96 
(.12) 
.03 
(.09) 
.82 
(.25) 
.04 
(.09) 
.93 
(.11) 
.06 
(.09) 
5 
1.00 
(.00) 
.06 
(.12) 
.97 
(.10) 
.11 
(.14) 
1.00 
(00) 
.09 
(.13) 
6 
.96 
(.10) 
.07 
(.13) 
.94 
(.12) 
.09 
(.13) 
.94 
(.14) 
.06 
(.13) 
With regard to the proportion of factors with explanatory value, a main effect of the 
type of classification system was found (question b; F(l, 75) = 13.70, ρ = .000; U 
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= 294.0, ζ = -2.93, ρ = .003). The DSM group generated a larger proportion of 
potentially explanatory factors than the CBCL group (.97 vs. .93). This difference is 
greater with a one-to-two type of correspondence (.98 vs. .88) and less with a 
two-to-one type of correspondence (.98 vs. .95; F(l, 75) = 3.24, ρ = .038; question 
f). A posteriori testing revealed the difference between the DSM-III-R and the 
control group (.97 vs. .95) to also be significant (F(l, 75) = 4.90, ρ = .015; U = 
229.5, ζ = -2.64, ρ = .004). The CBCL and the control group roughly performed at 
the same level. 
In other words: the DSM-III-R group outperforms both the CBCL and the control 
group with respect to the proportion of factors with explanatory value. The question 
then becomes which of the factors lacking explanatory value appear to be responsible 
for this effect? Nonparametric Mann-Whitney ÍAtests showed the CBCL group to 
generate more tautological factors (I/ = 407.5, ζ = -1.98, ρ = .047) and more circular 
factors of the first type (i/= 372.0, ζ = -2.02, ρ = .043) than the DSM-III-R group. 
The control group also formulated more circular factors of the first type (U = 283.0, 
ζ = -1.92, ρ = .055) than the DSM group. Again no differences were found between 
the CBCL and control conditions. 
As for the proportion redundancy, no effects were initially found. A posteriori 
testing nevertheless confirmed the suspicion of a difference between the DSM-III-R 
and the control group (F(l, 75) = 3.76, ρ = .028; U = 254.5, ζ = -2.10, ρ = .018), 
with the DSM group formulating less redundant hypotheses than the control group 
(.06 vs. .09). The differences between the CBCL and the control group and between 
the DSM-III-R and the CBCL condition were not found to be significant. 
4.3.2 Possibility of operationalization and degree of specificity 
In Table 4.4 the cell means of possibility of operationalization and degree of 
specificity for the direct factors are presented. Possibility of operationalization was 
found to be influenced by the degree of case complexity (question c;F(l, 77) = 3.68, 
ρ = .03). The direct factors in hypotheses concerning simple cases can be operationa-
lized more frequently than those in hypotheses concerning complex cases (.86 vs. 
.82). Further, the interaction between the degree of case complexity and classification 
versus nonclassification was found to be significant (question d). However, a 
posteriori testing showed this effect to stem from the interaction between the degree 
of case complexity and the DSM-III-R versus the control conditions (F(l, 77) = 6.17, 
ρ = .0075). Particularly with regard to simple cases, DSM-III-R classification more 
often leads to the generation of an empirically manipulable direct factor than no 
classification (.90 vs. .80). With regard to complex cases, however, both groups 
perform at approximately the same level (.81 vs. .83). 
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Table 4.4 Mean possibility of operationalization (POO) and mean degree of specificity 
(DSP) as a function of case and classification (standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
Classification 
DSM-III-R 
(n=32) 
POO 
DSP 
CBCL 
(n=27) 
POO 
DSP 
Control 
(n=21) 
POO 
DSP 
1 
.93 
(.16) 
1.2 
(3) 
.97 
(.11) 
1.2 
(•3) 
.91 
(.16) 
1.2 
(•3) 
2 
.88 
(.20) 
1.0 
(•3) 
.78 
(.22) 
1.0 
(•3) 
.68 
(.33) 
1.0 
(•3) 
I 
3 
.81 
(.27) 
1.3 
(.3) 
.88 
(.18) 
1.3 
(-4) 
.83 
(.21) 
1.2 
(-3) 
Case 
4 
.85 
(.27) 
1.1 
(•4) 
.81 
(.31) 
1.1 
(4) 
.90 
(.17) 
1.2 
(•4) 
5 
.89 
(.19) 
1.3 
(.3) 
.88 
(.19) 
1.2 
(•3) 
.91 
(.19) 
1.2 
(•3) 
6 
.69 
(.28) 
1.4 
(.4) 
.74 
(.33) 
1.2 
(-5) 
.67 
(.27) 
1.4 
(•4) 
The only significant effect for the degree of specificity once again concerns question 
c: the degree of case complexity (F(l, 77) = 18.61, ρ = .000). Complex cases elicited 
more imprecise direct factors than simple cases (1.24 vs. 1.10). 
4.4 Discussion 
The results may be summarized as follows. None of the dependent variables showed 
a main effect of classification in and of itself (question a). However, an effect of 
DSM-III-R classification as opposed to no classification (a') appeared on two 
occasions. Clinicians appear to formulate fewer redundant hypotheses when given the 
DSM-III-R classification. In addition, DSM-III-R classification leads to the 
generation of a larger proportion of potentially explanatory factors. This effect can 
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be attributed predominantly to the fact that the control condition produced more 
circular factors of the first type. A different effect of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL 
(question b) also appeared with respect to the proportion of direct factors with 
potentially explanatory value. Classification using the DSM-III-R produced a larger 
proportion of potentially explanatory factors than classification using the CBCL. This 
difference is even larger whith two applicable syndromes for the CBCL and one for 
the DSM-III-R (question f). With the CBCL classification, clinicians formulate more 
tautological factors and more circular factors of the first type than with the 
DSM-III-R classification. A main effect of the degree of case complexity (question 
c) was observed for two dependent variables. Simple cases elicit direct factors that 
are more precise and more open to operationalization than complex cases. No 
interaction effect between the degree of case complexity and classification (question 
d) or the degree of case complexity and the type of classification system (question 
e) could be found. However, with respect to the possibility of operationalization, an 
interaction between the degree of case complexity and the DSM-III-R versus the 
control group (d') was found. For simple cases, DSM-III-R classification more often 
leads to the generation of direct factors that can be operationalized than whitout 
classification. For complex cases, both of these groups performed approximately at 
the same level. Finally, no evidence of an interaction between the type of classifica-
tion system and the degree of resemblance (question g), or an even more complex 
interaction between the degree of resemblance and the type of correspondence for the 
two classification groups (question h) could be found. 
Before considering the implications of these findings, a discussion of some 
potentially relevant methodological issues is needed. First, the three groups proved 
to be quite similar with respect to the nuisance variables mentioned in the Method 
section with the exception of the amount of experience with the content of case 6, 
which proved to be significantly less for the control group. This fact, however, was 
not reflected in the relevant cell means (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Further, we checked 
whether subjects perhaps had the classification of another condition in mind 
(DSM-III-R or CBCL) even when they had been assigned to a specific condition 
(DSM-III-R, CBCL, or control). In the questionnaire, subjects were allowed to assign 
their own labels to the cases. They were also asked whether they used a particular 
classification system in clinical practice or not. It appeared that five subjects in the 
control group might have had a DSM-III-R classification in mind, two times with 
case 2 and three times with case 3. Without these cases, however, the overall pattern 
of results remained the same. 
The results show the dependent variables in this study to be roughly divided into 
a pair susceptible to classification systems (proportion redundancy and proportion of 
direct factors with potentially explanatory value) and a pair particularly sensitive to 
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the degree of case complexity (degree of specificity and possibility of operationali-
zation). An interaction of classification and the degree of case complexity was only 
observed for possibility of operationalization (DSM-III-R vs. control condition with 
simple vs. complex cases). 
The potential effects of classification and different classification systems were the 
main reason for this study. As already seen, no effect of classification in and of itself 
was found. A marked effect of classification according to the CBCL also did not 
appear. Not only were the differences between the CBCL and control conditions 
statistically nonsignificant, the differences also varied in direction: the one time the 
CBCL group scored better than the control group whereas the other time they scored 
worse (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Significant differences between the DSM-III-R and 
the control group, however, did appear (with respect to proportion redundancy, 
proportion of direct factors with potentially explanatory value, and - in interaction 
with degree of case complexity - possibility of operationalization), and the 
DSM-III-R group consistently scored better than the control group. Finally, the one 
time that a significant difference between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL condition 
could be observed (with respect to the proportion of direct factors with potentially 
explanatory value; also in interaction with type of correspondence), the DSM-III-R 
group performed better than the CBCL group. In other words, a beneficial effect on 
hypothesis-generation is not so much associated with classification in and of itself 
but rather the type of classification system used. The present results show the 
DSM-III-R to perform much better than the CBCL in this sense. 
As already noted, the DSM-III-R group outperforms both the CBCL and the 
control group with respect to the proportion of direct factors with potentially 
explanatory value. As the three groups did not differ with regard to the number of 
direct factors that they generated (Vermande et al., 1994),9 this result shows the 
DSM-III-R group to generate more potentially explanatory direct factors than the 
other groups. We have seen that both the CBCL and the control group generated 
more circular factors of the first type (i.e., a covering, descriptive label rather than 
a potentially explanatory factor) when compared to the DSM-III-R group. How 
should this striking phenomenon be interpreted? In keeping with Rispens (1986) and 
Rutter and Gould (1985), we think that clinicians tend to classify cases in terms of 
their own private classification systems. The fact that the CBCL group tended to 
classify in terms of their own individual system even when provided with the CBCL 
classification whereas the DSM group did not do this, may lie in the different natures 
of the CBCL and DSM-III-R syndromes. The disorders identified by the DSM-III-R 
9 In this thesis Chapter 3. 
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are based on observations and experiences of clinical experts and have been found 
to correspond fairly well to clinical intuition and the implicit taxonomies used by 
clinicians (e.g., Cantor, Smith, French & Mezzich, 1980 (DSM II); Van Mechelen 
& De Boeck, 1989). The scales of the CBCL, in contrast, are based on sophisticated 
statistical analyses of empirical data and have generally been found to correspond 
very poorly to the intuitive categories of clinicians (Krol, 1992). The disorders 
outlined in the DSM also have a long tradition whereas the scales of the CBCL are 
relatively new. It is well known that clinicians do not adopt new categories very 
easily and that traditional categories therefore persist (Morey, Skinner & Blashfield, 
1986). AH in all, the scales of the CBCL may be too remote from clinicians' private 
taxonomies and therefore elicit internal re-classification. Re-classification will also 
occur more frequently when more CBCL scales are applicable (as in question f). The 
fact that the CBCL group also formulates more tautological factors (i.e., restatements 
of the problem) than the DSM-III-R group may be a further indication of the need 
to interpret a case in terms more convenient than those of the CBCL. 
In a complementary examination involving descriptive or neutral as opposed to 
qualitative characteristics of hypotheses (Vermande et al., 1994),10 a difference 
between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL groups (question b) was found that fits the 
above interpretation: clinicians in the CBCL group assigned lower subjective 
probabilities to their favorite hypothesis (i.e., had less confidence in the hypothesis) 
than clinicians in the DSM-III-R group (who performed at the same level as the 
control group). This effect was even stronger in cases of a weak resemblance 
between the DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes (question g). According to the 
above-mentioned interpretation, clinicians may feel somewhat uncomfortable or even 
confused when using CBCL scales, resulting in lower confidence. No other 
differences between the effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification appeared, and 
a main effect of classification in and of itself (question a) was also not observed. 
An obvious question for further research is whether similar results can be 
obtained using the syndromes in the 1991 profile of the CBCL (Achenbach, 1991b). 
In our opinion, the answer will be "yes". The 1991 CBCL syndromes still differ from 
the DSM-III-R disorders. In addition, comparison of the DSM-III-R disorders with 
the 1991 CBCL scales using the computer program mentioned in the Introduction 
revealed similar types of correspondence, including "one-to-one", "one-to-two" and 
"two-to-one". 
Although alternative classifications for the same pathological behavior should 
have similar consequences for assessment and intervention, the results of the present 
10 In this thesis Chapter 3. 
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study suggest that this may not always be the case. This is obviously detrimental for 
clinical practice and developers of classification systems should be aware of the 
consequences of their systems for clinical practice. 
A second goal of the present study was to investigate the effect of the degree of 
case complexity. The finding that complex cases elicit less specific and less easily 
operationalized direct factors than simple cases is most likely a result of the larger 
cognitive strain caused by complex cases. This explanation is in keeping with the 
results of an earlier study of descriptive characteristics of clinical hypotheses 
(Vermande et al., 1994)." In this study clinicians seemed to maintain a certain 
constant level of overall complexity in their problem-solving behavior, particularly 
in their hypotheses: when cases were complex, clinicians offered more hypotheses 
and direct factors but appeared to be compensating for this complexity by lowering 
the number of indirect factors. When cases were simple, clinicians offered fewer 
hypotheses and direct factors but generated more complicated hypotheses by 
including more indirect factors. 
To what extent can the results of this study be generalized? Of all the possible 
qualitative characteristics (see Appendix C) we carefully selected four characteristics 
that appeared to be particularly relevant and measurable. Nevertheless, the possibility 
of different effects when additional variables are considered still remains. It is quite 
possible, for example, that classification in and of itself (question a) leads the 
clinician to focus on major rather than minor problems. This possibility could not be 
reliably measured in the present study, however, because it was generally difficult 
to determine which aspect of the clinical problem the clinician attended to (in most 
hypotheses the component "problem" was not indicated explicitly). Another highly 
relevant (but difficult to measure) variable concerns the requirement that plausible 
hypotheses should not be missing from the set of hypotheses generated by a clinician. 
However, the results of an initial study suggest no effects of classification or 
classification systems on this variable (Janssen & De Vries, 1993).12 
In order to preserve the internal validity of the present exploratory study, a 
paper-and-pencil task was selected for use. This meant that the subjects could not 
request additional information, lacked contact with the child and her family, and 
could not consult the relevant literature. The extent to which these factors influenced 
the outcomes of this study is not clear, but simple paper-and-pencil research has been 
shown in the medical field to yield results similar to those found using high-fidelity 
procedures (Elstein et al., 1978). Finally, it should be noted that only six different 
11 In this thesis Chapter 3. 
12 Discussed in Chapter S of this thesis. 
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cases were used in this study, and, in order to control for any gender effects, all of 
the cases concerned girls. Despite these restrictions, our results suggest that both the 
type of classification system and the degree of case complexity are important 
variables in clinical hypothesis-generation. 
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Effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification on 
the content of psychodiagnostic hypotheses 
In Chapters 3 and 4, an experiment to investigate the influence of classification and 
type of classification was described. The classification systems used were the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders (DSM-III-R: APA, 1987) and 
the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL: Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a). In the 
experiment, 86 psychodiagnosticians, divided into three groups, generated explanatory 
hypotheses for six cases. In the DSM-III-R and CBCL groups the cases were 
followed by their respective DSM-III-R and CBCL classes; in the control group the 
cases remained unclassified. The cases had been designed in order to investigate 
effects of the degree of case complexity (simple versus complex cases), the different 
number of classes identified by the DSM-III-R and the CBCL (two versus one), and 
the degree of resemblance of DSM-III-R and CBCL classes (strong versus weak). In 
order to measure the dependent variables a preliminary structural analysis of the 
hypothesis formulations was undertaken. 
The dependent variables investigated in Chapter 3 were descriptive in nature and 
included the number of hypotheses, the minimum and maximum subjective 
probability, the (estimated) number of direct and indirect factors, the proportion of 
composite hypotheses, and the proportion of explanation chains. No differences 
between the DSM and CBCL conditions were found, except that maximum 
probability was lower in the CBCL condition, especially in case of weak resemblan-
ce. An effect of classification in itself only appeared in interaction with the degree 
of case complexity: after classification of simple cases higher values for the number 
of direct factors and the proportion of composite hypotheses were obtained. The 
reverse was found for complex cases. A main effect of the degree of case complexity 
revealed higher values with complex cases for the number of hypotheses, the number 
of direct factors, and the proportion of composite hypotheses, and the reverse for the 
number of indirect factors and the proportion of explanation chains. 
The dependent variables of Chapter 4 concerned qualitative aspects and consisted 
of the proportion of factors with potentially explanatory value, the proportion 
redundancy, the possibility of operationalization, and the degree of specificity; all 
with respect to direct factors. No differences between the CBCL and the control 
groups were found. The DSM group performed better than the control group 
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regarding explanatory value, redundancy, and - for simple cases - possibility of 
operationalization. The DSM-III-R also scored better than the CBCL regarding 
explanatory value, particularly when the number of identified syndromes was two for 
the CBCL and one for the DSM-III-R. In addition, complex cases elicited hypotheses 
that were less specific and open to operationalization than simple cases. 
The two dependent variables of this final research chapter relate to the content 
of the generated hypotheses. The first dependent variable is treated in section S.l and 
concerns the number of different content areas to which the explanatory factors in 
the hypothesis set relate. For this purpose, twelve different content areas such as 
"genetic" and "cognitive" have been distinguished. The second dependent variable 
concerns the minimal completeness of the hypothesis set, that is, the extent to which 
important factors are present in the set of hypotheses. This latter variable was 
investigated by means of two pilot studies, of which the most comprehensive one 
will be discussed in some detail in section 5.2. For both dependent variables, the 
hypotheses obtained in the above-mentioned experiment are used. 
5.1 Effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification on the number of content 
areas in psychodiagnostic hypothesis sets 
5.1.1 Introduction 
To stress the fact that explanatory factors can be of various kinds, several categoriza-
tions of the content areas of hypotheses have been proposed (e.g., De Bruyn, 
Pameijer, Ruijssenaars & Van Aarle, in press; Meulenkamp & Van der Heijden, 
1989; Nezu & Nezu, 1993; Ter Horst, 1980). These range from a few very broad 
categories (e.g., external versus internal) to a number of more specific categories. 
The categories are often presented as a sort of checklist for diagnosticians in order 
to preclude premature closure of the set of hypotheses (described in Chapter 1). In 
this section it is investigated whether the number of different content areas that are 
addressed in the hypothesis set is influenced by classification and classification type. 
Although from the viewpoint of comprehensiveness it is desirable that a 
diagnostician considers hypotheses of various kinds, a small number of content areas 
and the fact that specific content areas are missing in the set of hypotheses does not 
permit a conclusion about the quality of the set of hypotheses. After all, as is the 
case with a small number of hypotheses (Chapter 3), such sets can still contain 
important and plausible hypotheses. Moreover, it might even be expected that 
classification restricts the number of addressed content areas, because identification 
of a certain syndrome could guide the diagnostician to a few highly plausible and 
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important hypotheses (De Bruyn et al., in press). Although a qualitative interpretation 
of the results with respect to the number of content areas thus is unclear, an 
investigation of the effects of classification and type of classification system is more 
complete if this dependent variable is also examined. 
5.1.2 Method 
The experimental design, the subjects, the task materials, the procedure, and the 
structural analysis of the hypotheses are the same as in Chapters 3 and 4. Again, 
only the first, middle, and last hypothesis of each set were analyzed. 
Dependent variable: the number of content areas 
The explanatory factors listed in the hypotheses obtained in this study could be 
categorized into the following content areas: 
Genetic: relating to heredity and units of heredity. 
Physical: relating to non-genetic physical features (anatomical, physiological, 
neurological, biochemical, etc.). 
Cognitive: relating to cognitive functions and abilities (intelligence, school 
performance, attention, memory, etc.). 
Non-cognitive: relating to non-cognitive psychological characteristics (personality 
traits, emotions, motivations, etc.). 
Developmental stage: relating to assignment to, transition to, and faulty passing of 
a developmental stage. 
Material-physical: relating to external, material qualities. 
Family: relating to members of the family, relatives, guardians, and pets. 
Peers: relating to friends and other peers. 
Other social relationships: relating to social relationships outside the family and 
peers. 
Social-economic: relating to social-economic status and social environment. 
Cultural: relating to (subculture and society. 
When a hypothesis contained more than one factor it could cover more than one 
content area. Both direct and indirect factors of a hypothesis were categorized.' 
For each content area it was determined whether it does or does not occur in the 
hypothesis set. That is, the data were made up of binary scores per content area. The 
interrater reliability of the scoring system as measured by Cohen's kappa proved to 
1 The instruction for the categorization is available on request 
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be .77. After categorization, the number of different content areas occurring in the 
hypothesis set was determined. 
Research questions and data analysis 
In keeping with Chapters 3 and 4, the following research questions were addressed 
for the number of different content areas: (a) Is there an effect of classification as 
opposed to absence of classification on the number of content areas that occur in a 
hypothesis set? (b) Do the DSM-III-R and the CBCL generate hypothesis sets that 
differ with respect to the number of content areas? (c) Does the complexity of the 
case affect the the number of content areas? (d) Is the potential effect of classifica­
tion on the number of content areas moderated by the complexity of the case? (e) Is 
the potential difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated by the 
complexity of the case? (f) Is the potential difference between the DSM-III-R and 
CBCL systems moderated by the different number of syndromes identified by the 
systems? (g) Is the potential difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems 
moderated by the degree of resemblance between the syndromes they identify?, and 
(h) Is the potential difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated 
by both the different number of syndromes identified by the systems and the degree 
of resemblance between the syndromes? 
These research questions were tested by means of analysis of variance using 
specific contrasts (see Table 2 of Chapter 3 or 4). The research questions, their 
corresponding contrasts, and the expectations as to the results have been amplified 
in both Chapter 3 and 4. To recollect, the tests for questions a, c, d, and f were 
one-tailed and those for the remaing questions two-tailed. 
5.1.3 Results 
The cell means for the number of content areas are presented in Table 5.1. To start 
with the result of question a, the control group proved to address significantly more 
different content areas than both the classification groups, the marginal means being 
2.82 and 2.53 (F(l, 78) = 4.81, ρ = .016). Contingency analysis for each category 
revealed only a few systematic differences between the control group and the two 
classification conditions. "Developmental stage" occurred more often in the control 
group than in both the classification groups (chi-square = 7.07, ρ = .008). "Social 
economic", however, was more often addressed in the DSM-III-R group than in the 
control group (chi-square = 3.98, ρ = .046). In other words, the few times that a 
significant difference occurred, the specific content area was mentioned alternately 
more in the control condition and more in (one of the) classification conditions. 
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Table 5.1 Mean number of content areas per hypothesis set as a function of case and 
classification (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Case 
Classification 
DSM-III-R 
(n=32) 
CBCL 
(n=28) 
Control 
(n=21) 
1 
2.69 
(.93) 
3.14 
(1.08) 
3.05 
(.97) 
2 
2.31 
(.78) 
2.21 
(.79) 
2.33 
(.58) 
3 
2.31 
(.78) 
2.07 
(1.09) 
2.14 
(.57) 
4 
3.16 
(1.08) 
2.32 
(1.28) 
3.62 
(1.28) 
5 
2.59 
(.71) 
2.93 
(.98) 
3.14 
(.79) 
6 
2.31 
(.86) 
2.36 
(.99) 
2.62 
(1.16) 
To continue, no significant difference between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL groups 
was found with respect to the number of content areas (question b). Contingency 
analysis for each content area did not reveal any differences either. Similarly, no 
significant difference with respect to the number of content areas appeared between 
simple and complex cases (question c). The interaction between the degree of case 
complexity and classification versus nonclassification, nevertheless, was found to be 
significant (question d). However, a posteriori testing showed this effect to stem from 
the interaction between the degree of case complexity and the CBCL versus the 
control conditions (F(l, 78) = 5.79, ρ = .009). With simple cases, the mean number 
of content areas is about the same in both groups (2.68 vs. 2.69), but with complex 
cases the mean of the control condition is higher than the one of the CBCL condition 
(2.42 versus 2.88). In other words, with complex cases, the mean number of content 
areas increases in the control condition but decreases in the CBCL condition. Further, 
the interaction between the degree of case complexity and the DSM-III-R versus the 
CBCL conditions (question e) appeared to be significant (F(l, 78) = 4.44, ρ = .038). 
With simple cases the mean for the DSM-III-R group is smaller than the one of the 
CBCL group (2.50 vs. 2.68), whereas the reverse is true with complex cases (2.59 
vs. 2.42). This effect is caused especially by a decrease of the number of content 
areas in the CBCL condition with complex cases. In addition, the interaction between 
the DSM-III-R versus the CBCL conditions and the one-to-two versus the two-to-one 
types of correspondence (question f) proved to be significant (F(\, 78) = 8.67, ρ 
=.002). When the number of identified syndromes is one for the DSM-III-R and two 
for the CBCL, the mean number of mentioned content areas is larger in the DSM 
group than in the CBCL group (2.73 vs. 2.20). But in the reverse situation of two 
identified syndromes for the DSM-III-R and one syndrome for the CBCL the mean 
119 
CHAPTER 5 
of the DSM group is smaller than the one of the CBCL group (2.45 vs. 2.64). Thus, 
in both groups, the identification of two as opposed to one syndrome leads to a 
decrease of the number of content areas that are mentioned in the hypothesis set, and 
this effect is somewhat larger in the case of CBCL classification. The interaction 
between DSM-III-R versus CBCL classification and the degree of resemblance 
between the syndromes identified by these systems (question g) was also found to be 
significant (Щ, 78) = 6.44, ρ = .013). When the DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes 
have a strong resemblance the mean of the DSM-III-R group is smaller than the one 
of the CBCL group (2.53 vs. 2.71). In the case of less resembling DSM and CBCL 
syndromes the opposite holds true (2.59 vs. 2.30). Thus, the mean of the CBCL 
group drops when its syndromes only weakly resemble DSM-III-R syndromes, while 
the mean of the DSM-III-R group stays about the same. Finally, no higher order 
interaction between the type of correspondence and the degree of resemblance for the 
two classification groups (question h) could be found. 
5.1.4 Discussion 
The results show that classification is related to a reduction of the number of content 
areas that is addressed in a hypothesis set (results of questions a and f). In specific 
cases, classification according to the CBCL is somewhat more susceptible to this 
effect than classification according to the DSM-III-R, the scores of the DSM-III-R 
group being somewhat more stable (results of question d, e, f, g). On the whole, 
however, the DSM-III-R and the CBCL groups mention about the same number of 
content areas (result of question b). 
Before considering interpretations of these findings, a discussion of a potentially 
relevant methodological issue is needed. A priori it is to be expected that the number 
of content areas is related to some other dependent variables, especially the number 
of factors and hypotheses, the degree of specificity of the factors, and the number of 
factors with potentially explanatory value. Inspection of the results with respect to 
these variables (summarized at the beginning of this chapter), however, showed quite 
different patterns of effects than the ones found for the number of content areas. So, 
it is unlikely that the present findings can be traced back to those other results. 
Two quite different interpretations for the first finding (classification is related 
to a reduction of the number of content areas that is addressed in a hypothesis set) 
come to mind. Both interpretations are tentative and need independent corroboration. 
The first one was stated in the introduction and implies that classification restricts the 
number of addressed content areas because identification of a certain syndrome 
guides the diagnostician to a few (highly plausible and important) hypotheses. 
According to this interpretation, the reduction actually concerns a pre-selection. 
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Nevertheless, the combination of the results of question a (the control group 
addresses more content areas than both the classification groups) and question f (in 
the classification conditions, the identification of two as opposed to one syndrome 
leads to a decrease of the number of content areas) suggests that classification 
imposes extra cognitive strain on the diagnosticians. This cognitive strain might be 
a direct result of the extra information to be processed. Incidentally, it is not very 
likely that the supposed extra cognitive strain in the classification conditions is due 
to a lack of time, because only three diagnosticians indicated a lack of time (two of 
them were from the control group) and only a few diagnosticians stayed in the 
experimental room until the end. 
Although likely in view of the above results, the interpretation of extra cognitive 
strain does not fit very well with the absence of other significant results on both 
question a and f in the preceding chapters and the even beneficial effects of 
DSM-III-R classification as opposed to absence of classification found in Chapter 4. 
In addition, the interpretation of cognitive strain is in contrast with an asserted 
advantage of classification mentioned in Chapter 1, namely the supposition that by 
abstracting and structuring the welter of information, classification contributes to 
efficient processing and the avoidance of cognitive overload (Achenbach, 1985). Why 
should this not be the case here? One (partial) explanation could be that over one 
third of the diagnosticians participating in the experiment indicated never to employ 
a classification system in their practice and as a consequence had difficulty dealing 
with the classifications presented to them. Another explanation is that a "cognitive 
overload avoiding effect" of classification might only become manifest with cases 
less prototypical (containing more distractive symptoms) than the ones used in this 
experiment (see Chapter 3). 
The interpretation of extra cognitive strain in the classification groups might also 
apply to the (as yet unexplained) interaction effect found in Chapter 3 that after 
classification of simple cases higher values for the number of direct factors and the 
proportion of composite hypotheses were obtained, while the reverse was found for 
complex cases. The fact is that the relevant cell means for these two dependent 
variables show that the scores for the control group increased with complex cases 
whereas those of the classification groups stayed about the same (see Chapter 3). 
On the whole, no difference between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL conditions 
appeared and both classification groups mention fewer content areas than the control 
group. Under specific conditions (i.e, when complex cases, weak resemblance, 
and - to a lesser degree - two syndromes are involved), however, the reduction of 
the number of addressed content areas related to classification is somewhat more 
noteworthy with classification according to the CBCL than according to the 
DSM-III-R. That is, the interactions are especially caused by a drop of the CBCL 
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scores in these cases. In connection with the second interpretation mentioned above 
this means that in these situations the CBCL imposes more cognitive strain than the 
DSM-III-R. For this, the same explanation as given for the "framing effects" found 
in Chapters 3 and 4 may apply, especially if the results of question g are considered 
(the mean number of addressed content areas in the CBCL group drops when its 
syndromes only weakly resemble DSM-III-R syndromes, while the mean of the 
DSM-III-R group stays about the same). That is, the syndromes of the CBCL may 
be more remote from the private taxonomies of diagnosticians than the disorders of 
the DSM-III-R and therefore cause more cognitive strain (see Chapter 3 and 4 for 
a more detailed argumentation). The other interpretation of the selecting effect of 
classification fits less well with the obtained interaction effects. 
5.2 Effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification on the minimal 
completeness of psychodiagnostic hypothesis sets 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The six case descriptions in the present experiment were not constructed as having 
a "correct solution" (see Chapter 3). As is often the case in psychodiagnostic practice, 
the case descriptions were incomplete and open and permitted a broad range of 
hypotheses. In Appendix D belonging to Chapter 4, it was stated that hypothesis sets 
should generally be exhaustive so that the correct explanation of the problem will not 
be missed. However, given the great many potentially explanatory factors that usually 
play a part in clinical psychology, a more lenient view of psychodiagnostic 
hypotheses is held: important and plausible hypotheses should not be missing from 
the set of hypotheses generated by a clinician (see Appendix D). For the sake of 
brevity, we denote this requirement as "minimal completeness". 
The presence of important hypotheses in (nonclinical) hypothesis sets has been 
the subject of studies by Gettys and his colleagues (summarized by Slovic, 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1988). These investigators asked subjects to list all 
possible hypotheses about the cause of a problem, such as an automobile malfunction. 
Other tasks asked for hypotheses about students' undergraduate majors, workers' 
occupations, animals, and geographical areas. In all of these studies, subjects 
consistently generated hypothesis sets that lacked important hypotheses. This held for 
professionals as well as lay subjects. In Chapter 1 we discussed that also for the 
clinical domain premature closure of the hypothesis set (with the result that the 
correct hypothesis is not considered) is often reported. 
122 
EFFECTS ON THE CONCENT OF PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC HYPOTHESES 
From a clinical point of view, minimal completeness is one of the most 
interesting qualitative criteria for sets of psychodiagnostic hypotheses. Unfortunately, 
minimal completeness is also one of the most difficult to measure variables. 
Objective standards, such as the base rates of explanatory conditions for disorders, 
are generally lacking. In addition, the use of expert opinions, which seems an 
obvious solution, requires caution. Being humans, experts are susceptible to cognitive 
limitations (see Chapter 1) and expert decision makers are often found to be 
inaccurate and biased (Shanteau, 1988; Slovic et al., 1988). Another difficulty, 
discussed in Chapter 2, is that experts are not unanimous about the etiology of 
disorders, especially when they adhere to different theoretical orientations. 
In spite of these problems, two pilot studies2 were carried out to explore the 
effect of DSM-HI-R and CBCL classification on the minimal completeness of the 
hypothesis sets obtained in the experiment. As the use of expert opinions as a 
criterion - for want of something better - is a generally accepted method, determina-
tion of minimal completeness was accomplished with the help of some experts. They 
indicated which factors are highly relevant for the disorder in question and thus 
should be present in the hypothesis sets. The risk that the experts would overlook 
important factors themselves was prevented by presenting them an inventarisation of 
factors found in the literature. The method and major results of the most comprehen-
sive pilot study (Janssen & De Vries, 1993) will be treated below. In the discussion 
its results will be compared with those of the smaller study (Ten Thije, 1994). 
5.2.2 Method 
The task materials and the procedure are the same as in Chapters 3 and 4. From both 
the experimental design and the subjects, however, only a part was used. This will 
be discussed below. Another difference with the preceding is that all the hypotheses 
of a set were examined (i.e., not only the hypotheses of which a structural analysis 
was made as was done in Chapters 3 and 4 and section 5.1). 
Design 
Only three of the six cases were used (for reasons stated below). They concerned 
case 1 (depression), 2 (gender identity disorder), and 3 (conduct disorder). The 
experimental design thus included a between-subjects variable with three levels (the 
2 The two pilot studies concern master's theses (Janssen & De Vries, 1993 ; Ten Thije, 1994) 
that were written within the framework of the present study and after an idea of M. 
Vermande. The students were supervised by J. van den Bereken and M. Vermande. 
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DSM-III-R condition, the CBCL condition, and the control condition) and a 
within-subjects variable with three levels (the three cases). 
Subjects 
From each of the experimental groups (DSM-III-R group, CBCL group, and control 
group), 10 diagnosticians were selected in such a way that the three groups were 
matched on level of experience, employment (inpatient or outpatient mental health 
setting), and type of mental health setting (regional institute for ambulatory mental 
health care, psychiatric institution, private practice, or otherwise). Thus, the 
hypothesis sets of a subgroup of 30 out of 81 diagnosticians were analyzed. 
Dependent variable: minimal completeness 
It was intended that the hypothesis sets for all of the six cases would be analyzed. 
For that purpose at least one (independent) expert per case was contacted. The 
experts had been selected because of their expertise, but also because they could not 
be strongly identified with one particular theoretical orientation (e.g., psychoanalysis). 
Unfortunately, only three experts could find the time to cooperate on this study: one 
for case 1 (depression), one for case 2 (gender identity disorder), and one for case 
3 (conduct disorder). 
To prevent the risk of experts generating incomplete hypothesis sets themselves, 
it was decided that the students would list explanatory factors for the syndromes of 
each case. For this purpose, manuals of clinical child and adolescent psychology or 
psychiatry were used, as well as specific literature on the syndromes. Clearly 
identical factors were combined, but similar factors were listed separately in order 
to prevent loss of information. In this way lists of factors were obtained that 
consisted of 98 factors in the case of depression, 25 factors for gender identity 
disorder, and 181 factors for conduct disorder. Each factor was numbered and put on 
a card. 
The cards and the list for a certain disorder were subsequently sent to the expert 
in question. The experts were asked to do the following. First, they had to read the 
explanatory factors. Factors that occurred more than once had to be combined or 
clustered. Possibly missing factors had to be put onto blank cards that had been 
enclosed. Next, they had to select the 25 percent most occurring factors that play an 
important part in the particular disorder. These selected factors then had to be ranked, 
with the most occurring factor receiving a "l".3 
3 The instruction for the expert is available on request 
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The number of (clusters of) factors selected by the expert was 15 for the first 
case, 6 for the second case, and 25 for the third case. For each target factor the 
students determined whether it does or does not occur in the hypothesis set. That is, 
the data were made up of binary scores per target factor. The interrater reliability of 
the scoring system as measured by Cohen's kappa proved to be .60. The number of 
target factors mentioned (at least once) per hypothesis set was considered to be an 
indication for the minimal completeness of the set. 
Research questions and data analysis 
As only the hypothesis sets of three of the six cases could be analyzed, effects with 
respect to the degree of case complexity, degree of resemblance, and different 
number of syndromes identified by the DSM-III-R and the CBCL could not 
(properly) be investigated. That is, it was only tested whether the three classification 
conditions differ with respect to minimal completeness. If these differences proved 
to be significant, specific research questions would then be investigated, including 
the questions a and b of Chapters 3 and 4: (a) Is there an effect of classification as 
opposed to absence of classification on the minimal completeness of psychodiagnostic 
hypothesis sets?; and (b) Do the DSM-III-R and the CBCL affect minimal 
completeness differently? 
For each case the number of target factors that appeared in each hypothesis set 
were compared by means of analysis of variance. Note that in contrast to earlier 
analyses in Chapters 3 and 4, now analyses for each of the cases are conducted 
separately. 
5.2.3 Results 
The cell means for the number of selected factors that appeared in each hypothesis 
set are presented in Table 5.2. The numbers are rather low compared with the 
number of hypotheses and factors generated (about 4.6 hypotheses, 5.8 direct factors, 
and 4.1 indirect factors averaged over the three cases and conditions, see Chapter 3). 
However, no significant differences associated with classification condition were 
obtained. 
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Table 5.2 Mean number of target factors mentioned (at least once) per hypothesis set 
as a function of case and classification 
Case 
Classification 1 2 3 
DSM-in-R 1.9 1.0 3.1 
(n=10) 
CBCL 2.6 1.1 2.7 
(n=10) 
Control 3.2 0.9 2.6 
(n=10) 
With respect to the target factors that appeared in the hypothesis sets, only once a 
significant effect was found. This concerned factor 4 of case 2 (gender identity 
disorder): "weak reinforcement of normative gender role behavior by the parents". 
This factor appeared significantly more often in the CBCL group than in the two 
other groups (chi-square = 6.67, ρ = .04). The frequencies in the three experimental 
groups per factor for case 2 are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table S3 Frequencies of the target factors for case 2 per classification condition 
Target factors 
Classification 1 2 3 4 S 6 
DSM-III-R 6 0 0 0 3 1 
(n=10) 
CBCL 6 1 0 3 1 0 
(n=10) 
Control 7 0 0 0 2 0 
(n=10) 
5.2.4 Discussion 
Although in section S.l it was observed that the control group addressed more 
content areas than both classification groups, in the present study no significant effect 
of classification condition on the minimal completeness of psychodiagnostic 
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hypothesis sets was found. That is, all groups mention about the same number of 
target factors. With respect to individual target factors, a significant effect appeared 
once and implied that the CBCL group mentioned a certain target factor more often 
than the DSM-III-R and the control groups. 
With so many tests, one or a few significant effects are likely to be found. Hence 
we may conclude that no clear effects of classification and the two types of 
classification systems have been obtained. This conclusion, however, should be a 
very cautious and tentative one given the limited number of cases and subjects. 
The above conclusion is in keeping with the results of another study relating to 
the minimal completeness of the hypothesis sets obtained in the experiment (Ten 
Thije, 1994). In that study, only the first case (depression) was considered, but the 
hypothesis sets of all subjects were included. A list of 197 factors was obtained from 
the literature. These were sent to an expert, along with the case description and the 
DSM-III-R and CBCL classification of the case (as presented to the subjects 
participating in the experiment) in a sealed envelope. The expert was asked to select 
the 25 percent most occurring factors that play an important part in depression of 
girls aged 14 years and 4 months (i.e., the age of the girl in the depression case), 
with a minimum of 20. The expert was then requested to read the case and its 
classifications and to indicate which of the selected factors are plausible given the 
information in the case. In both subtasks, the expert could add plausible factors not 
listed.4 Although not asked for, the expert also indicated factors that can explain 
depression occasionally. In this way, three lists of target factors were obtained: a list 
of 6 case-specific factors, a list of 10 general factors, and a list of 16 incidental 
factors. No significant differences associated with classification condition were 
obtained for these lists. In addition, the numbers of the case-specific and general 
factors mentioned in the hypothesis sets were rather low compared with the number 
of hypotheses and factors generated. 
The data of both pilot studies thus show that a rather disappointing number of 
factors generated by the diagnosticians corresponds to the target factors. This is in 
keeping with the finding of Getty s and colleagues, mentioned in the introduction, that 
hypothesis sets lack important hypotheses (Slovic et al., 1988). In relation to the 
heighth of the subjective probabilities obtained in Chapter 3, it seems that 
diagnosticians nevertheless overestimate the completeness of their hypothesis sets. 
This was also a result of the studies by Gettys. In Chapter 1 it was discussed that 
premature closure of the hypothesis set and overconfidence are recurring biases in 
clinical judgement. 
4 The instruction for the expert is available on request. 
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Although no differences between the classification conditions were found in this 
section, the literature search for explanatory factors generally had more succes in 
searches using DSM labels. As was stated in Chapter 1, information retrieval is one 
of the purposes of a classification system. This argues in favour of the feasibility of 
the DSM-III-R. 
As was stated in the introduction, the two studies reported here have the status 
of pilot studies, and their emerged restrictions imply suggestions for more profound 
research. First, the investigation of only a small number of cases was caused by the 
fact that many experts could not find the time to perform the task - which took two 
to three hours - within the period of a few months. This means that the experts have 
to be approached amply beforehand (at least one year). Secondly, inspection of the 
listed explanatory factors and their references revealed that there is little consensus 
about which variables enter into a disorder. This also appeared from the fact that the 
experts disqualified a number of factors from the literature as "irrelevant" or 
"speculative". It is therefore likely that the use of different experts will yield 
different selections of factors, so much the more when also a case has to be assessed. 
A (partial) solution would be to depart from the factors selected by all the experts 
either individually or commonly, depending on what is feasible. Consensus among 
experts could possibly be increased by having them construct the case themselves, 
rather than submit a settled case. In the third place, in Appendix D belonging to 
Chapter 4 it was stated that the factors of a hypothesis should account for a large 
magnitude of shared variance with the problem, be plausible, and be modifiable. 
Nevertheless, the factors selected by the experts proved to contain some unmodifiable 
ones (e.g., with respect to heridity). This aspect should therefore be stressed more in 
the instruction to the experts, although the question remains whether consensus about 
modifiability is feasible. Finally, the dependent variables did not consider the ranking 
of the selected factors, although all experts succeeded in doing so. If the ranking is 
firm and common, it could be included in the dependent variable to permit more 
accurate measurement. 
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General discussion 
In this final chapter we will first summarize the present study and its major 
conclusions. Next, we will discuss some issues with respect to the validity of the 
experimental part of the study. This discussion will be followed by interpretations of 
some major results and suggestions for further research. The chapter ends with 
implications for psychodiagnostic practice and research, including the recommen-
dation of a classification system with respect to psychodiagnostic hypothesis-
generation. 
6.1 Summary and conclusions 
The present study was carried out within the frame work of the diagnostic cycle, a 
normative model of the psychodiagnostic process (De Bruyn, 1992). The diagnostic 
cycle prescribes, among other things, that classification of a client's problems should 
precede the generation of explanatory hypotheses for these problems. However, the 
actual influence of classification on hypothesis-generation is unclear. The present 
study tried to elucidate this situation. It also investigated whether alternative 
classifications of the same problem behavior have different effects on psychodiagnos-
tic hypotheses. This question is also relevant in the light of the phenomenon of 
framing-effects, which are frequently observed in human decision making and refer 
to the fact that different structurings of the same problem situation can lead to 
different decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Slovic, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 
1988). Two of the most influential classification systems in the field of developmen-
tal psychopathology were selected for investigation: the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of mental disorders (DSM-III-R: APA, 1987) and the Child Behavior 
Checklist (CBCL: Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983a). 
Effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classification on psychodiagnostic hypothesis-
generation were investigated by asking diagnosticians to generate hypotheses for 
clinical cases that were classified according to these two systems. To make sure that 
the cases would be classifiable in both the DSM-III-R and the CBCL, it was decided 
to construct the cases on the basis of correspondences between syndromes of the two 
systems. For that reason, 47 of the disorders found in the DSM-III-R and all of the 
51 profile scales found in the CBCL were compared with respect to the symptoms 
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constituting these syndromes. This was done by means of a computer program. A 
correspondence between DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes was defined to be present 
when the number of common symptoms met the threshold required for each of the 
classification systems. Several types of correspondence were found. It also appeared 
that the corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes could have a particularly 
strong or weak resemblance. Both the type of correspondence and the degree of 
resemblance were systematically incorporated in the construction of the cases. Two 
cases were of the "one-to-one" type of correspondence (one DSM-III-R disorder 
corresponding to one CBCL scale); two cases were of the "one-to-two" type (one 
DSM-III-R disorder corresponding to two CBCL scales); and two cases were of the 
"two-to-one" type (two DSM-III-R disorders corresponding to one CBCL scale). In 
each pair of cases, the degree of resemblance between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL 
syndromes was selected to be strong in one case and weak in the other case. In 
addition, the degree of case complexity, a variable found to influence hypothesis-
generation in the medical domain (Elstein, Shulman & Sprafka, 1978), was also 
included in the six cases. The division into simple and complex cases was 
(tentatively) based on the type of correspondence. Cases classified by both the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL as one syndrome (which means a "one-to-one" correspon-
dence) were considered simple cases. Cases classified by either one of the 
classification systems as more than one syndrome (in this study "one-to-two" and 
"two-to-one" correspondences) were considered complex cases. 
The foregoing gave rise to eight research questions: (a) Is there an effect of 
classification as opposed to absence of classification on diagnostic hypotheses? (b) 
Do the DSM-III-R and the CBCL yield different diagnostic hypotheses? (c) Does the 
complexity of the case affect diagnostic hypotheses? (d) Is the potential effect of 
classification on diagnostic hypotheses moderated by the complexity of the case? (e) 
Is the potential difference between effects of the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems on 
diagnostic hypotheses moderated by the complexity of the case? (f) Is the potential 
difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated by the different 
number of syndromes identified by the systems? (g) Is the potential difference 
between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated by the degree of resemblance 
between the syndromes they identify?, and (h) Is the potential difference between the 
DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated by both the different number of syndromes 
identified by the systems and the degree of resemblance between the syndromes? 
These questions are summarized as test strategies in the first column of Tables 6.1a 
and 6.1b. 
To investigate these questions, an experiment was conducted in which 86 
diagnosticians generated hypotheses for all six cases. The diagnosticians were divided 
into a DSM-III-R, a CBCL, and a control group. In the DSM and CBCL groups the 
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cases were followed by a presentation of their respective DSM-III-R and CBCL 
classes; in the control group the cases remained unclassified. There were three groups 
of dependent variables. These groups correspond respectively to Chapter 3, 4, and 5. 
The first group concerned descriptive characteristics of diagnostic hypotheses and 
consisted of the number of hypotheses, the minimum and maximum subjective 
probability, the (estimated) number of direct and indirect factors, the proportion of 
composite hypotheses, and the proportion of explanation chains. The second group 
concerned qualitative aspects and included the proportion of factors with potentially 
explanatory value, proportion redundancy, possibility of operationalization, and 
degree of specificity; all with respect to direct factors. Group three related to the 
content of diagnostic hypotheses and consisted of the number of different content 
areas occurring in hypothesis sets and the minimal completeness of hypothesis sets. 
The latter dependent variable was investigated in a pilot study that concerned half of 
the cases. The dependent variables per group and chapter are depicted in the top rows 
of Tables 6.1a and 6.1b. 
The tests for questions a, c, d, and f were one-tailed and those for the remaining 
questions two-tailed. Tables 6.1a and 6.1b present a summary of the significant 
results per research question along with the explained variances. 
Stated in words, the significant results per question are as follows: differences 
between the classification groups and the control group (question a) were only found 
with respect to the number of different content areas, the control group addressing 
more content areas than the classification groups. However, it appeared that the 
DSM-III-R group as opposed to the control group generated a larger proportion of 
factors with potentially explanatory value and a smaller proportion of redundant 
factors (question a'). In addition, the maximum subjective probability proved to be 
lower in the CBCL group than in the control group (question a'). Differences 
between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL groups (question b) were found with respect 
to the maximum subjective probability and the proportion of factors with potentially 
explanatory value. For both variables, higher values were obtained in the DSM-III-R 
condition than in the CBCL condition. Differences between simple and complex 
cases (question c) appeared with respect to the number of hypotheses, the number of 
direct factors, the proportion of composite hypotheses, the number of indirect factors, 
the proportion of explanation chains, the possibility of operationalization, and the 
degree of specificity. For the first three variables, higher values were obtained with 
complex cases than with simple cases. For the remaining four variables, lower values 
were obtained with complex than with simple cases. 
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Interaction effects between the degree of case complexity and classification versus 
nonclassification (question d) appeared with respect to the number of direct factors 
and the proportion of composite hypotheses. After classification of simple cases 
higher values for both variables were obtained. The reverse was found for complex 
cases. In addition, with simple cases, the DSM-III-R group generated hypotheses that 
were more open to operationalization than those of the control group (question d')· 
With regard to complex cases, however, both groups performed at the same level. 
Further, an interaction effect between the degree of case complexity and the CBCL 
versus the control group (question d') was found with respect to the number of 
content areas. With simple cases, both groups mention the same number of content 
areas, but with complex cases the number of content areas in the control group is 
higher than in the CBCL condition. An interaction effect between the degree of case 
complexity and the DSM-III-R versus the CBCL conditions (question e) only 
appeared with respect to the number of content areas. With simple cases the CBCL 
group addresses more content areas than the DSM-III-R group, whereas with 
complex cases the DSM-III-R group mentions more content areas. Interaction effects 
between the DSM-III-R versus the CBCL conditions and the one-to-two versus the 
two-to-one types of correspondence (question 0 appeared with respect to the 
proportion of factors with potentially explanatory value and the number of content 
areas. For the first dependent variable, the DSM-III-R group obtained higher values 
than the CBCL group with both types of correspondence, but the difference between 
the groups was larger when a one-to-two type of correspondence was involved. For 
the second dependent variable, it appeared that the DSM-III-R group mentions more 
content areas than the CBCL group when the number of identified syndromes is one 
for the DSM-III-R and two for the CBCL. But in the reverse situation of two 
syndromes for the DSM-III-R and one for the CBCL, the CBCL condition addresses 
more content areas than the DSM-III-R condition. Interactions between DSM-III-R 
versus CBCL classification and the degree of resemblance between them (question 
g) were found with respect to the maximum subjective probability and the number 
of content areas. The maximum subjective probability in the DSM-III-R condition 
is higher than in the CBCL condition, especially when the corresponding DSM-III-R 
and CBCL syndromes have a weak resemblance. As for the number of content areas, 
the CBCL condition addresses more content areas than the DSM-III-R condition 
when the resemblance is strong, whereas the opposite holds true for weak resemblan-
ce. Finally, no significant results were obtained for the higher order interaction 
between the type of correspondence and the degree of resemblance for the two 
classification groups (question h). 
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To conclude: with the exception of question h, all questions could be answered 
positively. However, for each question only a few dependent variables were found 
to be affected. The only exception to this is question c: the degree of case complexity 
affected seven dependent variables. Conversely, for each dependent variable the 
number of relevant questions was also small. The dependent variable most often 
affected is the number of different content areas (five times a significant result). 
Minimum subjective probability and minimal completeness were not affected at all 
(but effects on the latter variable were only investigated for questions a and b). 
The explained variances associated with the significant results are in general 
rather low. This means that other (possibly more) important independent variables 
play a part in hypothesis-generation (a finding not too surprising in the social 
sciences). 
Potential effects of classification and classification systems were the main reason 
for this study. Contrary to what was expected, only once an effect of classification 
in and of itself was found (question a). Differences between the control group and 
only one of the two classification groups appeared three times (question a')- It thus 
seems that effects on hypothesis-generation are not so much associated with 
classification in and of itself but rather with the type of classification system used. 
Nevertheless, differences between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL appeared only two 
times (question b). All in all, the influence of classification systems proved to be 
rather limited, especially as compared with the effect of the degree of case 
complexity. 
With one exception, the obtained differences between the three experimental 
groups (questions a, a', and b) show higher and/or better scores in the DSM-III-R 
condition than in both the CBCL and the control conditions. The exception to this 
concerns the number of content areas (question a). 
6.2 Validity 
In this section we will consider some issues regarding the validity of the experimen-
tal part of our study. 
6.2.1 Internal validity 
Internal validity is concerned with correctly concluding that an independent variable 
is, in fact, responsible for variation in the dependent variable (Kirk, 1982). We will 
first discuss the controlling and checking of potential nuisance variables and then 
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compare some of the present results with those of other studies relating to 
hypothesis-generation. 
First of all, the three experimental groups proved to be quite similar with respect 
to possibly relevant subject variables, including level of experience, type of education 
(psychology or special education), gender, employment (inpatient or outpatient 
mental health setting), specific type of mental health setting (regional institute for 
ambulatory mental health care, psychiatric institution, private practice, or otherwise), 
experience with the content of the six cases, actual use of a classification system 
(DSM-III-R, CBCL, or other), experience with the generation of explicit hypotheses, 
and theoretical orientation (psychodynamic, behavioral, biomedical, cognitive, family 
systems, sociological, other, and/or eclectic). The only exception was the amount of 
experience with the content of case 6, which proved to be significantly less for the 
control group. This fact, however, was not reflected in the relevant cell means. In 
addition, all subjects performed the task in the same situation and at the same time. 
Further, it was checked whether subjects perhaps had the classification of another 
condition in mind (DSM-III-R or CBCL) even when they had been assigned to a 
specific condition (DSM-III-R, CBCL, or control). It appeared that five subjects in 
the control group might have had a DSM-III-R classification in mind, two times with 
case 2 and three times with case 3. Without these subjects, however, the overall 
pattern of results remained the same. Next, five subjects were excluded from the data 
analysis because they did not agree with the classification (one subject in the DSM 
and one in the CBCL condition), did not finish the task in time (one subject in the 
CBCL and one in the control condition), or felt ill (one subject in the control 
condition). This means that no selective loss of subjects occurred. Moreover, the 
subjects were naive with regard to the goal and conditions of the experiment (in 
order to prevent nuisance variables such as expectations as to the results, and 
compensatory rivalry or on the other hand demoralization of subjects in the control 
condition). They were not allowed to talk to each other during the experiment. 
Apart from the three experimental groups, the six cases were made similar with 
regard to potentially relevant variables such as the amount of background informa-
tion, the degree of face validity, and the gender of the child. The cases were 
presented in a random sequence in order to control for maturation or fatigue. 
Randomness of the sequence was also checked after the experiment because not all 
of the subjects who signed up for the experiment actually participated. By making 
use of paper cases it was made sure that every subject had the same (amount of) 
information. Furthermore, the presentations of the relevant DSM-III-R disorders) and 
CBCL scale(s) that followed each case - agreed upon by independent experts - ensu-
red that the hypotheses were based on the proper classification (the two subjects that 
disagreed with a given classification were excluded from the data-analysis). 
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Finally, the scoring of the dependent variables was randomized across groups and 
cases so as to avoid that possible shifts in the criteria used by the scorer would 
disproportionately affect the results. The hypotheses of all subjects were typed out. 
Due to this the scorer could be made "blind" with respect to the experimental group 
the diagnostician in question belonged to. Because initial attempts to measure the 
dependent variables were characterized by a low interrater reliability, a structural 
analysis for hypotheses was developed (see Chapters 3 and 4). The final interrater re-
liabilities proved to be satisfying. 
The fact that some results of the present experiment have also been found in other 
studies regarding hypothesis-generation increases our faith in the internal validity of 
our study. Unfortunately, to our knowledge the main research question of whether 
classification and type of classification affects hypothesis-generation has not been 
investigated before. The influence of the degree of case complexity, however, has 
received some attention. Basically, the main reason to include the degree of case 
complexity was that it had been found to affect hypothesis-generation in the medical 
domain. Elstein et al. (1978) found, for instance, that multiple-solution problems are 
more difficult to solve than single-solution problems. There were also some 
indications that the number of generated hypotheses could be influenced by the 
complexity of the problem, and the direction of this relation was the same as found 
in the present study (see Table 6.1a). 
Although the independent variables and domains in question varied, some of the 
dependent variables of this study have also been investigated in other studies. In 
Chapter 3 it was discussed that the number of generated hypotheses (e.g., potential 
medical diseases or psychopathological classifications) is usually found to be four to 
seven (e.g., Elstein et al., 1978; Kassirer, 1982; Krems & Prechtl, 1991). This is in 
agreement with the mean number of hypotheses found in this study (between four 
and five). Next, only 64% of the diagnosticians in our study responded to the request 
of associating probabilities with the hypotheses they had been generating. As was 
discussed in Chapter 3, this is consistent with the observations in the medical domain 
that clinicians apparently are reluctant to describe their data in a probabilistic format 
(Elstein et al., 1978; Kassirer, 1982). Furthermore, the data with respect to circular 
factors of the first type (i.e., a covering, descriptive label rather than a potentially 
explanatory factor), presented in Chapter 4, are an indication that clinicians tend to 
classify cases in terms of their own private classification system. Before, this had 
been suggested by Rispens (1986) and Rutter and Gould (1985). Finally, the data 
with respect to minimal completeness in Chapter 5 showed that a rather disappointing 
number of factors corresponds to target factors (i.e., factors selected by experts). 
These findings are in keeping with the observation of Gettys and colleagues 
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(summarized by Slovic et al., 1988) that subjects who are asked to list all possible 
hypotheses for a problem (such as the cause of an automobile malfunction) 
consistently generated hypothesis sets that lacked important hypotheses. In addition, 
Elstein (1988) established that failure to include the correct diagnosis within the 
initial set of formulations (called "premature closure", see Chapter 1) is a common 
cause of mistaken medical diagnosis. In view of the rather large subjective 
probabilities reported in Chapter 3 (the mean minimal subjective probabilities per 
case and classification condition ranged from 30 to about 50%), it seems that our 
diagnosticians nevertheless overestimated the completeness of their hypothesis sets. 
This was also found by Gettys. As was discussed in Chapter 1, overconfidence in 
own capability is an often reported clinical bias. 
6.2.2 External validity 
External validity is concerned with the generalizability of research findings to and 
across populations of subjects and settings (Kirk, 1982). 
To start with the former, all subjects belonged to the population we wanted to 
consider. That is, all subjects were psychodiagnostic practitioners; others who signed 
up, such as welfare workers, test assistants and students, were not allowed to 
participate. In order to move diagnosticians to participate in the experiment, we made 
the experiment be part of a workshop on clinical judgement and decision making. 
The satisfying amount of response and the fact that a lot of participants indicated to 
be interested in a continuation of the workshop suggest that this aim was achieved. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the group of participating volunteers 
concerned a special subgroup in which, for instance, experts are lacking (because 
they do not need a workshop) or that consists of highly motivated diagnosticians 
(there were several participants from remote places such as Groningen, Maastricht, 
and Beverwijk). 
The cases used in the experiment comprised internalizing as well as externalizing 
behavior. Although the cases were constructed in order to cover some of the 
independent variables, their content was based on actual clinical records and 
information provided by clinicians. Their face validity was then checked and agreed 
upon by experts. In addition, a sample of six cases concerned what is maximally 
feasible: subjects participating in a pilot study indicated that six cases could be 
handled well, but that more cases would be problematic. 
As was discussed in the previous section, considerable effort has been put into the 
preservation of the internal validity of the experiment. Unfortunately, the price of 
some of these provisos is a decrease of the external validity (including ecological 
validity). In psychodiagnostic practice the cases concern both boys and girls. In 
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addition, the paper-and-pencil task involved meant that the subjects could not request 
additional information, lacked contact with the child and her family, could not 
consult the relevant literature, and were not able to discuss the cases with colleagues. 
The extent to which these factors influenced the results of this study is not clear. 
Nevertheless, simple paper-and-pencil research has been shown in the medical field 
to yield results similar to those found using high-fidelity procedures (Elstein et al., 
1978), even when schematic representations (bar charts) of clinical information rather 
than written case descriptions are being used (Braspenning & Sergeant, 1994). 
A more serious threat to the external validity seems the fact that the act of 
classifying itself has not been considered in the experiment. This aspect of 
classification seems important because it concerns a large difference between the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL. Classification by means of the CBCL is rather simple. 
Parents complete the checklist which is then scored by the diagnostician on the 
Revised Child Behavior Profile. Classification by means of the DSM-III-R, on the 
other hand, usually implies comparison of the condition of the client with the 
diagnostic criteria of the (many) disorders. Although the symptom index and the 
decision trees for differential diagnosis can provide some help with that, the 
interjudge reliability is usually found to be mediocre or low. Specific instruments 
such as computer programs and structured interviews have been developed to relieve 
the diagnostician and to enhance proper classification, but these instruments (still) 
cost a lot of time (see Chapter 2 for more information on CBCL and DSM-III-R 
classification). The reason for not having the subjects classify the cases themselves, 
again was the preservation of the internal validity: by providing the subjects with 
ready-made classifications we made sure that every subject in the DSM or CBCL 
condition had the same and proper classification. The consequence of this decision 
is that the results of this study only regard the end product of classification (i.e., in 
the DSM-III-R condition: a presentation of the disorders) with an indication of the 
relevant symptoms, and - where appropriate - an indication of the specific type and 
the severity of the disorders); in the CBCL condition: a presentation of the scale(s) 
together with the ratings of the items, and a presentation of the profile). 
Finally, during the course of the present study new editions of both the DSM 
(DSM-IV: APA, 1994) and the CBCL (CBCL/4-18: Achenbach, 1991a) have been 
published, raising the question of whether similar results could be obtained using 
those new versions. In Chapter 2 it was described that the correspondences between 
the profiles of the CBCL/4-18 and the DSM-III-R also involve one-to-one, 
one-to-two, and two-to-two types, and that the degree of resemblance of correspon-
ding DSM-III-R and CBCL/4-18 syndromes can also be determined as being either 
particularly strong or weaker. In addition, the general characteristics of the 
141 
CHAPTER 6 
DSM-III-R described in section 2.1 have been preserved in the DSM-IV. This 
suggests that the answer to the above question will be affirmative. 
6.3 Interpretations of some major results 
Although not many differences between effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classifica-
tions were found, it is noteworthy that the observed differences consistently concern 
higher scores in the DSM-III-R condition: in Chapter 3 it was found that diagnosti-
cians in the CBCL group assign lower maximum probabilities to their hypotheses 
than diagnosticians in the DSM group (who perform at the same level as the control 
group). This effect was even stronger in cases of a weak resemblance between the 
DSM and CBCL syndromes. The results of Chapter 4 show that the DSM-III-R 
condition generated more potentially explanatory direct factors than the CBCL 
condition (i.e., the CBCL condition generated more tautological factors and more 
circular factors of the first type), particularly when the number of identified 
syndromes was two for the CBCL and one for the DSM-III-R. In addition, the 
observed differences between the control group and only one of the two classification 
groups (question a'), also in interaction with the degree of case complexity (question 
d'), are in favour of the DSM-III-R. As was discussed in the relevant chapters, an 
explanation may lie in the different natures of the DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes 
(treated in Chapter 2). The disorders identified by the DSM-III-R are based on 
observations and experiences of clinical experts and have been found to correspond 
fairly well to clinical intuition and the implicit taxonomies used by clinicians (e.g., 
Cantor, Smith, French & Mezzich, 1980 (DSM II); Van Mechelen & De Boeck, 
1989). The scales of the CBCL, in contrast, are based on sophisticated statistical 
analyses of empirical data and have generally been found to correspond very poorly 
to the intuitive categories of clinicians (Krol, 1992). In addition, the disorders 
outlined in the DSM have a long tradition whereas the scales of the CBCL are 
relatively new. It is well known that clinicians do not adopt new categories very 
easily and that traditional categories therefore persist (Morey, Skinner & Blashfield, 
1986). All in all, the scales of the CBCL may be rather remote from diagnosticians' 
private taxonomies and therefore difficult to handle as a basis for hypothesis-
generation. The interaction effects obtained in section 5.1, especially with respect to 
question g (the mean number of addressed content areas in the CBCL group drops 
when its syndromes only weakly resemble DSM-III-R syndromes, while the mean 
of the DSM-III-R group stays about the same) underline this interpretation. 
The finding of a firm effect of the degree of case complexity confirms our 
intuitive division of the cases based on the type of correspondence. The result of 
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Chapter 4 that complex cases elicited direct factors that were less specific and open 
to operationalization than simple cases was explained by the larger cognitive strain 
caused by complex cases. As was discussed in Chapter 1, human capacity for rational 
thought is limited, especially by the small capacity of the working memory. An 
interpretation in terms of cognitive strain was also given for the results of Chapter 
3. With respect to descriptive characteristics, diagnosticians seemed to maintain a 
certain constant level of overall complexity in their hypothesis-generation: when 
cases were complex, they offered more hypotheses and direct factors (and, 
consequently, more composite hypotheses) but appeared to be compensating for this 
complexity by lowering the number of indirect factors (and, consequently, the 
number of explanation chains). When cases were simple, they offered fewer 
hypotheses and direct factors but generated more complicated hypotheses by 
including more indirect factors (and, consequently, formulating more explanation 
chains). 
There are some indications that cognitive strain can also be associated with 
classification. In section 5.1 it was discussed that the combination of the results of 
question a (the control group addresses more different content areas than both 
classification groups) and question f (in the classification conditions, the identifica-
tion of two as opposed to one syndrome leads to a decrease of the number of content 
areas) suggest that classification imposes extra cognitive strain on the diagnostician. 
The interaction effect found in Chapter 3 that after classification of simple cases 
higher values for the number of direct factors and the proportion of composite 
hypotheses were obtained, while the reverse was found for complex cases, may also 
point in that direction. The fact is that the relevant cell means for these two 
dependent variables show that the scores for the control group increased with 
complex cases whereas those of the classification groups stayed about the same. 
Nevertheless, there are some matters that speak against this tentative interpretation. 
First of all, the results of Chapter 4 show that the DSM-III-R group performed better 
than the control group with respect to several qualitative criteria. Moreover, the 
interpretation of cognitive strain being associated with classification is in contrast 
with a generally asserted advantage of classification mentioned in Chapter 1, namely 
the supposition that by abstracting and structuring the welter of information, 
classification contributes to efficient processing and the avoidance of cognitive 
overload (e.g., Achenbach, 1985). In addition, the reduction of the number of content 
areas in the classification conditions could also concern a pre-selection induced by 
classification. That is, classification of the case could possibly restrict the number of 
considered content areas because identification of a certain syndrome guides the 
diagnostician to a few (highly plausible and important) hypotheses (De Bruyn, 
Pameijer, Ruijssenaars & Van Aarle, in press). 
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Finally, in section 6.2.1 it was discussed that the the mean number of hypotheses 
found in this study (between four and five) is in agreement with the number that is 
usually found in studies where clinicians have to consider multiple hypotheses 
simultaneously (four to seven; Elstein et al., 1978; Kassirer, 1982; Krems & Prediti, 
1991). This small number has often been interpreted as being due to the limited 
capacity of the short-term memory (Elstein et al., 1978; Kassirer, 1982). In our 
study, however, subjects could write down their hypotheses one by one, thus there 
was less need to rely on short-term memory for temporarily storing a set of 
potentially relevant hypotheses. An explanation may be that the hypotheses generated 
in the present study are often more complex than those found in the other studies (A. 
S. Elstein, personal communication, August 3, 1994). 
Incidentally, in Chapter 1 it was discussed that a differential effect of divergent 
classification systems was not unlikely given the phenomenon of framing effect. Sure 
enough, as was considered above, some different effects of the DSM-III-R and the 
CBCL frames occurred. The present study, however, shows some differences with 
studies of framing effects as they are usually found in the literature on decision 
making (see, for instance, the example given in section 1.1). First of all, our study 
concerned the generation of hypotheses rather than choice. In addition, choices in 
framing research usually involve a few options on the basis of a short scenario, 
whereas rather much information is presented in our case descriptions. In all, the task 
of hypothesis-generation in the present study seems rather complex. Next, the frames 
used in this study (i.e., the DSM-III-R and CBCL classifications) are alternative, but 
not complementary descriptions of the same problem situation. In addition, they are 
comprehensive compared with the few alternatively formulated options that usually 
embody frames. Although the present study was conducted within the realm of the 
diagnostic cycle rather than framing research, the different from usual conceptions 
of decision task and frame may contribute to the scientific discussion on framing 
effects. This leads us to the next paragraph. 
6.4 Suggestions for further research 
This exploratory study gives rise to a lot of research issues, and several have already 
been suggested (either explicitly or implicitly) in the foregoing chapters and sections. 
The major goal of the present thesis was to investigate effects of classification 
and specific classification systems on psychodiagnostic hypotheses. Because of the 
explanatory nature of the study, both the quality and (as yet) neutral or descriptive 
characteristics of hypotheses were considered. Unfortunately, effects with respect to 
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the minimal completeness of the hypothesis set could not be investigated thoroughly, 
both because of this broad approach and because of the difficulty of reliably and 
validly measuring this dependent variable. Since minimal completeness is neverthe-
less one of the most interesting criteria from a clinical point of view, it is an obvious 
variable for further research. In section 5.2 suggestions for a more comprehensive 
study of the minimal completeness were discussed, including the use of panels of 
experts. 
Minimal completeness is one of the features that appeared from the inventarisa-
tion of qualitative criteria for hypotheses and hypothesis sets (Appendix D). From a 
theoretical point of view, a further structuring of the criteria listed in Appendix D 
is desirable. Such a project, however, will run up against some complexities. For 
example, in view of the different authors and backgrounds (including empirical 
cycles, Bayes' theorem, views of explanatory value, models of scientific explanation, 
and clinical practice) from which the list has been compiled, it is difficult to 
coordinate and subordinate relations. Moreover, different authors may have different 
or even opposite opinions. A moot point, for instance, is the question of whether 
teleological (intentional) explanations can have explanatory value or not (yes: e.g., 
Elster, 1983; Fellesdal, Wallae & Elster, 1986; no: e.g., Bunge, 1985). Another 
complexity is that there may be a trade-off between features. For example, very 
precisely formulated hypotheses are usually at the expense of the degree of 
comprehensiveness (exhaustiveness) of the hypothesis set (Carlier, Van der Heijden 
& Hellendoom, 1988). 
From the pilot studies concerning the minimal completeness of hypothesis sets it 
appeared that there may be very many explanatory factors for a certain disorder listed 
in the literature (section 5.2). It was also discussed that consensus about etiology is 
usually missing (see also Chapter 2). Clearly, research into the base rate and general 
importance (e.g., explanatory power and treatability) of the various factors is badly 
needed. The availability of such data would increase psychodiagnostic efficiency 
substantially, especially when it is applied in special diagnostic tools such as 
knowledge based systems and checklists. 
The many possible factors, the fact that only 43% of the diagnosticians indicated 
to generate hypotheses in their practice, and the observation that diagnosticians seem 
to omit important hypotheses (section 5.2), raise the question of whether hypothesis-
generation is too difficult for diagnosticians. Rather than to think up all important 
possible factors, it might be more efficient, for example, to also check an a priori 
comprehensive list of general detrimental conditions. This might be a part of the 
anamnesis. In fact, many clinicians appear to check a lot of possible unfavorable 
conditions during the intake rather than explicitly formulating them as hypotheses, 
although this does not always occur in a standardized manner (see, for example, De 
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Ridder's, 1991, inventarisation of issues discussed in the intakes of the Amsterdam 
Institute for Medical Psychotherapy). 
Finally, in section 6.1 it was discussed that the explained variances associated 
with the significant results are in general rather low (ranging from 3% to 19%), 
suggesting that other independent variables play a part in psychodiagnostic 
hypothesis-generation. Since rather large individual differences in hypothesis-
generation could be observed, one may wonder to what degree subject variables play 
a part and which subject variables are characteristic of good hypothesis-generators. 
An initial attempt to answer the latter question was made within the framework of 
the present research.' It appeared, among other things, that the theoretical orientation 
of the diagnostician can affect hypothesis-generation. For example, cognitive oriented 
diagnosticians more often formulate hypotheses with a full explanatory structure (i.e., 
a problem, an explanatory factor, and some relation between these elements; see 
Appendix D) than diagnosticians of other theoretical orientations. 
6.5 Implications for psychodiagnostic practice and research 
Which of the classification systems can be recommended with respect to psychodiag-
nostic hypothesis-generation? Or, which of the classification sytems is the best to be 
fit in the problem analysis step of the diagnostic cycle? Distancing ourselves from 
the as yet neutral dependent variables (Chapter 3 and the first section of Chapter 5), 
the following has appeared. No clear difference between the three classification 
conditions was found regarding the minimal completeness of hypothesis sets, 
although the comment should be made that this could not be investigated for all of 
the cases and subjects (second section of Chapter 5). As regards the remaining 
dependent variables (Chapter 4), it appeared that a beneficial effect of CBCL 
classification failed to occur. Significant differences between the DSM-III-R and the 
control group, however, did appear (with respect to proportion redundancy, 
proportion of direct factors with potentially explanatory value, and - in interaction 
with the degree of case complexity - possibility of operationalization), and the 
DSM-III-R group consistently scored better than the control group. In addition, the 
one time that a significant difference between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL 
condition could be observed (with respect to the proportion of direct factors with 
potentially explanatory value; also in interaction with the type of correspondence), 
1 A master's thesis by Kuipers and Hellingman (1994), supervised by J. van den Bereken 
and M. Vermande. 
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the DSM-III-R group performed better than the CBCL group. Moreover, as a side 
effect of investigating the minimal completeness of hypothesis sets (section 5.2), it 
appeared that literature search for explanatory factors generally had more success in 
searches using DSM labels. In other words, on the basis of the information now 
available classification according to the DSM-III-R is preferable to both absence of 
classification and classification according to the CBCL. 
Our investigation started in Chapter 2 with a comparison of DSM-III-R and 
CBCL syndromes with respect to the symptoms constituting the syndromes. The 
method we applied (i.e., a subjective matching of symptoms followed by an objective 
matching of syndromes by means of a computer program considering diagnostic 
criteria and cut-off scores) is more detailed than the approximate, prima-facie 
comparisons pursued by others (e.g., Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1987). The results 
formed the basis for the research questions and the case construction. The compari-
son, however, is not only interesting from the perspective of the experiment. As a 
by-product, it may provide a basis for mental health practitioners to switch more 
easily from the one system to the other. As a matter of fact, our representations of 
the DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes (Table 2.5) are being used for the development 
of a computer program that gives both a DSM-III-R and a CBCL classification of 
observed symptoms (Krol, current research). Other "by-products" of the present study 
that can be useful to fellow researchers include the qualitative criteria listed in 
Appendix D and the structural analysis of hypothesis formulations. 
The structural analyses in the present study revealed that useful components of 
hypotheses are often missing. First of all, from Chapter 1 it can be gathered that a 
scientific explanation consists of a part that explains (the explanans), a part that is 
explained (the explanandum), and some connection between the two (Elster, 1983; 
Ruben, 1990). In a psychodiagnostic hypothesis, similarly a connection is made 
between one or more explanatory factors and one or more problems to be explained. 
It nevertheless appeared that in about 6% of the hypotheses in this study either the 
problem or the relation was entirely missing (leaving aside missing relations between 
the indirect factors), and that in 53% only factors were present. This makes the 
hypothesis less clear and controlable to others. Next, in Appendix D the specification 
of an explanatory mechanism (e.g., Elster, 1983, 1989; Haynes, 1992; Haynes, Spain 
& Oliveira, 1993) and the quotation of sources and theoretical framework (Hellen-
doorn, 1988; Pameijer, 1992) were included as characteristics of good clinical 
hypotheses. In the structural analysis these variables were covered by the component 
"references". References indicate that the stated relation between the factor and the 
problem is relevant and direct the interpretation and operationalization of used 
concepts. Somewhat disappointingly, only 12 of the 86 subjects (three in each 
experimental group) were found to refer to an explanatory mechanism or a scientific 
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theory now and then.2 It can be objected that the absence of the above-mentioned 
components might have been prevented if the instruction had been specifically asking 
for them. Nevertheless, the percentages above show that diagnosticians (often) do not 
include problems, relations, and references in their hypotheses spontaneously. This 
means that their inclusion in hypotheses has to be explicitly taught in psychodiagnos-
tic education. 
Finally, several of the generated hypotheses were difficult to understand. This was 
not only because of missing basic elements (problems and relations), but also because 
of superfluous parts (uninformative repetitions and loose talk) and complicated and 
chaotic language. This was especially brought to light by the representation of the 
problems, factors, and relations of a hypothesis in a causal network (see Figure 3.1 
and 4.1). We therefore suggest that diagnosticians themselves represent their 
hypotheses as causal networks (see also the suggestions for graphically representing 
causal relationships in Chapter 1). This helps them to focus on essential elements and 
possibly to structure their reasoning. 
As was expected, no hypothesis could be found that corresponded to the deductive-
nomological model and the models of statistical relevance discussed in Chapter 1. 
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Appendix A 
The six cases that were presented to the 
psychodiagnosticians (in Dutch) 
CASE 1: 
Personalia 
Naam: Petra 
Geslacht: vrouwelijk 
Leeftijd: 14 jaar en 4 maanden 
School: V.W.O., derde klas 
Gezinssamenstelling 
Moeder, 38 jaar, part-time verkoopster 
Petra 
Huub, 9 jaar 
Sander, 7 jaar 
Vader is in 1987 overleden (Petra was toen 10 jaar) 
Aanmelding en klacht 
Petra is verwezen door de huisarts. Ze is oververmoeid en maakt een matte indruk. 
Het lichamelijk onderzoek van Petra heeft geen afwijkingen aan het licht gebracht. 
Probleembeschrijving 
Petra is een tenger meisje dat klein is voor haar leeftijd. Moeder is met Petra naar 
de huisarts gegaan omdat Petra sinds een maand constant moe en futióos is. Ze slaapt 
meer dan voorheen, 's Morgens kan ze niet uit bed komen en in het weekend blijft 
ze het liefst in bed liggen. Haar bewegingen zijn sloom en traag. Ze loopt sloffend 
en heeft neerhangende schouders. Ook spreekt ze zachtjes. Ze heeft geen zin meer 
om dingen te ondernemen. In het weekend zit ze vaak op de bank met een lege blik 
voor zich uit te staren. Ze doet bijna niet meer mee met gezinsactiviteiten zoals 
spelletjes, en zit steeds vaker op haar kamer. Naar school gaat ze met tegenzin. Zelfs 
voor zwemmen, wat ze altijd graag gedaan heeft, kan ze geen enthousiasme meer 
opbrengen. Als moeder probeert haar te overreden om beneden te blijven, aan een 
spelletje mee te doen of toch te gaan zwemmen, reageert Petra geïrriteerd. Verder 
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voelt Petra zich bijna voortdurend neerslachtig, hoewel daar volgens haar geen reden 
toe is. Ook op anderen komt ze bedrukt over. Ze lacht bijvoorbeeld nog maar weinig. 
Net als Petra zelf kan moeder daar geen directe aanleiding voor bedenken. Ze acht 
het niet waarschijnlijk dat Petra nog inzit over de dood van de hond van het gezin, 
twee maanden geleden ("daar is tenminste niets van te merken"). Qua karakter 
beschrijft moeder haar dochter als wat introvert en nerveus. Op het V.W.O. haalt ze 
goede cijfers maar desondanks is ze bang om onvoldoendes te halen. Voor een 
proefwerk leert ze het liefst de hele nacht door. Petra heeft nooit veel vrienden of 
vriendinnen gehad. Ze beperkte zich altijd tot één of twee. Sinds de middelbare 
school is ze stevig bevriend met Sandra. Ze vond het dan ook verschrikkelijk dat 
Sandra, die bij haar in de klas zat, na de brugklas naar de HAVO moest. Op de 
zwemclub heeft ze wel kennissen maar geen echte vriendinnen. 
Ook op school heeft men gemerkt dat Petra vermoeid en futióos is. Het is echter nog 
te vroeg in het schooljaar om te kunnen bepalen of de schoolprestaties achteruit zijn 
gegaan. In de klas is Petra wat op de achtergrond. Ze heeft met niemand in de klas 
een echte vriendschapsband. Het is echter niet zo dat haar klasgenoten haar niet 
mogen. 
Achtergrondgegevens 
Zwangerschap, geboorte, sensorische ontwikkeling, spraakontwikkeling, motorische 
ontwikkeling, sociale ontwikkeling en zindelijkheidstraining zijn zonder bijzonder-
heden verlopen. Petra was een lief kind ("niet dwars of koppig zoals een neefje van 
dezelfde leeftijd"). Op de kleuterschool ging alles prima, maar in de eerste klas van 
de lagere school had Petra moeite om te wennen. Ze had toen veel last van buikpijn. 
Toen Petra 10 jaar was, is vader overleden ten gevolge van een verkeersongeluk. 
Moeder - die het nu nog moeilijk heeft met de dood van haar man - is toen een half 
jaar overspannen geweest. De drie kinderen zijn in die tijd bij een tante in huis 
geweest. 
CASE 2: 
Personalia 
Naam: Liesbeth 
Geslacht: vrouwelijk 
Leeftijd: S jaar en 8 maanden 
School: basisschool, groep 2 
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Gezinssamenstelling 
Vader, 35 jaar, computerprogrammeur 
Moeder, 29 jaar, huisvrouw (voorheen secretaresse) 
Liesbeth 
Maarten, 2 jaar 
Aanmelding en klacht 
De ouders melden zich aan op aanraden van de kleuterleidster. Liesbeth gedraagt zich 
jongensachtig en beweert ook vaak dat ze een jongen is. 
Probleembeschrijving 
Tijdens een spel op school waarbij de klas zich moest splitsen in jongens en meisjes, 
bleef Liesbeth volhouden dat ze een jongen was en wilde ze zich per se niet bij de 
meisjesgroep voegen. De kleuterleidster heeft toen contact met de ouders opgenomen. 
Deze herkennen de klacht van de kleuterleidster, maar hebben altijd gedacht dat het 
gedrag van hun dochter van voorbijgaande aard is ("Och, dat gaat wel over"). 
Liesbeth gaat het liefst met jongens om. Op haar verjaarspartijtje, bijvoorbeeld, had 
ze uitsluitend vriendjes uitgenodigd. Ze heeft een voorkeur voor stoeien en ravotten 
en is daarbij luidruchtig. Met haar vriendjes speelt ze dikwijls "Zorro-tje". Ook in 
haar dromen is ze Zorro of Superman. In haar eentje speelt ze het liefst met auto's 
en soldaatjes. 
Het haar van Liesbeth is opvallend kort geknipt. Ze draagt het liefst stoere broeken 
en truien en wil zelfs bij speciale gelegenheden geen jurkje aan. Toen moeder laatst 
op oma's vijfenzestigste verjaardag voet bij stuk hield, liep Liesbeth de hele dag te 
mokken. Ook bij verkleedpartijen laat ze stelselmatig jurken, rokken en damesschoe-
nen links liggen. De laatste tijd wil ze onderbroeken met een gulp dragen, en heeft 
ze - omdat de ouders weigeren die voor haar te kopen - na een logeerpartij een 
onderbroekje van een neefje meegenomen. 
Liesbeth vindt het beter om een jongen te zijn, "want dan ben je sterker en dan mag 
je met pistolen en legerspullen spelen". Ze vindt 'Hans' veel mooier dan haar eigen 
naam en wil zo genoemd worden. Aan vreemden stelt ze zich voor als Hans of met 
de woorden "Ik ben Liesbeth en ik ben een jongen". Tegen moeder beweert ze dat 
ze later een penis krijgt. Verder heeft moeder eens gezien dat Liesbeth trots met 
zakdoekjes in haar slipje rondliep en tegen Maarten zei "Kijk, ik heb er ook één". 
Als vader vindt dat er grenzen zijn overschreden (onderbroekjes met een gulp, 
'Hans') wijst hij Liesbeth erop dat ze een meisje is. Liesbeth wordt dan kwaad, 
spreekt vader tegen. Moeder is wat milder gestemd ten opzichte van haar dochters 
gedrag. Zij stond bijvoorbeeld na veel zeuren toe dat Liesbeth haar halflange haar 
165 
APPENDIX A 
uiterst kort liet knippen. Afgezien van bovengenoemde, zijn er geen problemen. 
Liesbeth wordt door andere kinderen niet met haar gedrag geplaagd. 
Achtergrondgegevens 
Zwangerschap en bevalling verliepen zonder problemen. Volgens de ouders maakte 
het hen niet uit of zij een meisje of een jongen kregen; ze waren blij met een meisje. 
Bij de tweede zwangerschap hoopten zij op een zoon. Moeder is na de geboorte van 
Liesbeth 1,5 - 2 jaar depressief geweest. Spraakontwikkeling, motorische ontwikke-
ling, sensorische ontwikkeling, sociale ontwikkeling en zindelijkheidstraining kenden 
geen bijzonderheden. De ouders kunnen zich niet herinneren wanneer Liesbeth voor 
het eerst bovenbeschreven gedrag ging vertonen. Vermoedelijk was dit vóór het 
vierde jaar. 
CASE 3: 
Personalia 
Naam: Chantal 
Geslacht: vrouwelijk 
Leeftijd: 9 jaar en 3 maanden 
School: basisschool, groep 6 
Gezinssamenstelling 
Vader, 31 jaar, bouwvakker, nu werkloos 
Moeder, 30 jaar, huisvrouw (LHNO-opleiding) 
Chantal 
Aanmelding en klacht 
Moeder meldt Chantal aan. Ze is in de klas niet meer te handhaven vanwege haar 
agressieve en brutale gedrag. 
Probleembeschrijving 
Chantal is een verzorgd uitziend meisje en groot voor haar leeftijd. Ze maakt een 
oudere indruk (kleding, manier van praten en doen) dan 9 jaar. 
De problemen zijn begonnen op driejarige leeftijd: Chantal sloeg, had een grote 
mond, bonkte met haar hoofd op de muur en op de grond, en hield haar adem in 
totdat ze blauw werd. Op school ging het tot groep drie redelijk. Na die tijd werd ze 
vaak de klas uitgestuurd en maakte ze veel ruzie. Nu dreigen de gedragsproblemen 
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op school uit de hand te lopen: ze daagt medeleerlingen uit door hen te treiteren 
(meestal verbaal, maar ook aan de haren trekken, knijpen, een duw geven); als die 
dan iets terug doen begint ze te slaan en te vechten. Verder is ze brutaal en 
ongehoorzaam, hetgeen ze stoer schijnt te vinden ("Toen zei ik tegen meneer: "doe 
dat zelf maar". Nou, dat doe ik gewoon"). De schoolprestaties zijn normaal. Moeder 
benadrukt dat zij Chantal wél de baas kan. Toch vertoont Chantal thuis de volgende 
gedragingen: dingen vernielen (een stuk uit een tafelkleed knippen waar moeder 
ijverig op geborduurd heeft; een stuk uit een tijdschrift van vader of moeder 
scheuren); moeders make-up spullen gebruiken; in de dakgoot kruipen; gedurende een 
jaar niet willen eten (op zeven- en achtjarige leeftijd); stelen (dure bonbons van 
moeder, kleingeld uit moeders portemonnee); ongehoorzaam zijn (weigeren naar bed 
te gaan), liegen (ontkennen van bovengenoemde daden). Verder is ze een maand 
geleden naar een nabijgelegen kantine van een voetbalclub gelopen. Daar heeft ze het 
verhaal opgehangen dat haar ouders haar met een stuk hout hadden geslagen. De 
voetbalclub alarmeerde de politie, die op haar beurt de Stichting voor Jeugd en Gezin 
inschakelde. Jeugd en Gezin kwam bij navraag tot de conclusie dat Chantal het 
verhaal van het stuk hout had verzonnen en dat ze over acteertalent beschikt. Chantal 
heeft geen vriendjes of vriendinnetjes. Ze is een echte eenling. Ze stoot iedereen af 
door hen te jennen. Vader en moeder doen wel spelletjes met haar (kaarten, haar 
meenemen naar bingo-avonden). 
Achtergrondgegevens 
Zwangerschap, bevalling, spraakontwikkeling, motorische ontwikkeling, sensorische 
ontwikkeling en zindelijkheidstraining kenden geen bijzonderheden. Tot ongeveer het 
derde levensjaar was Chantal een voorbeeldig kind. 
Het gezin woont in een sociaal-economisch zwakke buurt. Vader is werkloos. 
Volgens moeder wil men hem niet in dienst nemen omdat hij angstig is en snel 
overspannen. Moeder heeft nu het plan om zelf te gaan werken. Moeder heeft geen 
gemakkelijke jeugd gehad: de eerste levensjaren heeft ze veel in het ziekenhuis 
gelegen; op haar veertiende moest ze noodgedwongen zelfstandig gaan wonen omdat 
er na de dood van haar moeder niemand was om voor haar te zorgen. Ze heeft enige 
jaren ZMOK-onderwijs gevolgd. Hoewel vader veel thuis is, neemt moeder het 
grootste deel van de opvoeding voor haar rekening. 
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CASE 4: 
Persoonsgegevens 
Naam: Willeke 
Geslacht: vrouwelijk 
Leeftijd: 14 jaar en 6 maanden 
School: derde klas HAVO; daarvoor tweede klas VWO 
Gezinssamenstelling 
Het gezin bestaat uit moeder (huisvrouw) en 8 kinderen (2 zoons, 6 dochters), 
geboren tussen 1957 en 1981. Willeke is het zevende kind, heeft nog een zusje onder 
zich. Vier kinderen zijn het huis uit. Vader (econoom) is in mei 1982 overleden. De 
ouders zijn van Indonesische afkomst en zijn na hun huwelijk in 1957 naar 
Nederland gekomen. 
Aanmelding en klacht 
De mentor van de klas van Willeke meldt haar aan wegens bizar gedrag. 
Probleembeschrijving 
Het opvallendste gedrag van Willeke is dat zij praat tegen mensen die er helemaal 
niet zijn, maar die zij wel schijnt te horen. Willeke zelf zegt een jongen te horen die 
commentaar op haar levert en haar probeert aan te zetten tot agressief gedrag. Ze 
probeert zijn bevelen/aansporingen niet op te volgen. De jongen liet zich aanvankelijk 
alleen op school horen, nu ook in de stad en thuis. Het gaat om een jongen op wie 
ze hevig verliefd is geweest. Het is moeilijk om een gesprek met Willeke te voeren. 
Ze raakt namelijk de draad van haar verhaal kwijt, springt van de hak op de tak. De 
hallucinaties en het chaotische spreken zijn ongeveer twee weken geleden begonnen. 
Willeke gedraagt zich echter al minstens een halfjaar vreemd. Ze praat bijvoorbeeld 
in zichzelf terwijl er anderen bij zijn. Verder heeft ze betrekkingsideeën, vooral wat 
jongens betreft: als iemand (bijvoorbeeld een voorbijganger) kucht of een gebaar 
maakt denkt ze dat dat op haar slaat en geringschattend is bedoeld. Ze is opvallend 
bezig met de indruk die ze op jongens maakt en wat zij van haar denken. Daarnaast 
heeft ze minder belangstelling voor de dingen om haar heen, onder meer te merken 
aan de lege blik in haar ogen. Ze slaapt moeilijk in en heeft vaak last van hoofdpijn 
(slikt dagelijks aspirine). Op school is ze, naar eigen zeggen, snel afgeleid. 
Tussen moeder en Willeke zijn veel conflicten. Moeder vindt haar een opstandig kind 
dat slecht luistert. Om ruzies te vermijden zit Willeke vaak op haar kamer. Met zus 
Ria (33 jaar), die getrouwd is, heeft ze wel een goede relatie. Vooral de laatste twee 
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weken hangt ze erg aan Ria. De omgang met de andere kinderen van het gezin is 
normaal. Buiten het gezin heeft Willeke altijd weinig sociale contacten gehad. 
Momenteel heeft ze helemaal geen vrienden of kennissen waarmee ze optrekt. Haar 
klasgenoten vinden haar, volgens de mentor, een vreemd meisje. Willeke zelf gaat 
contacten met hen uit de weg omdat ze voelt dat ze niet volledig geaccepteerd wordt. 
Dit maakt haar angstig. 
Volgens de mentor hebben verschillende docenten geconstateerd dat Willeke sinds 
carnaval (een maand geleden) in toenemende mate afleidbaar is. 
Medisch onderzoek heeft geen organische factor aangetoond. 
Achtergrondgegevens 
Zwangerschap en geboorte verliepen zonder problemen. Moeder herinnert zich weinig 
van Willeke's ontwikkeling. Er zijn haar geen bijzonderheden bijgebleven van slapen, 
eten, zindelijkheid, contactname en spraak-, sensorische en motorische ontwikkeling. 
Als klein kind heeft Willeke vrijwel alleen met haar broers en zussen gespeeld, 
mocht geen vriendjes of vriendinnetjes mee naar huis nemen. Ze keek graag televisie 
en speelde liever binnen dan buiten. Vader, die een groot deel van de dagelijkse 
opvoeding op zich nam, is in 1982 overleden aan een hartinfarct. Willeke was toen 
5 jaar oud. Sinds die tijd staat moeder er alleen voor. Willeke heeft de kleuterschool, 
de basisschool en de brugklas HAVO/VWO goed en met plezier doorlopen. In de 
tweede klas van het VWO volgde een HAVO-advies omdat Willeke lagere cijfers 
behaalde dan verwacht. Na de HAVO wil ze weer naar het VWO omdat ze net als 
haar vader econoom wil worden. 
Een broer van vader zou psychiatrische behandeling hebben gehad. 
CASE 5: 
Personalia 
Naam: Annelies 
Geslacht: vrouwelijk 
Leeftijd: 10 jaar en 3 maanden 
School: basisschool, groep 5; blijven zitten in groep 3 
Gezinssamenstelling 
Vader, 37 jaar, kweker 
Moeder, 35 jaar, kweker 
Annelies 
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Peter, 7 jaar 
Astrid, 5 jaar 
Vader en moeder hebben samen een kwekerij. 
Aanmelding en klacht 
Annelies is voor psychologisch onderzoek verwezen door de kinderarts. Ze is vaak 
misselijk, veelal gepaard gaande met braken, en heeft veel last van buikpijn en 
hoofdpijn. Medisch onderzoek heeft geen bijzonderheden aan het licht gebracht. 
Probleembeschrijving 
Sinds haar zesde jaar heeft Annelies geregeld last van misselijkheid, met name 's 
ochtends. Ze trekt dan bleek weg en moet veelal braken. De misselijkheid is in de 
loop der tijd in frequentie toegenomen tot zo'n drie à vier keer per week, en treedt 
steeds vaker ook 's middags op. Ongeveer een halfjaar geleden kreeg Annelies 
bovendien last van hoofdpijn en buikpijn. Vooral de buikpijn kan zo hevig zijn dat 
ze ervan moet huilen. Beide pijnklachten komen zo'n twee keer per week voor, ook 
's avonds. Vader en moeder sporen Annelies meestal aan om flink te zijn en proberen 
haar zoveel mogelijk naar school te laten gaan. Annelies is namelijk een zwakke 
leerling. Volgens de leerkracht vraagt ze meer dan andere kinderen om extra uitleg, 
is ze snel afgeleid en kost het haar moeite om haar werkjes op tijd afte krijgen. Haar 
ouders houden haar daarom alleen thuis als de klachten bijzonder hevig zijn (zo'n 2 
à 4 keer per maand). Ze stoppen haar dan in bed of leggen haar op de bank. Annelies 
is volgens de ouders een gevoelig kind. Vooral het laatste jaar huilt ze veel en snel. 
Als vader of moeder bijvoorbeeld zeggen "Goh, dat kan je wel wat aardiger zeggen" 
of "Nee, je moet nu echt naar bed" begint ze te huilen. Ze kan ook vreselijk boos 
worden. Op haar verjaardag bijvoorbeeld, drie weken geleden, was ze heel lastig 
omdat ze dagen tevoren moeilijk kon inslapen vanwege de opwinding. Af en toe 
gedraagt Annelies zich "baby-achtig" tegenover de ouders. Ze praat dan op een 
kinderlijke manier (hoge stem, kinderlijke woorden) en doet alsof ze bepaalde taken 
(tafeldekken) niet alleen kan. Annelies heeft geen vaste vriendinnetjes, maar is ook 
geen echte buitenstaander. 
Achtergrondgegevens 
Zwangerschap en bevalling verliepen zonder problemen. Als baby heeft Annelies met 
haar hoofd gebonkt en geneuried. Spraakontwikkeling, motorische ontwikkeling, 
sociale ontwikkeling en zindelijkheidstraining kenden geen bijzonderheden. Als klein 
kind sliep ze met een lampje op de kamer en met de deur open. 's Nachts kwam ze 
altijd uit bed. Op vijfjarige leeftijd kreeg ze een bril. 
Vader heeft last van hoofdpijn. 
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CASE 6: 
Personalia 
Naam: Maaike 
Geslacht: vrouwelijk 
Leeftijd: 5 jaar en 11 maanden 
School: groep 2 van de basisschool 
Gezinssamenstelling 
Vader, ingenieur, 36 jaar 
Moeder, free-lance journaliste, 34 jaar 
Maaike 
Lydia, twee jaar (bijna drie jaar) 
Aanmelding en klacht 
De ouders komen op eigen initiatief. De voornaamste klacht betreft inslaapproblemen. 
Maaike valt moeilijk in slaap omdat ze vooral in het donker bang is om te stikken. 
De angst om te stikken komt ook tot uiting in het lang kauwen van voedsel. 
Probleembeschrijving 
Maaike heeft een grote angst om dood te gaan, met name om te stikken. Ze is daar 
voortdurend mee bezig. De angst om te stikken uitte zich aanvankelijk alleen in 
donkere, afgesloten ruimtes zoals tunnels. Nu is ze echter ook bang als ze 's avonds 
in het donker in bed ligt. Ze kan dan vaak niet slapen en komt huilend en/of in 
paniek naar haar ouders toe. Deze proberen haar te kalmeren waarna ze doorgaans 
1-1,5 uur later dan gepland in slaap valt. De volgende dag is ze dan lastig, met name 
onder het eten (dreinen en jengelen). De inslaapproblemen zijn toegenomen met het 
komen van de herfst. Verleden maand zijn ze opgelopen tot 3 à 4 keer per week. Het 
laten branden van een lamp en het open laten van de slaapkamerdeur heeft weinig 
geholpen. In haar slaap vinden de ouders haar gespannen: ze tandenknarst en 
transpireert veel. De angst om te stikken komt ook tot uiting bij het eten. Als Maaike 
kon kiezen nam ze alleen glad voedsel, zonder klontjes of brokken die in de keel 
zouden kunnen blijven steken bij het slikken. Van haar ouders moet ze echter ook 
vast voedsel eten. Daardoor zit ze lang aan tafel, in haar eten prikkend, langzaam 
etend en eindeloos kauwend. De ouders hebben Maaike uitgelegd dat de angst om te 
stikken onrealistisch is. Het lukt haar echter niet om de angst en gedachten 
hieromtrent te onderdrukken (bijvoorbeeld door ergens anders aan te denken). 
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Maaike wordt door haar ouders beschreven als een lief kind. Behalve onder het eten 
is ze vrijwel nooit tegendraads. Ze is bijna nooit stout of ondeugend en wil het een 
ander graag naar de zin maken. Ze is heel bezorgd om Lydia. Verder is ze bijzonder 
sociaal voelend. Zo nodigde ze op haar verjaardagsfeestje alle "zielige" kinderen van 
de klas uit, omdat die nergens worden gevraagd. 
Op school is Maaike's angst om te stikken alleen te merken aan het feit dat ze 
traktaties van jarige kinderen niet meteen opeet, maar mee naar huis neemt. Ook in 
de klas is Maaike een liefen braaf kind. Ze luistert goed en werkt netjes en precies. 
Ze is bijdehand en leergierig. Haar betrokkenheid op zielige kinderen is opvallend; 
Maaike is de 'maatschappelijk werkster' van de klas. Als andere kinderen haar 
pesten, wat zelden voorkomt, blijft ze aardig. De omgang met klasgenootjes is verder 
normaal. 
Achtergrondgegevens 
Zwangerschap, bevalling, spraakontwikkeling, motorische ontwikkeling en sociale 
ontwikkeling verliepen zonder bijzonderheden. Maaike was een vrolijke baby die niet 
veel huilde. Als jong kind kreeg ze buisjes in haar oren. Precies driejaar na Maaike 
werd Lydia geboren. Lydia moest de eerste zes weken in het ziekenhuis blijven. 
Maaike heeft die tijd bij opa en oma gelogeerd. Vlak na de geboorte van Lydia werd 
Maaike tot moeders teleurstelling weer onzindelijk. Oma zorgde echter snel dat 
Maaike weer zindelijk werd. De angst om te stikken openbaarde zich voor het eerst 
op vierjarige leeftijd toen het gezin op vakantie een grot bezocht, en is sindsdien 
steeds erger geworden. Maaike heeft geen aandoeningen aan de luchtwegen. 
Note. Every case description started with "Read the case carefully" (Lees de casus 
aandachtig door). 
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The DSM-III-R and CBCL classifications of case 2 
(in Dutch) 
Bestudeer de DSM-III-R classificatie en overtuig uzelf dat deze DSM-III-R stoornis 
op de casus van Liesbeth van toepassing is. 
De gevalsbeschrijving van Liesbeth wordt volgens DSM-III-R geclassificeerd als een 
Geslachtsidentiteitsstoomis van de kindertijd. De gevalsbeschrijving voldoet niet aan 
(alle) criteria van andere stoornissen. 
Geslachtsidentiteitsstoornis van de kindertijd (Gender Identity Disorder of 
Childhood) 
Bij meisjes: 
A. Aanhoudend en intens verdriet dat zij een meisje is en het uiten van de wens een 
jongen te zijn (niet slechts de behoefte aan enkele cultuur-gebonden voordelen 
van het jongen-zijn), of volhouden dat zij een jongen is. 
B. Ofwel (1) ofwel (2): 
X (1) voortdurend getoonde aversie tegen de gangbare vrouwelijke kleding en 
de eis stereotiepe mannelijke kleding te dragen, bijv. jongensondergoed en 
andere accessoires 
(2) voortdurend loochenen van de vrouwelijke anatomie, zoals blijkt uit ten 
minste één van de volgende: 
X (a) de bewering dat ze een penis heeft of dat die zich zal ontwikkelen 
(b) de weigering zittend te urineren 
(c) houdt staande dat ze geen borsten wil krijgen of niet wil menstrueren 
C. Betrokkene heeft de puberteit nog niet bereikt. 
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Bestudeer de CBCL-classificatie en het profiel (op de volgende pagina), en overtuig 
uzelf dat Liesbeth op dat syndroom scoort. 
De ouders van Liesbeth hebben de CBCL ingevuld. De gevalsbeschrijving van 
Liesbeth wordt geclassificeerd als Sexuele problemen omdat Liesbeth op dit 
syndroom boven de horizontale stippellijn scoort: 
Sexuele problemen 
2. 5. Gedraagt zich als een kind van het andere geslacht 
Q 39. Gaat om met kinderen die in moeilijkheden verzeild raken 
Q 59. Speelt met eigen geslachtsdelen in het openbaar 
Q 60. Speelt te veel met eigen geslachtsdelen 
2 73. Sexuele problemen (geef aan welke) 
O 96. Denkt te veel aan sex 
¿ 110. Wil liever van het andere geslacht zijn 
6 Totaal 
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Appendix С 
Instruction, questionnaire, and subtasks for 
the CBCL group (in Dutch) 
Instruction: 
INSTRUYE 
Geachte diagnost, 
In deze taak wordt u gevraagd om diagnostische hypothesen te formuleren. Een 
diagnostische hypothese is een (nog te bevestigen) veronderstelling dat een bepaalde 
factor, of een samenstelling van factoren, een probleem geheel of gedeeltelijk 
verklaart. 
Zo zou een hypothese omtrent leerproblemen van een kind de factor "lage intelligentie" 
kunnen bevatten. Een andere verklarende factor zou kunnen zijn "overmatige negatieve 
faalangst". 
Kortom, een diagnostische hypothese is een potentiële verklaring van probleem-
gedrag, die uit één of meerdere factoren kan bestaan. Elke potentiële verklaring 
wordt in een latere fase van het diagnostische proces op haar houdbaarheid getoetst. 
U krijgt zes casussen (gevalsbeschrijvingen) uit de praktijk aangeboden. Elke casus 
bevat de volgende onderdelen: 
- personalia 
- gezinssamenstelling 
- aanmelding en klacht 
- probleembeschrijving 
- achtergrondgegevens. 
Elke casus is geclassificeerd met behulp van de Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL, 
ontworpen door Achenbach en Edelbrock). De CBCL is een lijst van 118 gedra-
gingen. Het gebruik van de CBCL is als volgt: de verzorgers van een kind geven op 
de lijst aan of een gedraging duidelijk of vaak van toepassing is op hun kind (score 
2), een beetje of soms van toepassing is (score 1) of niet van toepassing is (score 0). 
Vervolgens wordt de ingevulde lijst gescoord op een profiel (Revised Child Behavior 
Profile). Op dat profiel staan de gedragingen van de lijst gerangschikt in syndromen. 
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Syndromen zijn klassen van samenhangende gedragingen. Ieder syndroom krijgt een 
totaalscore door de scores van de betreffende gedragingen bij elkaar te tellen. Als de 
totaalscore boven de horizontale stippellijn komt, is er sprake van dat syndroom. Een 
kind kan op meer dan één syndroom scoren. 
Elke aangeboden casus wordt gevolgd door het syndroom of de syndromen waarop 
het kind scoort en het profiel van de gedragsproblemen. Voor de duidelijkheid zijn 
op het profiel de syndromen waarop het kind niet scoort, weggelakt. 
Wat wordt er van u verwacht? 
De taak bestaat uit twee delen. U begint met het eerste deel. Het is belangrijk dat u 
deel 2 pas leest als u deel 1 af heeft! 
DEEL 1 
U leest steeds een casus aandachtig door. Vervolgens bestudeert u de bijbehorende 
CBCL classificatie en het profiel. Constateer dat het kind op dat syndroom (of die 
syndromen) scoort. Hiema formuleert u op het antwoordblad zo veel diagnostische 
hypothesen als u kunt bedenken. Na elke hypothese laat u een regel open. 
Het is de bedoeling dat u de zes casussen in de aangeboden volgorde afwerkt! 
DEEL 2 
Deel 2 begint met een aantal vragen over uw werkzaamheden als diagnost. Het zijn 
geen kennisvragen. Hierna volgen drie kleine opdrachten, die betrekking hebben op 
de door u geformuleerde hypothesen. U maakt eerst opdracht 1 voor alle zes de 
casussen, dan opdracht 2 en tot slot opdracht 3. 
Voor de gehele taak staat maximaal 2 uur en 20 minuten. Tussendoor zorgen wij 
voor koffie en thee. Onze inschatting is dat u voor deel 1 plusminus 1 uur en 40 
minuten nodig heeft en voor deel 2 plusminus 40 minuten. Daarom zal om 12.10 uur 
even een seintje worden gegeven. 
Mocht u onverhoopt meer tijd nodig hebben voor deel 1, dan is dit geen groot 
bezwaar. Wilt u in dat geval echter wél de vragen aan het begin van deel 2 
beantwoorden (dat kost maximaal 2 minuten). 
U mag niet met anderen overleggen. 
WILT U A.U.B. DUIDELIJK SCHRIJVEN? 
178 
INSTRUCTION, QUESTIONNAIRE, AND SUBTASKS FOR THE CBCL GROUP (IN DUTCH) 
Wat doet u als u klaar bent? 
1. Doe alle papieren weer in de enveloppe en laat de enveloppe op tafel liggen. 
2. Verlaat de zaal. 
3. De lunch is om 13.00 uur (Eet smakelijk!). 
Questionnaire: 
Beantwoord onderstaande vragen: 
1) Hoeveel jaar ervaring heeft u als diagnost? 
2) Bent u pedagoog of psycholoog? 
3) Bent u een man of een vrouw? 
4) Werkt u bij een ambulante of residentiële in-
stelling? 
5) Bij wat voor soort instelling werkt u? 
(bijv. RIAGG) 
6) Heeft u ervaring met een soortgelijke casus als 
die van: 
- Petra (Depressief-teruggetrokken) 
- Liesbeth (Sexuele problemen) 
- Chantal (Delinquent en Wreed) 
- Willeke (Schizoid en Immatuur-Hyper-
actief) 
- Annelies (Lichamelijke klachten) 
- Maaike (Schizoid of Angstig) 
7) Zou u een casus anders benoemen dan de 
CBCL doet? 
- Depressief-teruggetrokken 
- Sexuele problemen 
- Delinquent en Wreed 
- Schizoid en Immatuur-Hyperactief 
- Lichamelijke klachten 
- Schizoid of Angstig 
pedagoog / psycholoog 
man / vrouw 
ambulant / residentieel 
ja / nee 
ja / nee 
ja / nee 
ja / nee 
ja / nee 
ja / nee 
ja / nee 
nee / ja, nl. 
nee / ja, nl. 
nee / ja, nl. 
nee / ja, nl. 
nee / ja, nl. 
nee / ja, nl. 
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8) Maakt u in uw praktijk gebruik van het classi­
ficatiesysteem 
- DSM-III-R (uitgegeven door de APA) - ja / nee 
- Child Behavior Checklist (ontwikkeld door 
Achenbach en Edelbrock) - ja / nee 
- een ander classificatiesysteem, - ja / nee 
nl 
9) Bent u in de praktijk gewend om net zo expli- - ja / nee 
ciet hypothesen te formuleren als in deze taak? 
10a) Denkt u in de praktijk voornamelijk volgens 
een specifieke theoretische oriëntatie? 
- psychodynamische oriëntatie - ja / nee 
- gedragsanalytische (leertheoretische, beha-
vioristische) oriëntatie - ja / nee 
- biomedische oriëntatie - ja / nee 
- cognitieve oriëntatie (informatie-verwer-
king, cognitieve ontwikkeling, cognitieve 
stijl, sociale cognitie) - ja / nee 
- gezinssystemen - ja / nee 
- sociologische oriëntatie - ja / nee 
- een andere dan bovenstaande, - ja / nee 
nl 
10b) Of denkt u voornamelijk eclectisch? - ja / nee 
II) Heeft u nog opmerkingen? - nee/ja,nl. 
Subtasks: 
Maak eerst opdracht 1 voor alle zes de casussen, dan opdracht 2 voor alle zes de 
casussen en tot slot opdracht 3 voor alle zes de casussen. 
Opdracht 1 
Rangorden per casus de hypothesen die u heeft geformuleerd naar de mate van geloof 
die u er aan hecht. Geef dit aan door een cijfer voor elke hypothese te zetten in 
kolom A van het antwoordblad. Voor de hypothese die u het meest waarschijnlijk 
acht zet u in een 1, de hypothese die u daarna het meest van toepassing acht krijgt 
een 2, etc. 
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Opdracht 2 
Geef na elke hypothese (op de opengelaten regel) kort aan welke informatie u zou 
willen hebben om te kunnen beslissen of de hypothese van toepassing (houdbaar) is. 
Opdracht 3 
Geef in kolom В aan in percentages (van 0 tot 100%) hoe zeker u bent van elke 
hypothese. 
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Appendix D 
Characteristics of good psychodiagnostic 
hypotheses 
SINGLE PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC HYPOTHESES 
Logical consistency (no contradictions) 
Parsimony (simplicity, principle of 
economy) 
Examples of decreased parsimony in 
psychodiagnostic hypotheses: 
• Redundancy (repeated occurrence 
of the same factor) 
• Digression (out of place elements 
such as predictions and treatment 
recommendations) 
Full eiplanatory structure (including 
the following elements: explanans, 
explanandum, and some connection 
between these) 
De Groot (1969); Quinn (1971) 
De Groot (1969); Foliesdal, Wallee & 
Elster (1986), *Fuqua, Gunberg & 
Newman (1984); »Haynes (1992) 
Elster (1983); Quinn (1971); Ruben 
(1990); *Strohmer, Biggs, Haase & 
Keller (1983) 
Specificity (of the elements in the 
explanatory structure, including 
instantiation and sufficient qualification 
or quantification) 
Local causality (cause and effect are 
contiguous in time and space, e.g., a 
continuous and contiguous explanatory 
chain that bridges the temporal and 
spatial gap) 
More lenient view, as little action at 
distance as possible 
•Haynes (1992); Quinn (1971); 
Stegmüller (1983); •Westmeyer (1990) 
Elster (1983); Fellesdal et al. (1986) 
(see preceding references) 
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Specified explanatory mechanism that 
relates explanans and explanandam (how 
or in what way the explanatory factor 
exerts its influence) 
Potentially explanatory value (the 
hypothesis could really be an 
explanation of the problem) 
Examples of no potentially 
explanatory value: 
• Tautological explanation 
(restatement of the problem) 
• Circular explanation 1 (provision 
of a covering, descriptive label 
for the problem) 
• Circular explanation 2 (a 
component of the problem 
labeled as explanatory factor) 
• Methaphorical explanation 
(analogy making) 
• Symptomatic explanation (based 
on spurious correlation instead of 
true or explanatory correlation) 
• No temporal asymmetry 
(explanans succeeding the 
explan andum) 
Stated empirical reference (indication 
of the empirical phenomena that the 
hypothesis explains) 
Scientific foundation (based on 
empirical or theoretical knowledge, 
preferably in that order) 
Elster (1983, 1989); *Haynes (1992); 
•Haynes, Spain & Oliveira (1993) 
laws: Hempel (1965); »Roes (1985); 
Stegmüller (1983); •Westmeyer (1972, 
1975, 1990) 
Bunge (1985) 
•Davison & Neale (1990); »Haynes 
(1992); •Westmeyer (1990) 
Bunge (1985) 
Elster (1983; 1989); Fellesdal et al. 
(1986); *Haynes (1992); Salmon (1970); 
Stegmüller (1983); Verschuren (1991) 
Elster (1983); Fallesdal et al. (1986); 
•Haynes (1992); »Haynes et al. (1993); 
Verschuren (1991) 
De Groot (1969) 
•Carlier, Van der Heijden & 
Hellendoom (1988); Hempel (1965); 
•Nezu & Nezu (1993); •Pameijer 
(1992); Quinn (1971); Stegmüller 
(1983); •Westmeyer (1972, 1975) 
•Carlier et al. (1988); •Gadenne (1988); 
•Pameijer (1992) 
More lenient view of 
psychodiagnostic hypotheses: in case 
of missing scientific knowledge, 
hypotheses may be based on 
experience and intuition 
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Quotation of sources and theoretical 
framework 
Testability (falsifiability, refutability) 
Examples of no or decreased 
testability: 
• Ambiguity 
• Vagueness 
• No operationalization possible 
(no empirical manipulability; 
evidence unobservable) 
• Complexity 
Congru¡ty (relevance of the hypothesis 
in view of complete case information) 
Clinical utility (clues for treatment 
planning and implementation) 
Examples of no or decreased clinical 
utility: 
• The hypothesis contains only 
minor factors (that account for 
only a small magnitude of shared 
variance with the problem) 
• The factors posited in the 
hypothesis are not modifiable 
(which is often the case with 
factors very remote in time) 
• Insufficient depth of explanation 
(an explanation of the 
explanatory factor itself is 
needed) 
•Hellendoom (1988); *Pameijer (1992) 
e.g., *Carey, Flasher, Maisto & Turkat, 
1984; Chalmers (1976); *De Bruyn 
(1992); De Groot (1969); Quinn (1971); 
Runkel & McGrath (1972); * Shapiro 
(1951); •Westmeyer (1975) 
De Groot (1969); Fischhoff & Beyth-
Marom (1988); *Pameijer (1992); Quinn 
(1971); Sanders & Van Rappard (1987) 
Chalmers (1976); Derksen (1980); 
Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom (1988) 
De Groot (1969); Fischhoff & Beyth-
Marom (1988); *Pameijer (1992) 
Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom (1988) 
•Pameijer (1992); *Strohmer et al. 
(1983) 
•Haynes (1992); »Haynes et al. (1993) 
•Haynes (1992); "Haynes et al. (1993) 
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SETS OF PSYCHODIAGNOSTIC HYPOTHESES 
Full coverage (explanation of the entire 
problem or all problems when relevant) 
*Fuqua et al. (1984); •Pameijer (1992); 
Stegmüller (1983); •Turkat (1987); 
•Westmeyer (1990) 
Emphasis on major problems 
Completeness (comprehensiveness, 
exhaustiveness) 
More lenient view of 
psychodiagnostic hypotheses: no 
important (clinically useful) and 
plausible alternative hypotheses may 
be forgotten 
This may be facilitated by theoretical 
eclecticism 
(cf. for 1 hypothesis: *Kurpius, 
Benjamin & Morran (1985); *Morran 
(1986) 
Salmon (1970) 
•Carlier et al. (1988); •Haynes (1992); 
•Haynes et al. (1993); •Lazare (1976); 
•Nezu & Nezu (1993); •Pameijer (1992) 
•Carlier et al. (1988); •Pameijer (1992) 
For some purposes (e.g., application of 
Bayes' theorem) a partition of the set 
of hypotheses is required (i.e., both 
exhaustiveness and exclusiveness) 
More lenient view of 
psychodiagnostic hypotheses: 
hypotheses may be supplementary 
instead of competing 
Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom (1988); 
Phillips (1973); Pollard (1986); Salmon 
(1970: homogeneous partition); 
•Schaefer (1977); •Schroots, Akkerman 
& De Groot (1978) 
•Carlier et al. (1988); •Gadenne (1988); 
•Pameijer (1992) 
Note. References to clinical literature are preceded by an asterisk. 
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In Chapter 1 psychodiagnostics is described as being concerned with the explanation 
of problem behavior with a view to treatment recommendation. Nowadays, psycho-
diagnostics is considered by many as a rather complex process of judgement and 
decision making. Although diagnosticians usually have good faith in the quality of 
their performances, it has been demonstrated that clinical judgements are often 
distorted, that is, different from what could be expected on rational grounds. To 
improve the quality of psychodiagnostics, several models have been proposed that 
may govern the process of psychodiagnostic decision making. One of the models that 
tries to give a complete account of how the diagnostician has to proceed is the 
diagnostic cycle (De Bruyn, 1992). 
The present study was carried out within the framework of the diagnostic cycle. 
The diagnostic cycle prescribes, among other things, that classification of a client's 
problems should precede the generation of explanatory hypotheses for these 
problems. However, the actual influence of classification on hypothesis generation 
is unclear. The present study tries to elucidate this situation. It also investigates 
whether alternative classifications of the same problem behavior have different effects 
on psychodiagnostic hypotheses. This question is also relevant in the light of the 
phenomenon of framing- effects, which are frequently observed in human decision-
making and refer to the fact that different structurings of the same problem situation 
can lead to different decisions. Two of the most influential classification systems in 
the field of developmental psychopathology were selected for investigation: the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders (DSM-III-R) and the system 
based on the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL). Because the aims of this study 
concern the steps "classification of problem behavior" and "hypothesis-generation", 
Chapter 1 ends with a discussion of some aspects of classification (terminology, 
advantages and approaches) and diagnostic hypotheses (explanations, causality and 
hypothesis-generation). 
Chapter 2 goes more deeply into the DSM-III-R and the CBCL classification 
systems. In the first part of Chapter 2, a description of these systems is given. The 
second part concerns a discussion of several formal principles (on taxonomie, taxonic 
and clinical attribute level) of psychopathological classification systems in general 
and of the DSM-III-R and the CBCL in particular. A major difference between the 
DSM-III-R and the CBCL is their way of construction (clinically vs. empirically 
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based). Part three constitutes the main part of Chapter 2 and reports on the 
determination of correspondences between syndrome- definitions of the DSM-HI-R 
and the CBCL. This comparison involved 47 DSM-III-R disorders and all of the 51 
profile scales of the CBCL. First, the behavioral criteria of the DSM-III-R disorders 
were "translated", if possible, into CBCL items. The CBCL scales and translated 
DSM disorders were then represented as nested lists. This representation was 
followed by the development of a computer program which matches DSM-III-R 
disorders with CBCL scales. A correspondence between DSM-III-R and CBCL 
syndromes was defined to be present when the number of common symptoms met 
the threshold required for each of the classification systems. The results involved 
simple correspondences (between single DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes) and more 
complex types, which show that the same set of symptoms may be grouped 
differently by the classification systems. In addition, it appeared that the resemblance 
between corresponding DSM-III-R and CBCL syndromes can be particularly strong 
or weak. 
The major purpose of the determination of correspondences between DSM-III-R 
disorders and CBCL syndromes was to provide a basis for the construction of clinical 
cases that are classifiable in both the DSM-III-R and the CBCL and that could be 
used to investigate the effect of classification on hypothesis-generation. The 
construction of cases is described in the final part of Chapter 2 and in more detail 
in Chapters 3 and 4. Both type of correspondence and degree of resemblance were 
systematically incorporated in the case construction. Two cases were of the 
"one-to-one" type of correspondence (one DSM-III-R disorder corresponding to one 
CBCL scale); two cases were of the "one-to-two" type (one DSM-III-R disorder 
corresponding to two CBCL scales); and two cases were of the "two-to-one" type 
(two DSM-III-R disorders corresponding to one CBCL scale). In each pair of cases, 
the degree of resemblance between the DSM-III-R and the CBCL syndromes was 
selected to be strong in one case and weak in the other case. In addition, the degree 
of case complexity, a variable found to influence hypothesis-generation in the 
medical domain, was also included in the six cases. The division into simple and 
complex cases was (tentatively) based on the type of correspondence. Cases classified 
by both the DSM-III-R and the CBCL as one syndrome (which means a "one-to-one" 
correspondence) were considered simple cases. Cases classified by either one of the 
classification systems as more than one syndrome (in this study "one-to-two" and 
"two-to-one" correspondences) were considered complex cases. The actual content 
of the cases was based on clinical records and information provided by clinicians. 
The foregoing gave rise to eight research questions that were addressed in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5: (a) Is there an effect of classification as opposed to absence of 
classification on diagnostic hypotheses? (b) Do the DSM-III-R and the CBCL yield 
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different diagnostic hypotheses? (c) Does the complexity of the case affect diagnostic 
hypotheses? (d) Is the potential effect of classification on diagnostic hypotheses 
moderated by the complexity of the case? (e) Is the potential difference between 
effects of the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems on diagnostic hypotheses moderated by 
the complexity of the case? (f) Is the potential difference between the DSM-III-R and 
CBCL systems moderated by the different number of syndromes identified by the 
systems? (g) Is the potential difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems 
moderated by the degree of resemblance between the syndromes they identify?, and 
(h) Is the potential difference between the DSM-III-R and CBCL systems moderated 
by both the different number of syndromes identified by the systems and the degree 
of resemblance between the syndromes? 
To investigate these questions, an experiment was conducted in which 86 
diagnosticians generated hypotheses for all six cases. The diagnosticians were divided 
into a DSM-III-R, a CBCL, and a control group. In the DSM and CBCL groups the 
cases were followed by a presentation of the respective DSM-III-R and CBCL 
classes; in the control group the cases remained unclassified. 
There were three groups of dependent variables. These groups are discussed 
respectively in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. The first group (Chapter 3) concerned 
descriptive characteristics of diagnostic hypotheses and consisted of the number of 
hypotheses, the minimum and maximum subjective probability, the number of direct 
and indirect factors, the proportion of composite hypotheses, and the proportion of 
explanation chains. Statistical analyses revealed no significant differences between 
the DSM-III-R and CBCL groups, except that maximum probability was lower in the 
CBCL condition, especially in case of weak resemblance. The maximum subjective 
probability in the DSM and control groups was the same. An effect of classification 
in itself only appeared in interaction with case complexity: after classification of 
simple cases higher values for the number of direct factors and the proportion of 
composite hypotheses were obtained. The reverse was found for complex cases. A 
main effect of the degree of case complexity revealed higher values with complex 
cases for the number of hypotheses, the number of direct factors, and the proportion 
of composite hypotheses, and the reverse for the number of indirect factors and the 
proportion of explanation chains. 
In Chapter 4 an overview of characteristics of good diagnostic hypotheses is 
given. The second group of dependent variables concerned a selection of these 
qualitative aspects and included the proportion of factors with potentially explanatory 
value, the proportion redundancy, possibility of operationalization, and the degree of 
specificity; all with respect to direct factors. No differences between the CBCL and 
the control group were found. The DSM group performed better than the control 
group regarding potentially explanatory value, proportion redundancy, and - for 
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simple cases - possibility of operationalization. The DSM-III-R condition also scored 
better than the CBCL condition regarding potentially explanatory value, particularly 
when the number of identified syndromes was two for the CBCL and one for the 
DSM-III-R. Finally, complex cases elicited hypotheses that were less specific and 
open to operationalization than simple cases. 
The third group of dependent variables (Chapter 5) related to the content of 
diagnostic hypotheses and consisted of the number of different content areas 
occurring in hypothesis sets and the minimal completeness of hypothesis sets. With 
respect to the first variable it was found that the control group addressed more 
different content areas than both classification groups. No difference between the 
DSM-III-R and CBCL groups was found and no difference between simple and 
complex cases appeared. However, four interaction effects were found. The 
interaction between the degree of case complexity and the CBCL versus the control 
conditions implied that with simple cases both groups mention about the same 
number of content areas, but with complex cases the control group addressess more 
areas than the CBCL group. Further, the interaction between the degree of case 
complexity and the DSM-III-R versus the CBCL conditions showed that with simple 
cases the mean of the DSM-III-R group is smaller than the one of the CBCL group, 
whereas the reverse is true with complex cases. Next, the interaction between the 
DSM-III-R versus the CBCL conditions and the one-to-two versus the two-to-one 
types of correspondence showed that in both groups the identification of two as 
opposed to one syndrome leads to a decrease of the number of content areas. Finally, 
the interaction between the DSM-III-R versus CBCL classification and the degree of 
resemblance between their syndromes implied that in the case of a strong resemblan-
ce the number of content areas of the DSM-III-R group is smaller than the one of 
the CBCL group, whereas in the case of less resembling DSM and CBCL syndromes 
the opposite holds true. The second dependent variable (the minimal completeness 
of hypothesis sets) was investigated in a pilot study that concerned half of the case 
descriptions. No clear effects of classification and the two types of classification 
systems were obtained. 
In Chapter 6 a tabular overview of the results is given, showing that with the 
exception of question h, all questions could be answered positively, although it 
should be mentioned that the effects are often marginal. The degree of case 
complexity (question c) affected the largest number of dependent variables (seven). 
Its effects suggest an interpretation in terms of cognitive strain. Another conclusion 
is that effects on hypothesis-generation are not so much associated with classification 
in and of itself but rather with the type of classification system used. With the 
exception of one (as yet neutral) dependent variable, the differences between the 
three experimental groups show higher and/or better scores in the DSM-III-R 
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condition than in both the CBCL and the control conditions. An explanation for the 
different effects of DSM-III-R and CBCL classifications, also discussed in the 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, may lie in the different natures of the syndromes. The disorders 
identified by the DSM-III-R are clinically based and have been found to correspond 
fairly well to clinical intuition and the implicit taxonomies used by clinicians. The 
scales of the CBCL, in contrast, are empirically based and have generally been found 
to correspond very poorly to the intuitive categories of clinicians. In addition, the 
disorders outlined in the DSM have a long tradition while the scales of the CBCL 
are relatively new. All in all, the scales of the CBCL may be rather remote from 
diagnosticians' private taxonomies and therefore difficult to handle as a basis for 
hypothesis-generation. 
Further, in Chapter 6 the validity of the experiment is discussed. This also 
includes findings of the present study that are consistent with those of (quite) 
different studies, such as the number of generated hypotheses (between four and 
five), the fact that diagnosticians were reluctant to associate probabilities to their 
hypotheses, and the fact that the hypothesis sets lacked important hypotheses. In 
addition, in Chapter 6 suggestions for further research are made. The thesis ends with 
implications for psychodiagnostic practice and research. The results, especially those 
with regard to the quality of hypotheses and hypothesis sets, imply that the 
DSM-III-R is preferable to both absence of classification and classification according 
to the CBCL, and this is sustained by the observation (in Chapter 5) that literature 
search for explanatory factors generally had more success in searches using DSM 
labels. Another suggestion is that diagnosticians represent their hypotheses as causal 
networks in order to focus on essential elements and to structure their reasoning. 
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Samenvatting 
Hoofdstuk 1 begint met een beschrijving van psychodiagnostiek. Psychodiagnostiek 
richt zich - kort gezegd - op verklaring van probleemgedrag met het oog op het 
opstellen van een behandelingsplan. Tegenwoordig wordt psychodiagnostiek door 
velen beschouwd als een gecompliceerd proces van oordeels- en besluitvorming. 
Hoewel diagnosten doorgaans vertrouwen hebben in de kwaliteit van hun werkzaam-
heden, blijkt dat klinische oordelen dikwijls zijn vertekend, dat wil zeggen afwijken 
van wat op rationele gronden kan worden verwacht. Om de kwaliteit van de 
psychodiagnostiek te verbeteren, zijn er verschillende modellen ontwikkeld die het 
proces van diagnostische besluitvorming beogen te sturen. Eén zo'n model is de 
diagnostische cyclus (De Bruyn, 1992). 
Het hier beschreven onderzoek werd uitgevoerd in het kader van de diagnostische 
cyclus. Dit model schrijn onder meer voor dat classificatie van problemen vooraf 
behoort te gaan aan het genereren van verklarende hypothesen voor die problemen. 
Welke effecten classificatie op hypothese-generatie heeft, is echter nog onduidelijk. 
In deze studie wordt getracht hierin verheldering te brengen. Daarnaast wordt 
onderzocht of alternatieve classificaties van hetzelfde probleemgedrag verschillende 
effecten hebben op diagnostische hypothesen. Deze vraag is ook relevant in verband 
met "framing"-effecten die dikwijls optreden in menselijk beslissingsgedrag en 
verwijzen naar het feit dat alternatieve structureringen van hetzelfde probleem kunnen 
leiden tot verschillende beslissingen. Twee van de meest invloedrijke classificatie-
systemen voor ontwikkelingspsychopathologie werden gebruikt in het onderzoek: de 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders (DSM-III-R) en het systeem 
gebaseerd op de Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL). Omdat de doelstellingen van deze 
studie betrekking hebben op de fasen "classificatie van probleemgedrag" en 
"hypothese-generatie" eindigt het eerste hoofdstuk met een bespreking van enige 
aspecten van classificatie (terminologie, voordelen en benaderingswijzen) en van 
diagnostische hypothesen (verklaringen, causaliteit en hypothese-generatie). 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt dieper ingegaan op de classificatiesystemen DSM-III-R en 
CBCL. In het eerste deel wordt een beschrijving van deze systemen gegeven. Daarna 
volgt een bespreking van verschillende formele uitgangspunten (op taxonomisch, 
taxonisch en klinisch attribuut-niveau) van psychopathologische classificatiesystemen 
in het algemeen en van de DSM-III-R en de CBCL in het bijzonder. Een belangrijk 
verschil tussen de DSM-III-R en de CBCL is de manier waarop zij zijn ontwikkeld, 
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namelijk op basis van respectievelijk klinische ervaring en statistische analyse. In het 
derde en belangrijkste deel van dit hoofdstuk wordt verslag gedaan van de bepaling 
van inhoudelijke correspondentie tussen 47 stoornissen uit de DSM-IH-R en alle 51 
schalen van de CBCL. Eerst werden, indien mogelijk, de symptomen en criteria van 
de DSM-III-R-stoomissen "vertaald" in CBCL-items. De CBCL-schalen en de 
"vertaalde" DSM-stoomissen werden vervolgens gerepresenteerd als geneste lijsten. 
Hierna werd een computerprogramma ontwikkeld voor de vergelijking van DSM-III-
R-stoomissen en CBCL-schalen. Een correspondentie tussen DSM-III-R- en CBCL-
syndromen werd vastgesteld wanneer het aantal gemeenschappelijke symptomen 
(d.w.z. de overlap) tenminste voldeed aan de afzonderlijke drempelwaarden. De 
gevonden correspondenties omvatten eenvoudige typen (tussen één DSM-III-R- en 
één CBCL-syndroom) en meer complexe typen, die laten zien dat dezelfde 
verzameling symptomen door de twee classificatiesystemen verschillend wordt 
gegroepeerd. Daarnaast bleken corresponderende DSM-III-R- en CBCL-syndromen 
te variëren in de mate van gelijkenis. 
Het voornaamste doel van de bepaling van inhoudelijke correspondenties tussen 
DSM-III-R-stoornissen en CBCL-schalen was het verschaffen van een basis voor de 
constructie van klinische casussen die in beide systemen classificeerbaar zijn en die 
konden worden gebruikt voor het onderzoek naar het effect van classificatie op 
hypothese-generatie. De casus-constructie is beschreven in het laatste deel van 
hoofdstuk 2 en - meer gedetailleerd - in de hoofdstukken 3 en 4. Zowel het 
correspondentietype als de mate van gelijkenis werden systematisch in de casuscon-
structie betrokken: twee casussen waren van het "één-op-één"-correspondentietype 
(één DSM-III-R-stoomis correspondeert met één CBCL-schaal); twee casussen waren 
van het "één-op-twee"-type (één DSM-III-R-stoomis correspondeert met twee CBCL-
schalen); en twee casussen waren van het "twee-op-één"-type (twee DSM-III-R-
stoomissen stemmen overeen met één CBCL-schaal). Voor elk paar casussen gold dat 
de mate van gelijkenis tussen de DSM-III-R- en de CBCL-syndromen in de ene casus 
sterk was en in de andere zwak. Ook werd de mate van casuscomplexiteit, een 
variabele waarvan bekend is dat zij hypothese-generatie in het medische domein 
beïnvloedt, in de casussen verwerkt. Het onderscheid tussen eenvoudige en complexe 
casussen werd (tentatief) gemaakt aan de hand van het correspondentietype. Casussen 
die volgens beide systemen worden geclassificeerd als één syndroom ("één-op-één"-
correspondenties) werden beschouwd als eenvoudige casussen. Casussen die volgens 
één van beide systemen worden geclassificeerd als meer dan één syndroom (in deze 
studie "één-op-twee"- en "twee-op-één"-correspondenties) werden beschouwd als 
complexe casussen. De feitelijke inhoud van de casussen werd gebaseerd op klinische 
dossiers en informatie van klinici. 
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Het voorafgaande leidde tot acht onderzoeksvragen die het onderwerp zijn van de 
hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5: (a) Heeft classificatie (op zich) effect op diagnostische 
hypothesen? (b) Hebben de DSM-III-R en de CBCL een verschillend effect op 
diagnostische hypothesen? (c) Heeft de complexiteit van de casus effect op 
diagnostische hypothesen? (d) Is er sprake van interactie tussen classificatie (op zich) 
en de complexiteit van de casus? (e) Is er sprake van interactie tussen het type 
classificatiesysteem (DSM-III-R versus CBCL) en de complexiteit van de casus? (f) 
Is er sprake van interactie tussen het type classificatiesysteem en het verschillend 
aantal syndromen dat door de systemen wordt geïdentificeerd? (g) Is er sprake van 
interactie tussen het type classificatiesysteem en de mate van gelijkenis tussen de 
syndromen die door de systemen worden geïdentificeerd? en (h) Is er sprake van 
(hogere orde) interactie tussen het type classificatiesysteem, het verschillend aantal 
syndromen dat door de systemen wordt geïdentificeerd en de mate van gelijkenis 
tussen de geïdentificeerde syndromen? 
Om deze vragen te beantwoorden werd een experiment uitgevoerd waarin 86 
diagnosten werd gevraagd hypothesen te genereren voor alle zes de casussen. De 
diagnosten werden verdeeld in een DSM-III-R-, een CBCL- en een controlegroep. 
In de DSM- en de CBCL-groepen werd aan de casussen een classificatie volgens het 
respectievelijke classificatiesysteem toegevoegd. In de controlegroep bleven de 
casussen ongeclassificeerd. 
In het experiment werden effecten op drie groepen afhankelijke variabelen 
bestudeerd, die worden besproken in de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5. De eerste groep 
(hoofdstuk 3) betrof descriptieve kenmerken van diagnostische hypothesen en bestond 
uit het aantal hypothesen, de minimum en maximum subjectieve probabiliteit, het 
aantal directe en indirecte factoren, de proportie samengestelde hypothesen en de 
proportie verklaringsketens. Statistische analyse bracht geen significante verschillen 
tussen de DSM-III-R- en de CBCL-groep aan het licht, zij het dat de maximum 
probabiliteit lager was in de CBCL-conditie, in het bijzonder in het geval van zwakke 
gelijkenis tussen de DSM- en de CBCL-syndromen. De maximum probabiliteit in de 
DSM-III-R- en de controlegroep was gelijk. Een effect van classificatie op zich bleek 
slechts in interactie met casuscomplexiteit: na classificatie van eenvoudige casussen 
werden hogere waarden waargenomen voor het aantal directe factoren en de proportie 
samengestelde hypothesen. Het tegenovergestelde deed zich voor bij complexe 
casussen. Een hoofdeffect van de mate van casuscomplexiteit hield in dat bij 
complexe casussen hogere waarden werden gevonden voor het aantal hypothesen, het 
aantal directe factoren en de proportie samengestelde hypothesen en lagere waarden 
voor het aantal indirecte factoren en de proportie verklaringsketens. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een overzicht gegeven van kenmerken van goede 
diagnostische hypothesen. De tweede groep van afhankelijke variabelen had 
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betrekking op een selectie van deze kwalitatieve criteria en omvatte de proportie 
factoren met mogelijke verklaringswaarde, de proportie redundantie, de operationali-
seerbaarheid en de mate van specificiteit; alle met betrekking tot directe factoren. Er 
werden geen verschillen gevonden tussen de CBCL- en de controlegroep. De DSM-
groep presteerde beter dan de controlegroep wat betreft de proportie mogelijke 
verklaringswaarde, de proportie redundantie en - in het geval van eenvoudige 
casussen - operationaliseerbaarheid. De DSM-IH-R-groep scoorde ook beter dan de 
CBCL-groep wat betreft de proportie mogelijke verklaringswaarde, in het bijzonder 
wanneer het aantal geïdentificeerde syndromen voor de CBCL twee bedroeg en voor 
de DSM-III-R één. Complexe casussen tenslotte, leverden hypothesen op die minder 
specifiek en operationaliseerbaar waren dan eenvoudige casussen. 
De derde groep afhankelijke variabelen (hoofdstuk 5) had betrekking op de 
inhoud van diagnostische hypothesen en bestond uit het aantal verschillende 
inhoudelijke domeinen dat voorkwam in de hypotheseverzamelingen en de minimale 
compleetheid van de hypotheseverzamelingen. Met betrekking tot de eerste variabele 
werd geconstateerd dat de controlegroep meer verschillende inhoudelijke domeinen 
naar voren bracht dan de twee classificatiecondities. Er werd geen verschil gevonden 
tussen de DSM-III-R- en de CBCL-groep, evenmin als tussen eenvoudige en 
complexe casussen. Wel werden vier interactie-effecten gevonden. De interactie 
tussen de mate van casuscomplexiteit en de CBCL- versus de controlegroep hield 
in dat beide groepen hetzelfde aantal inhoudelijke domeinen noemden bij eenvoudige 
casussen, terwijl in het geval van complexe casussen de controlegroep meer domeinen 
noemde. De interactie tussen de mate van casuscomplexiteit en de DSM-III-R-
versus de CBCL-groep hield in dat bij eenvoudige casussen het gemiddeld aantal 
genoemde domeinen in de DSM-III-R-groep kleiner was dan in de CBCL-groep, 
maar dat het tegenovergestelde zich voordeed bij complexe casussen. Daarnaast liet 
de interactie tussen de DSM-III-R- versus de CBCL-conditie en het "één-op-twee"-
versus het '4wee-op-één"-correspondentietype zien dat in beide groepen de 
identificatie van twee in plaats van één syndroom leidde tot afname van het aantal 
inhoudelijke domeinen. Tenslotte betrof de interactie tussen de DSM-III-R- versus 
de CBCL-classificatie en de mate van gelijkenis tussen de DSM- en de CBCL-
syndromen dat in het geval van sterk gelijkende syndromen de DSM-III-R-groep een 
kleiner aantal inhoudelijke domeinen noemde dan de CBCL-groep, terwijl het 
tegenovergestelde optrad bij minder gelijkende syndromen. De tweede afhankelijke 
variabele (de minimale compleetheid van de hypotheseverzamelingen) werd 
onderzocht in een pilot study, die de helft van de casussen betrof. Er werd geen 
duidelijke effect gevonden van classificatie op zich, noch van het type classificatie-
systeem. 
196 
SAMENVATTING 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een overzicht van de resultaten in tabelvorm gegeven. Het 
blijkt dat met uitzondering van onderzoeksvraag h, alle vragen positief konden 
worden beantwoord, hoewel de effecten vaak marginaal zijn. De mate van 
casuscomplexiteit (vraag c) beïnvloedde het grootste aantal afhankelijke variabelen 
(zeven). De effecten van casuscomplexiteit suggereren een verklaring in termen van 
cognitieve belasting. Geconcludeerd wordt verder dat effecten op hypothese-generatie 
niet zo zeer samenhangen met classificatie op zich, maar veeleer met het type 
classificatiesysteem dat wordt gebruikt. Met uitzondering van één (vooralsnog 
neutrale) afhankelijke variabele, betreffen de verschillen tussen de drie classificatie-
condities hogere en/of betere scores in de DSM-III-R- dan in de CBCL- en de 
controleconditie. Een verklaring voor de verschillende effecten van DSM-III-R- en 
CBCL-classificatie zou kunnen liggen in de verschillen in aard van de syndromen. 
De stoornissen zoals die worden beschreven in de DSM-III-R zijn gebaseerd op 
klinische ervaring en blijken (volgens ander onderzoek) vrij goed overeen te komen 
met de impliciete taxonomieën en de intuïtie van klinici. De schalen van de CBCL 
daarentegen zijn empirisch, via statistische analyse, geconstrueerd en blijken (volgens 
ander onderzoek) slechts in geringe mate overeen te stemmen met de intuïtieve 
categorieën van klinici. Daarnaast hebben de DSM-stoomissen een lange traditie, 
terwijl de CBCL-schalen redelijk nieuw zijn. Al met al kan worden gezegd dat de 
CBCL-schalen nogal ver af staan van de privé-taxonomieën van diagnosten en zij 
lijken daarom moeilijk hanteerbaar als uitgangspunt voor hypothese-generatie. Deze 
interpretatie kwam ook aan de orde in de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5. 
Verder wordt in hoofdstuk 6 de validiteit van het experiment besproken. Hierin 
komen ook resultaten aan de orde die consistent zijn met die van (heel) ander 
onderzoek, zoals het aantal gegenereerde hypothesen (tussen vier en vijf), het feit dat 
diagnosten onwillig waren probabiliteiten toe te kennen aan hun hypothesen en het 
feit dat in de hypotheseverzamelingen belangrijke hypothesen ontbraken. Tevens 
worden in hoofdstuk 6 suggesties voor verder onderzoek gedaan. Het proefschrift 
eindigt met de implicaties voor de praktijk van en het onderzoek op het terrein van 
de psychodiagnostiek. De resultaten, met name die betrekking hebben op de kwaliteit 
van de hypothesen en de hypotheseverzamelingen, houden in dat classificatie volgens 
de DSM-III-R te verkiezen is zowel boven het achterwege laten van classificatie als 
boven classificatie volgens de CBCL. Dit wordt ondersteund door de constatering (in 
hoofdstuk 5) dat literatuuronderzoek naar verklarende factoren doorgaans meer succes 
had wanneer op DSM-termen werd gezocht. Ook wordt aanbevolen dat diagnosten 
hun hypothesen weergeven als causale netwerken. Hierdoor wordt bevorderd dat zij 
zich concentreren op essentiële elementen en dat zij hun denken structureren. 
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